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ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF UKRAINIAN REFUGEES: A CASE
STUDY OF THE POLISH LABOUR MARKET

Relatore:

Chiar.mo Prof. Francesco Scervini

Correlatore:

Chiar.mo Prof. Pawel Kaczmarczyk

Tesi di laurea di Chiara Guidetti

Matricola n. 516085

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the economic integration of Ukrainian refugees into the Polish labour market, analysing both theoretical and empirical perspectives. These issues have gained particular significance following the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, which forced millions to flee their homes. Poland emerged as a key destination for displaced individuals, creating unprecedented challenges and policy responses in refugee integration. This thesis, therefore, provides insights into both the immediate and long-term effects of forced migration on the Polish labour market. It explores integration theories, critiques of traditional models, and international research on key labour market indicators to provide a comprehensive understanding of refugee employment dynamics. To establish historical context, the study first examines past migration patterns between Poland and Ukraine. It then focuses on key employment factors, such as education, language proficiency, prior work experience, and job characteristics, assessing their role in shaping labour market outcomes.

Based on 2022 and 2023 data, the research analyses over 7,000 cases using correlation and regression methods to identify employment determinants for both war refugees and economic migrants. The findings highlight both barriers and opportunities, revealing the critical factors influencing refugee job prospects and the challenges they face in achieving full labour market integration. By combining theory and empirical evidence, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of economic integration processes and their implications for refugee participation in Poland's workforce.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Russian aggression of Ukraine caused one of Europe's largest refugee movements in recent years and Poland has been one of the primary host countries. The large influx of refugees allows for an in-depth analysis of the factors influencing their economic integration into the labour market. This thesis aims to examine Ukrainian refugees' economic integration into the Polish labour market, their demographic and structural characteristics, and their reasons for migrating.

This thesis is a significant academic and personal experience, as I had the opportunity to conduct my research in Warsaw, Poland. Writing the thesis in collaboration with the University of Warsaw not only provided access to high-quality data¹ and expertise but also allowed me to understand the context in person. I chose to conduct this research abroad to better connect with the context of the study and deepen my understanding of the Polish labour market and migration policies. This experience was made possible by the Giovanni Manera Scholarship, which supported my stay and research efforts in Warsaw. The scholarship highlights the significance of this topic and underscores the importance of promoting international academic collaborations.

Supervised by Professor Francesco Scervini and in collaboration with Professor Pawel Kaczmarczyk, Director at the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw, this research benefits from access to microdata and mentorship in migration studies. This collaboration provides a solid basis for analysing the demographic and economic characteristics of Ukrainian refugees, the unique aspects of the Polish

¹ The data used in this paper is a result of the research project "Between Ukraine and Poland", supported by the Centre of Excellence in Social Sciences at the University of Warsaw (as part of the Excellence Initiative - Research University).

labour market, and the intricate relationship between these factors.

By adopting an outcome-centric approach, this thesis seeks to identify and analyse the key factors that influence labour market integration. The thesis seeks to provide valuable insights into the academic discussion on migration and labour markets while offering practical recommendations for policymakers. The collaboration with the University of Warsaw and the Centre of Migration Research ensures access to high-quality data and expertise, allowing for an in-depth analysis. This thesis aims to connect theoretical frameworks with empirical evidence, offering both academic insight and practical relevance in addressing the challenges of refugee integration.

To address the research focus, this thesis is guided by two primary research questions:

Q1: What individual characteristics influence the labour market participation of Ukrainian refugees in Poland?

This question seeks to identify how factors such as education, professional background, gender, family structure, language proficiency, and social networks shape the likelihood of employment among Ukrainian refugees in Poland. The analysis draws on theoretical frameworks like human capital theory and the aspirations-capabilities approach to examine these determinants.

Q2: How do migration motivations affect employment outcomes for Ukrainian refugees in Poland?

This question focuses on how factors such as pre-war economic migration, war-related displacement, and family reunification influence refugees' integration into the Polish labour market.

Based on these research questions, the study hypothesizes the following:

H1: Human Capital Hypothesis

Refugees with higher education levels, professional experience, and Polish language proficiency are more likely to secure employment in the Polish labour market. Conversely, limited language skills and a lack of transferable qualifications will reduce the likelihood of labour market participation.

H2: Family Structure Constraint Hypothesis

Refugees with caregiving responsibilities, such as young children or elderly dependents, are less likely to participate in the labour market due to time constraints and inadequate access to childcare or support services.

H3: Migration Motivation Hypothesis

War refugees who escape conflict and violence encounter greater obstacles to labour market integration than economic migrants. The circumstances of war often lead to psychological trauma, career interruptions, and difficulties in adapting to the host country's labour market, all of which hinder their employability. Additionally, factors such as language barriers, challenges in credential recognition, and caregiving responsibilities can further restrict their participation in the workforce.

The thesis is structured as follows:

- Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter presents the research questions, hypotheses, and objectives, highlighting labour market integration for Ukrainian refugees and outlining the thesis structure.

- Chapter 2: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches to Integration

This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the thesis, discussing key concepts such as human capital theory, multi-dimensional integration frameworks, and the aspirations-capabilities approach. It also reviews relevant empirical studies on migration and labour market integration, highlighting the unique challenges and opportunities faced by Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

- Chapter 3: Ukrainian Migration to Poland—Historical Contexts and Recent Trends

This chapter outlines historical migration patterns between Poland and Ukraine, examines recent trends, and analyses demographic shifts among post-2022 conflict refugees.

- Chapter 4: Data and Methods

This chapter details the datasets used for the analysis, including the 2022 and 2023 datasets from the Centre of Migration Research. It discusses the data sources, variables, and methods used for analysis, offering a detailed description of key demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, education, family structure, language proficiency, and employment status.

- Chapter 5: Drivers and Mechanisms of Labor Market Integration—The Case of Ukrainian War Refugees

This chapter presents the core empirical analysis, investigating the factors that influence the labour market integration of Ukrainian refugees. Using quantitative methods, it examines correlations between employment status and individual characteristics, migration motivations, and family constraints. The hypotheses are tested through regression models, including OLS and logit analyses, to determine the relative significance of various factors.

- Chapter 6: Conclusion

The final chapter summarizes the key findings of the study, reflecting on their implications for academic research and policy. It also discusses limitations and offers recommendations for future research and practical interventions to improve refugee labour market integration.

2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO INTEGRATION

This chapter establishes the theoretical and empirical framework for understanding integration, setting the stage for later analysis of Ukrainian refugees in Poland's labour market. A foundational discussion of "integration" is essential due to the varied and evolving interpretations of this concept in migration research. While integration has become a commonly used term, it remains inconsistently defined and difficult to operationalize. Researchers and policymakers rely on diverse frameworks, leading to varying understandings of "successful" integration, shaped by national contexts, periods, and the interests of scholars, policymakers, and immigrant communities (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016).

2.1 Theoretical Foundations of Integration

In the academic field, integration is seen as a state and a process, allowing static and dynamic perspectives to coexist. While commonly viewed as a two-way process of mutual adaptation between immigrants and the receiving society, there is also the acknowledgement that integration often reflects a power imbalance between the majority and minority groups, where the receiving society holds more influence over the process. As noted by Kaczmarczyk et al. (2020), researchers often leave definitions of integration intentionally open to accommodate the concept's inherent diversity, as seen in Penninx's (2005) broad definition of integration as "the process of becoming an accepted part of society." This ambiguity, while helpful for inclusivity, raises questions about what "accepted" truly means in different societal contexts (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2020; Penninx, 2005)

Scholars such as Ager and Strang (2008) offer operational frameworks

that identify core components of integration, yet stop short of explicitly defining the term itself, illustrating a tension between theoretical precision and practical applicability (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2020). This issue becomes especially apparent in the operationalization phase, where researchers must select specific indicators—often in the spheres of labour, education, health, and housing—to measure integration. This leads to variation, as researchers prioritize different dimensions and variables, like the labour market or social interactions, based on their focus and goals.

In European migration studies, integration is understood as a multidimensional process involving social, cultural, and economic aspects (Favell, 2010). Some view it as an ongoing process with no fixed “end state,” while others see it as a path toward upward mobility and, in some cases, citizenship. However, not all migrants seek a permanent settlement, raising questions about the desirability of universal integration (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2020). Definitions of economic integration vary across migration studies, ranging from full labour market access to the “catching up” approach, which is particularly prominent in the American tradition of migration research (Chiswick, 1978). This diversity is reflected in the academic literature, where frameworks often differ, remain implicit, or even contradict one another, requiring researchers to select approaches that align with their specific study objectives. For example, terms like “adaptation,” “inclusion,” and “participation” emphasize different aspects of integration, focusing either on an immigrant agency or structural constraints, each shaping the interpretation of the integration process (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2020).

Despite these complexities, integration—particularly economic integration—remains a central focus for both policymakers and

researchers. This chapter aims to review key theories of integration to propose a more refined definition of economic integration that will guide the following sections on labour market integration. Although the primary focus here is on economic integration, it remains essential to consider integration as a multi-layered process encompassing various aspects of immigrant participation in the host society, to provide a comprehensive analysis of Ukrainian refugees' experiences in Poland (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016; Kaczmarczyk et al., 2020).

2.1.1 Defining integration

Integration is understood as the process through which immigrants settle and engage with the host society, both in practical and social terms. Upon arrival, immigrants must secure housing, employment, education for their children, and access to healthcare. They also need to establish social and cultural connections with local communities, interacting with individuals, institutions, and social groups to gain recognition for their unique cultural identities. This process of integration is not one-sided; it involves changes within the host society, as population dynamics shift and new institutional frameworks are developed to address the political, social, and cultural needs of immigrants (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016).

The study of integration has a long history, beginning with the Chicago School of Urban Sociology in the early 20th century. Early studies primarily focused on examining migration patterns from Europe to cities in the United States. During this period, the concept of assimilation emerged, referring to the concentration of immigrant groups in specific areas and, more importantly, the process by which these communities adopted the cultural and social behaviours of the native population (Chiurco & Criscuolo, 2019).

According to the assimilation model in the United States, immigrants were expected to settle into the lower levels of the social hierarchy and take on jobs that native populations found undesirable. The process of integration was believed to involve immigrants learning the language, adopting cultural norms, and abandoning the customs and traditions of their countries of origin, ultimately identifying fully with the host society. This understanding of assimilation aligns with the functionalist approach, with Parsons being a key proponent. From a functionalist perspective, social integration is crucial for maintaining internal cohesion in a system. This integration occurs through the internalization of norms by all individuals, ensuring social coherence and solidarity. It facilitates the coordination of various system components, allowing for a balanced relationship between them (Chirco & Criscuolo, 2019). The Parsons' model, therefore, advocates for the homogenization of society to reduce conflict stemming from diversity. From this viewpoint, diversity is considered a problem to be resolved because it is believed to lead to social tension. This suggests that the concept of integration, as presented in this context, is rooted in a particular view of society, where heterogeneity is assumed but seen as dysfunctional. The solution, according to this perspective, is the internalization of shared values and norms (Chirco & Criscuolo, 2019).

The assimilation model in the United States can be understood within the historical and socio-economic context of the time. In the early stages of immigration to the U.S., large numbers of immigrants arrived in a rapidly industrializing society. The country needed a cheap labour force to fill the lower-tier jobs in manufacturing, agriculture, and services. For many, the notion of "Americanization" was seen as a pragmatic solution, ensuring that immigrants would integrate into the

labour force while also adapting to the values and norms of American society. This assimilation model thus seemed rational, as it aimed to create a homogeneous, stable society that could efficiently integrate newcomers while maintaining social order and minimizing potential tensions that could arise from cultural differences. Moreover, the U.S. was largely focused on economic growth and industrialization during this period, which reinforced the idea that assimilation would benefit both immigrants (by providing them with opportunities) and the broader society (by maintaining social cohesion and economic productivity) (Collins, 2020).

Europe also embraced this view as it sought to manage the rise of migration processes in the 1950s and 1960s. In the early years, and sometimes even today, migration policies have often prioritized maintaining national identity and integrity, overlooking the actual needs and perspectives of immigrants. Social changes have frequently been set aside in favour of preserving national culture, leading to migration policies that lacked a forward-looking approach. As a result, several "ideal types" of integration have emerged in Europe, reflecting the experiences of countries like France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. While these models do not always reflect real-world conditions, they help to explain the general approaches to integration in society. The European assimilation model, for example, is exemplified by France, which, after decolonization, saw large migration flows from its former colonies (Sayad et al., 2002).

The French model eventually leaves migrants in a state of “double absence,” a term coined by Algerian sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad to describe the condition where migrants are only partially detached from their country of origin while also being only partially integrated into the host country. This situation arises from the forms of exclusion migrants

face, which result in an experience that is not truly integration. As one Algerian worker interviewed by Sayad puts it, “They want us to become French, but at the same time, they make it clear that we will never fully belong. This is what they call integration” (Sayad et al., 2002).

In the 1980s, British immigration and integration policies took a unique path, contrasting sharply with the French model. While France emphasized a unified "Republican" approach based on universalism, Britain focused on race relations, ethnic minorities, and multiculturalism, influenced by its colonial history and relationship with the Commonwealth (Favell, 1998). Later, the United Kingdom adopted a contrasting pluralist or multicultural approach, allowing ethnic communities to preserve their cultural identities while maintaining functional coexistence within a democratic society. This moves toward a more liberal model balanced multicultural inclusion with social cohesion, reflecting a shift away from rigid assimilation models (Catarci, 2014).

Britain's approach to immigration and integration in the post-World War II era was pragmatic and segmented, balancing strict immigration controls with progressive race relations policies. This dual approach saw immigration laws evolve alongside race relations legislation aimed at fostering social harmony. The Race Relations Act of 1976, building on earlier laws, sought to reduce racial discrimination and tensions, framing Britain as a multicultural society. Following World War II, Britain maintained relatively open immigration for Commonwealth citizens, institutionalized by the 1948 Nationality Act. However, race riots in 1958 led to a shift in public opinion, prompting tighter immigration controls starting with the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. By the 1970s, Britain focused on racial integration while maintaining restrictive immigration policies. The 1971

Immigration Act further limited immigration to close relatives, and the 1981 Nationality Act introduced a tiered citizenship system, signalling a move away from the open Commonwealth policy to a more restrictive approach (Favell, 1998).

France's integration model focused on a unified national identity, while Britain's approach emphasized multiculturalism within controlled borders. Britain separated immigration control from race relations, fostering integration while managing entry and citizenship. British citizenship was seen as part of a community-based national identity, reflecting ideals of social order, cultural diversity, and mutual tolerance, as articulated by Roy Jenkins. British race relations policies aimed to address racial discrimination and social inequalities. The Race Relations Board, established by the 1965 Act, sought to reduce prejudice and support non-discriminatory practices. This pragmatic approach helped Britain manage cultural diversity without challenging its broader national identity, focusing on social order rather than full cultural integration. In the 1980s, Britain's immigration and integration policies balanced strict border controls with a progressive race relations framework, in contrast to France's more unified approach to citizenship and integration (Favell, 1998).

Over time, critiques emerged against the assumption that immigrants must conform entirely to the host society's dominant cultural norms, as seen in both the U.S. and European models. In the U.S., immigrants were expected to align with the middle-class, white Protestant norms, while in Europe, national language, culture, and traditions often set the standard for integration (Penninx & Garcés-Mascreñas, 2016). This created a framework that did not fully account for the cultural diversity brought by migrants.

Earlier studies framed integration as a linear, one-way process, but contemporary scholars challenge this view, suggesting that integration is more complex and non-linear. Scholars now advocate for a disaggregated approach to integration, focusing on multiple domains—such as work, education, and social networks—that recognize the dynamic nature of host societies influenced by immigration (Favell, 2003). In discussing integration, Favell highlights the concepts of assimilation and integration as leading frameworks that explore the settlement, interaction, and social change following immigration. Although assimilation and integration have shifted politically over time, both terms remain central in public policy and academic discourse. Favell traces their roots to Durkheimian sociology, where they are understood as fundamental for achieving societal cohesion through the socialization of members. Favell points out that, especially in the U.S., assimilation often suggests that new immigrants should resemble mainstream middle- and upper-class norms as a path to societal success, a concept formalized by Gordon (1964) in his typology that emphasized structural assimilation—entry into labour and housing markets—as a critical element of immigrant success. However, critiques have emerged against the assimilationist perspective, particularly due to its tendency to impose majority norms on minority groups, often neglecting the possibility of cultural autonomy. In response, scholars argue for a model of integration that allows for a pluralist society, acknowledging both shared norms and the value of cultural diversity. This has led to the understanding of integration as a multi-dimensional process involving various fields—social, professional, and cultural—where immigrants engage with existing systems while contributing to their transformation (Favell, 2003).

Scholars like Heckmann (2003) focus on integration as a process of inclusion into existing social systems and emphasize that this engagement occurs across multiple fields—social, professional, cultural and identificational integration. Structural integration involves gaining rights and access to key institutions such as the labour market, education, and housing. Cultural integration, seen as a precondition for participation, entails cognitive, cultural, and behavioural changes, though Heckmann emphasizes that this is a mutual process that also reshapes the host society. Social integration refers to immigrants' membership within private relationships and groups, such as friendships, marriages, and associations. Finally, identificational integration involves immigrants' feelings of belonging and identification with the host society. Heckmann argues that integration results from both individual choices and politically supported integration policies, including specific (direct) measures aimed at immigrants and general (indirect) policies that promote inclusion within the national system. This layered approach underscores the need for policies that consider these multiple dimensions to facilitate meaningful integration across different aspects of society (Heckmann & Schnapper, 2003).

In conclusion, while older concepts like assimilation have evolved, integration remains a contested and evolving concept. It continues to be redefined to better account for the diversity of migrant experiences and the dynamic transformations within host societies (Penninx & Garcés-Masareñas, 2016).

To better understand the current and more comprehensive view of integration, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides a widely accepted definition that captures its complexity in contemporary migration studies. The IOM defines integration as “the

two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural, and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion” (UN, 2019). This definition emphasizes that integration is a bidirectional process with shared responsibilities for both newcomers and host societies. While this interpretation is fundamental to contemporary views on integration, it hasn’t always been the prevailing perspective. The IOM definition further clarifies that integration does not necessarily imply permanent residence but does involve considering the rights and obligations of migrants and host societies. It also includes access to essential services, the labour market, and adherence to shared values that connect migrants and the host community to a common purpose.

In the specific context of refugees, however, local integration as a durable solution suggests “permanent settlement in a country of first asylum, and eventually being granted nationality of that country” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); et al., 2006). This distinction highlights how integration, while generally adaptable to various migration situations, may have unique implications and requirements in cases involving refugee populations.

2.1.2 Frameworks for Analysing Immigrant Integration

In understanding the integration of Ukrainian refugees into the Polish labour market, it is essential to recognize that integration is shaped by interactions between two primary parties: the immigrants and the host society. Each group has distinct roles and influences on the integration process, though they are not equal. The receiving society, with its established structures and institutional power, typically holds greater

influence in determining integration outcomes (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016).

(Penninx, 2005) highlights that integration involves two fundamentally unequal actors: the immigrant population, with varying backgrounds and capacities for adaptation, and the receiving society, which holds structural and institutional control. The receiving society's expectations, norms, and institutional arrangements typically carry more weight in determining integration outcomes, as it controls policy formation and implementation. This imbalance often results in integration policies shaped by the political preferences of the host society, potentially creating a “lopsided” relationship. Policies may reflect the priorities of the host society rather than being co-developed with immigrant communities, limiting opportunities for reciprocal negotiation.

Both studies we are analysing categorize integration across three interconnected levels:

- Individual Level: At this level, integration considers immigrants' engagement across legal, socio-economic, and cultural-religious dimensions. Legally, individuals' immigration status affects their access to work, housing, healthcare, and education, directly influencing their ability to integrate. Socio-economically, labour market participation is key, as employment fosters economic independence and social connections. For Ukrainian refugees in Poland, having access to the labour market under the EU's Temporary Protection Directive (2024) offers an immediate path to participation (Duszczyk et al., 2024). Culturally and religiously, immigrants' practices and values shape how they integrate into the social fabric, influenced by the level of

acceptance they receive from host society members. The host society's openness to diverse cultural practices significantly affects the depth of integration at the individual level (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016).

- **Organizational Level:** Immigrant and host society organizations play pivotal roles in facilitating or obstructing integration. For instance, immigrant organizations may provide essential support networks, advocacy, or resources to help refugees navigate local systems. Host society organizations, such as NGOs, community centres, and trade unions, may offer additional support. In Germany, for example, NGOs helped guest workers integrate into society long before government policies explicitly supported their inclusion. In Poland, local NGOs, community organizations, and labour unions could play similar roles in supporting Ukrainian refugees by providing job training, language courses, or social services that ease entry into the workforce (Penninx & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2016).
- **Institutional Level:** Institutions such as the labour market, education, and healthcare systems influence integration by setting structural boundaries that define opportunities for immigrants. These institutions, while ostensibly serving the entire population, may have culturally embedded norms and practices that inadvertently disadvantage newcomers. In Poland, the education system and employment services, for example, may require cultural adjustments to be fully accessible to Ukrainian refugees. Immigrant-specific institutions, often rooted in the private sphere (such as cultural centres or community organizations), can offer services tailored to immigrant communities' needs. Over time, these institutions

may become accepted parts of the host society's public life, as seen with churches, trade unions, or ethnic community centres across Europe. However, these immigrant-specific institutions sometimes remain marginalized or excluded, limiting their impact (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016).

These levels are interdependent, creating a dynamic, multi-faceted integration process. Institutions shape organizational capacity by determining resources and legal frameworks, while organizations advocate for policies and provide services that directly impact individual integration experiences. For instance, labour market policies might enable NGOs to offer job placement programs or career counselling for Ukrainian refugees, enhancing their integration. Although the receiving society's structural power often prevails, immigrant communities can collectively mobilize to influence both organizational practices and institutional structures (Penninx, 2005). This interconnectivity highlights the layered nature of integration. Institutional structures set the framework within which organizations function, while organizations directly shape individuals' opportunities. Despite an uneven power distribution, individuals can sometimes drive change within organizations and institutions, reflecting the dynamic and reciprocal nature of integration (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016).

Finally, Penninx (2005) emphasizes the importance of time in integration processes, noting that integration is a long-term journey, especially for individuals who have migrated as adults. While cognitive adjustments (e.g., learning new societal norms) may occur relatively quickly, shifts in deeper cultural and normative values often take more time. The experience of the second generation is notably different; they navigate a dual socialization process, balancing their families' cultural

heritage with the norms and values of the host society. This generational dynamic often becomes a crucial test of the effectiveness of integration policies, as the success of second-generation immigrants can reflect broader societal acceptance and the inclusivity of institutional arrangements.

In conclusion, labour market integration is shaped by a complex interplay of individual, organizational, and institutional factors, with host country policies and societal attitudes playing a decisive role. While migrants actively navigate this process, structured policy frameworks and support networks—including both immigrant and host society organizations—significantly influence integration outcomes. This underscores the multi-layered nature of economic integration, where both structural conditions and individual agency intersect (Garcés-Masareñas & Penninx, 2016; Penninx, 2005).

2.1.3 Understanding the Layers of Integration: A Multi-Dimensional Framework

Integration, as defined by Ager and Strang (2008), is a "dynamic process that allows migrants to participate and feel accepted within society." Their influential framework identifies eight key domains that provide a comprehensive understanding of integration: legal status, employment, education, health, social relationships, political participation, housing, and language skills. This multi-dimensional model is critical because it recognizes that integration is not merely about securing legal status or employment, but also involves the ability to develop social connections, access essential services, and engage with broader societal processes. Ager and Strang (2008) argue that successful integration requires not only economic participation but also social inclusion and cultural acceptance. This highlights that integration is a two-way process, where the host society must also play an active

role in welcoming and including migrants. Central to their framework is the idea that integration is context-dependent, shaped by both the migrant's actions and the policies and structures of the receiving society. This nuanced view acknowledges that integration is dynamic, and migrants can experience different levels of inclusion in various domains depending on the support systems available to them (Ager & Strang, 2008). While Penninx and Garcés-Mascreñas (2016) define integration as "the process of becoming an accepted part of society," Ager and Strang expand this definition by specifying the concrete domains through which this process occurs. Their model provides clear indicators for evaluating integration, allowing for empirical analysis and offering actionable insights for policy interventions. They emphasize the importance of language skills and social relationships as foundational elements for broader integration. Language acquisition enables migrants to access employment, healthcare, and education, while social relationships are crucial for fostering a sense of belonging and community.

Figure 1 - The Domains of Immigrant Integration Source: Ager and Strang (2008)



In addition, Ager and Strang (2008) argue that political participation is

a key component of integration, as it reflects migrants' ability to engage with and influence the host society. This participation goes beyond voting rights to include active involvement in civic life, such as community organizing or participation in local governance. Political integration, they suggest, is not limited to legal citizenship but involves the degree to which migrants can shape the policies that affect their daily lives. This process is vital, as it can strengthen social cohesion and help combat exclusionary policies that might otherwise marginalize migrants.

The legal-political dimension, as discussed by Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016), also fits well within the Ager and Strang (2008) framework. Ager and Strang highlight that legal recognition—such as having legal status or access to citizenship—is crucial for enabling other forms of integration. However, they go a step further by suggesting that social integration can also occur even without full legal rights, as long as there are pathways for participation in key areas such as housing, employment, and social networks.

The socio-economic dimension in Ager and Strang's model focuses on migrants' access to resources like employment, education, and housing, which are critical for their long-term success and integration. They emphasize that economic participation alone is insufficient without social support mechanisms. For example, access to affordable housing is necessary for migrants to establish stable lives and build community ties, while education allows them to improve their skills and better integrate into the labour market. Importantly, Ager and Strang also recognize that migrants who face discrimination or limited access to opportunities may struggle to advance socio-economically, even when their legal status is secured (Ager & Strang, 2008).

The cultural-religious dimension, also addressed by Ager and Strang, underscores the importance of fostering mutual understanding and acceptance between migrants and host societies. The authors stress that cultural integration involves negotiating identities—where migrants are allowed to maintain their cultural practices while also adapting to national norms. This aspect of integration requires both individual and societal efforts, as Ager and Strang highlight that integration is a two-way process. The migrant community must feel empowered to retain their cultural identities, but they must also navigate the host society's expectations regarding shared values and norms. Ager and Strang (2008) particularly note the importance of shared values such as gender equality, democracy, and the rule of law, which underpin cultural integration. However, they acknowledge that tensions often arise when cultural practices conflict with these values, leading to challenges in integration, particularly in multicultural settings.

Cultural integration is increasingly seen as essential alongside socio-economic integration, highlighting the importance of shared values for fostering mutual understanding within society. Unlike socio-economic indicators, which focus on employment and housing, measuring cultural integration requires a more nuanced approach due to the varying cultural values across countries and communities. Although core European values like democracy, gender equality, and the rule of law are widely recognized, their interpretations can differ significantly among EU Member States. A central challenge in cultural integration is balancing adherence to these societal values with the multicultural ideal that allows migrants to maintain their cultural identities. Issues like gender equality illustrate this tension, as cultural norms in some migrant communities may conflict with rights related to employment and personal choice for women. While employment rates among

migrant women can indicate cultural integration, this measure must be considered carefully due to influences like discrimination and childcare availability (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003).

According to Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003), cultural integration also involves examining whether the receiving society accommodates these differences. Two common approaches are:

- Assimilationist Societies: Where diversity is less accepted, and immigrants are expected to conform to the dominant culture.
- Pluralistic Societies: Where cultural diversity is embraced, and immigrants' identities are considered valuable to society.

Societies often fall between these extremes, sometimes allowing diversity privately but expecting conformity publicly. In many countries, there is a distinction between the private and public spheres of integration. While immigrants may be encouraged to preserve their cultural practices and identities privately, they may face pressure to conform to the dominant culture in public spaces such as the workplace, education, and civic life. This can lead to a situation where cultural diversity is tolerated in private settings, but public expectations require adherence to national norms and values, such as language use and gender equality (Penninx & Garcés-Masareñas, 2016).

Ager and Strang (2008) also stress that social relationships—particularly within migrant communities—are central to integration. Social networks, including friendships, family ties, and connections within the wider community, enable migrants to access crucial information and resources and often play a key role in employment opportunities and housing arrangements. Social networks also foster social capital, which is integral to social mobility and integration. For

example, migrants with strong social networks are more likely to be able to navigate challenges related to discrimination or housing availability. Importantly, Ager and Strang (2008) highlight that successful integration is contingent upon the openness of the host society. Migrant groups often face challenges when host societies are unwilling to accept cultural diversity or offer equal opportunities. When host societies embrace diversity and ensure equitable participation, migrants experience better outcomes across all domains of integration. This idea mirrors the findings of Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003), who emphasize that policies promoting equal access to social and economic resources are critical for ensuring integration.

Together, these frameworks suggest that integration is not a singular process but a multi-dimensional, interactive one. Successful integration requires concerted efforts from both migrants and host societies across a range of domains, including legal rights, economic participation, and social relationships. For Ukrainian refugees in Poland, Ager and Strang's framework offers an invaluable lens for understanding how their integration might progress across multiple domains, particularly language acquisition, access to healthcare, and the ability to form social networks, all of which are critical for long-term socio-economic participation and societal acceptance (Ager & Strang, 2008).

The three integration dimensions are deeply interconnected, with each influencing the others. For example, the legal-political dimension can shape socio-economic and cultural-religious integration. Immigrants lacking legal status often struggle to find stable employment or access public services, which limits their socio-economic participation. Cultural biases in the host society may also affect economic opportunities, even when formal rights are granted. Exclusionary policies reinforce perceptions of immigrants as outsiders, restricting

integration opportunities. While each integration domain can be studied individually, they frequently overlap and are difficult to separate. For instance, migrants limited educational attainment and language proficiency can reduce their labour market participation, but this may also stem from discriminatory practices. Similarly, some migrant communities may distance themselves from mainstream society to maintain their cultural identity, which can affect individual job prospects and housing quality, and contribute to school segregation (Ager & Strang, 2008).

Efforts to improve immigrant labour market participation can influence public attitudes toward migrants, sometimes positively—such as when fewer rely on social services—and sometimes negatively if they are viewed as competitors or recipients of preferential treatment. These examples underscore the complexities of integration, demonstrating that no single indicator can fully capture its multifaceted nature (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003).

2.1.4 Rethinking Integration: Critiques and Alternatives in Migration Discourse

The concept of integration is inherently complex, often framed as a one-sided process where migrants adapt to a pre-existing society. Critics argue that this perspective carries exclusionary implications, as it suggests assimilation rather than mutual adaptation. To address these concerns, scholars have introduced terms like "inclusion" and "incorporation," which emphasize collaborative integration models and seek to counteract the social exclusion of marginalized groups (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016).

Expanding on these critiques, Adrian Favell (2022) highlights a shift in migration studies—from optimistic integration narratives in liberal democracies to critical perspectives that examine racism, global

inequality, and the structural limitations of these democracies in managing migration. He advocates for a "political demography" approach, which incorporates post-colonial and critical race theories to challenge "methodological nationalism" and encourage a broader, transnational perspective on migration. Favell further argues that traditional migration frameworks, centred on immigration, integration, and citizenship, operate in a racialized hierarchy that reinforces global capitalist structures, necessitating a reevaluation of how migrants' agency is understood within migration studies (Favell, 2022).

In my thesis, Favell's critique helps contextualize and analyse integration frameworks by revealing the racial and economic inequalities often overlooked in mainstream policies. By integrating these critical perspectives, I aim to underscore the complexities of integration beyond standard models, acknowledging how policies can sometimes perpetuate inequities. This approach enriches the analysis of Ukrainian refugees' experiences in Poland, offering a deeper understanding of the socio-political dynamics at play.

Schinkel's critique challenges the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the concept of immigrant integration. In *Against 'Immigrant Integration': for an End to Neocolonial Knowledge Production* (2018), Schinkel argues that the notion of integration presupposes an "ideal" national subject and a cohesive national culture, framing immigrants as external entities needing adaptation. This framework upholds a neocolonial knowledge paradigm that categorizes migrants as outsiders to be assimilated, denying the inherent diversity and historical complexities of modern nation-states (Schinkel, 2018).

Schinkel's analysis is rooted in a post-colonial critique of social science methodologies, where he argues that the discourse on integration marginalizes immigrant communities by placing the "burden" of integration on them. Treating integration as a measurable, outcome-

based process risks framing migrants as subjects to be moulded in line with an idealized version of the host society, often excluding migrant perspectives. This reinforces societal power imbalances and ignores the bidirectional nature of integration. Schinkel questions why societal adaptation or transformation is rarely included in integration policies and advocates for a shift in discourse that recognizes how migrant communities contribute to societal evolution (Schinkel, 2018).

Moreover, Schinkel emphasizes that traditional integration metrics often ignore structural barriers faced by migrants, such as systemic discrimination in employment and housing. By framing integration as a one-sided process, institutions neglect the need for reciprocal societal change, potentially perpetuating cycles of marginalization. This contrasts with more dynamic models of integration, where both migrants and host societies undergo adaptation, challenging the idea of a static, “pure” national identity. Schinkel calls for an epistemological shift away from metrics of integration and towards fostering spaces for migrants’ self-expression and participation in shaping social norms. He advocates for research methodologies that reflect the realities of migrant lives and structural inequalities. His critique suggests that integration frameworks should prioritize inclusivity and reject outdated notions of cultural assimilation, offering a roadmap for more equitable policy frameworks that support a pluralistic understanding of societal change (Schinkel, 2018).

By integrating Schinkel’s critique with Entzinger and Biezeveld’s (2003) work on benchmarking integration, we gain a more nuanced perspective. While Entzinger and Biezeveld highlight the limitations of benchmarking in capturing the complexities of integration, Schinkel’s critique deepens this by pointing out how traditional metrics ignore structural inequalities such as discrimination in housing and employment. This view challenges the notion of integration as a static

process and emphasizes that it should be seen as an ongoing, reciprocal interaction that requires both migrants and host societies to change. Schinkel's insights suggest that integration policies should move beyond assimilation and address the structural barriers that prevent true integration, offering a vision of integration as an open-ended, dynamic process where both migrants and the host society contribute to shaping a more inclusive and equitable future (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Schinkel, 2018).

2.2 Empirical Insights from the Literature

2.2.1 Empirical background

The economic integration of migrants, whether voluntary or involuntary, is analysed through key frameworks: assimilation theory and segmented assimilation. Assimilation theory (Chiswick, 1978) suggests migrants follow a U-shaped career progression in their new country, initially working below their qualifications but advancing as they adjust. This theoretical framework examines the economic assimilation of foreign-born individuals, focusing on their earnings progression relative to native populations. Key factors affecting earnings include country of origin, time in the host country, and citizenship status. Initially, foreign-born individuals tend to earn less than natives but show significant wage growth over time. Factors such as language acquisition, adaptation to the host labour market, and investments in local job-relevant skills contribute to higher mobility and earnings growth, often allowing them to close the initial wage gap within several years. Educational background and pre-migration work experience play significant roles as well. For instance, schooling from countries with similar languages or educational systems to the host country results in higher earnings returns. However, those from countries with non-aligned languages or distinct economic contexts

may see lower returns due to perceived differences in skill relevance and education quality. Citizenship alone does not significantly affect earnings once the duration in the host country is controlled, but individuals from economically disadvantaged regions often face distinct wage challenges (Górny & Van Der Zwan, 2024).

Chiswick (1978) argues that high motivation, adaptability, and investment in skills often enable foreign-born workers to achieve wage parity or even an advantage over natives over time. This process suggests that self-selection in migration, combined with a willingness to invest in local human capital, enhances labour market outcomes for foreign-born individuals in the long term.

Chiswick's analysis indicates that, on average, foreign-born adult white men earn about 1% less than native-born individuals, although their weekly earnings can be higher by 3% after controlling for variables such as education and work experience (Chiswick, 1978). This highlights that foreign-born individuals often begin with lower earnings, but their wages tend to rise significantly over time due to various factors such as language acquisition, adaptation to the host labour market, and investments in local job-relevant skills. Over time, many foreign-born workers close the initial wage gap, achieving parity or even exceeding native earnings after 10 to 15 years in the host country. For instance, after 20 years, the earnings of foreign-born individuals can be approximately 6% higher than their native counterparts, underscoring the importance of sustained investment in human capital (Chiswick, 1978).

On the other hand, segmented assimilation (Friberg & Midtbøen, 2019) argues that migrants often remain in secondary, lower-paid jobs with limited upward mobility, especially in sectors with a strong secondary

labour market segment where migrants take on roles less favoured by native workers.

In *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies*, Piore (1979) challenges the conventional economic view that migration is primarily a response to wage differentials. Instead, he argues that migration is largely driven by active recruitment from industries in wealthier countries, which require workers for positions often avoided by native populations. This process leads to the formation of a "dual labour market", where stable, unionized jobs are reserved for locals, while migrants fill temporary, low-wage positions. Many migrants initially view their stay as short-term, aiming to save money and eventually return home. When they remain, Piore notes, they shift from a complementary to a competitive role, altering workforce dynamics. He also reinterprets U.S. migration history, suggesting industry replaced European migrants with Southern Black labour when legislation restricted European migration. Piore concludes that industry demand, rather than source-country development, is the key driver of migration flows (Alonso, 1981).

Migrant employment clustering in particular low-wage sectors, or niches, arises from various structural factors. High volumes of migrants arriving in a short timeframe often push them into lower-tier jobs, with migrant social networks guiding them to roles already held by earlier arrivals. For example, as we are going to see from the data, many Ukrainian migrants to Poland have concentrated in sectors like construction, domestic work and agriculture.

The concept of immigrant niche formation, as discussed by Friberg and Midtbøen (2017), explores how immigrants dominate specific employment sectors through three theoretical approaches:

- Supply-Side Approach: This focuses on the role of social networks within immigrant communities that facilitate job

access and training. These networks provide valuable social capital, aiding both immigrants in finding work and employers in recruiting trustworthy candidates. However, this perspective does not fully explain how these niches initially form.

- Demand-Side Approach: This perspective focuses on employer preferences for immigrant workers, who are often perceived as more adaptable and less demanding than native workers. Ethnic stereotypes influence hiring decisions, leading to the clustering of immigrants in specific job sectors.
- Structural Approach: This approach examines broader labour market dynamics, emphasizing how labour shortages in low-wage industries emerge as native-born workers pursue higher-status employment. Immigrants subsequently fill these gaps, a pattern reinforced by cumulative causation, which perpetuates their concentration in particular occupational niches.

Together, these approaches provide a comprehensive understanding of how structural, demand-driven, and social factors contribute to labour market segmentation based on ethnicity (Friberg & Midtbøen, 2019).

A key factor in escaping these migrant niches is human capital, such as local language skills and specific qualifications, which play a critical role in enabling migrants to move up professionally. Permanent migrants are more likely to invest in these skills, which enhance their long-term integration, while temporary migrants, focused on short-term earnings, are more likely to stay within niche roles (Chiswick, 1978). Humanitarian migrants are unique in that they often plan for long-term residence due to limited prospects for safe return, despite facing initial challenges such as fewer transferable skills, lack of language proficiency, and minimal pre-arrival preparation. As a result, they often experience a pronounced “entry effect”, starting in the lowest rungs of

both general and migrant-specific job markets. However, many humanitarian migrants eventually show a “catching-up” effect as they acquire host-country skills, particularly where legal stability and integration programs support them (Friberg & Midtbøen, 2017).

In essence, the economic integration of migrants is influenced by migration motivations, intended length of stay, and access to resources like language training and skills. These aspects, combined with demographic factors, create complex trajectories for migrants, shaping both their opportunities and contributions to labour markets in their new countries (Górny & Van Der Zwan, 2024).

2.2.2 Integrating Refugees into the Labor Market

The economic integration of humanitarian migrants is typically assessed using indicators such as employment status and earnings. However, research focusing on legal employment status and occupational specialization remains relatively limited (Górny & Van der Zwan, 2024).

Phillip Connor explores the challenges refugees face compared to other immigrant groups in the US, addressing the "refugee gap" in employment likelihood, occupational levels, and earnings. Despite similar overall employment rates (88-90%), refugees are less likely to occupy skilled positions (25.6% vs. 41.7% for non-refugees) due to lower education and English proficiency. Refugees earn an average of \$11.71 per hour, significantly less than the \$17.66 earned by non-refugee immigrants. This wage disparity is influenced by factors such as education, family dynamics, health, and neighbourhood characteristics. Addressing these barriers is crucial for enhancing the economic integration of refugees, highlighting the need for targeted interventions in education and language skills to help them achieve better economic outcomes (Connor, 2010).

Research shows that humanitarian migrants often occupy lower positions in the labour market at their initial phase of migration, attributed to factors such as a lack of pre-migration preparation and limited choices regarding destination countries. They frequently concentrate in low-wage migrant niches, facing a wage penalty (Górny & Van der Zwan, 2024).

Brell, Dustmann, and Preston (2011) indicate that integrating refugees into the labour market of high-income countries is more challenging than for economic migrants due to differences in motivations, skills, and the integration process. Economic migrants move for job opportunities, arriving with relevant skills and language proficiency, while refugees often flee danger, which may leave them without economically advantageous skills. Refugees experience disruptions in education and work, leading to skill degradation, and may face psychological barriers from trauma. Their integration journey is divided into four phases—flight, journey, intermediate destinations, and arrival—each presenting a unique obstacle. During flight, refugees make quick decisions, often lacking the resources available to economic migrants.

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of refugee migration, with emphasis on the current refugee crisis. After first reviewing the institutional framework laid out by the Geneva Convention for Refugees, we demonstrate that, despite numerous attempts at developing a common European asylum policy, EU countries continue to differ widely in interpretation and implementation. We then describe key features of the current refugee crisis and document the overall magnitudes and types of refugee movements, illegal border crossings, and asylum applications to EU member states. We next turn to the economics of refugee migrations, contrasting economic and refugee

migrants, discussing the trade-offs between long-term asylum and temporary protection, and highlighting the economic advantages of increasingly coordinating the different national asylum policies. Finally, we illustrate the economic integration of past refugee migrants to EU countries and conclude with several policy recommendations (Brell et al., 2011). The findings from Dustmann et al. emphasize that, although initial barriers to employment are considerable, refugees' integration prospects improve over time. Employment rates for refugees show a marked improvement as they spend more time in the host country. Within the first three years, refugees are 50 percentage points less likely to be employed than natives due to legal restrictions during the asylum application process. However, this gap narrows significantly over 15 to 19 years and approaches zero after 25 years of residence, indicating a potential for successful long-term integration (Dustmann et al., 2017)

This catch-up effect arises from humanitarian migrants' motivation to invest in human capital in the host country (Cortes, 2004; Bakker et al., 2017), although long-term outcomes vary (Bratsberg et al., 2014). Integration processes are influenced by country-specific legal frameworks and support systems (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010; Bevelander & Pendakur, 2014; Lumley-Sapanski, 2021). Unlike many other refugee groups, Ukrainian refugees benefit from the EU Temporary Protection Directive, which grants them immediate access to the labour market upon arrival. However, despite this advantage, they may still face barriers such as discrimination and limited institutional support, which can hinder their labour market integration. Addressing these challenges requires targeted policies that focus on skill development, psychological support, and community engagement, ensuring that refugees receive the necessary resources to navigate the

labour market effectively.

Key factors affecting economic integration include ethnicity, social capital, gender, age, and household composition (Bratsberg et al., 2014; Dustmann et al., 2017). Female humanitarian migrants often face greater labour market challenges and gendered patterns of niching (Liebig & Tronstad, 2018; Perales et al., 2021). Additionally, younger migrants tend to accumulate host country-specific skills more rapidly (Bratsberg et al., 2014; Brell et al., 2020). Mental health issues can also serve as barriers to employment (De Vroome & Van Tubergen, 2010; Bakker et al., 2017; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2018).

The article "Mobility and Labor Market Trajectories of Ukrainian Migrants to Poland in the Context of the 2014 Russian Invasion of Ukraine" by Agata Górný and Van der Zwan (2023) examines Ukrainian migration to Poland before and after the 2014 Russian invasion, addressing research gaps in the economic integration of humanitarian migrants. By focusing on a single national group, the study considers cultural factors shaping labour market trajectories. It suggests that social and ethnic networks will direct newcomers into existing Ukrainian labour niches, while the rising migration inflow may also lead to the formation of new occupational niches. The authors propose that post-war migrants will undergo a "catching up effect," enabling them to move beyond traditional labour market niches more easily than pre-war migrants, as they are more inclined to invest in Poland-specific human capital (Górný & Van Der Zwan, 2024).

2.2.3. Indicators of Labor Market Integration: An OECD-Based Analysis

The integration of Ukrainian refugees into the Polish labour market can be effectively assessed through various indicators of immigrant integration outlined in the Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023

report by the OECD and the European Commission. These indicators provide a comprehensive framework for understanding the structural challenges and opportunities encountered by Ukrainian refugees. They include Educational Attainment, Access to Adult Education and Training, Language Proficiency, Employment and Labor Market Participation, Unemployment, Risks of Labor Market Exclusion, Involuntary Inactivity, Types of Contracts, Working Hours, Involuntary Part-Time, Job Skills, Overqualification, and Self-Employment.

For this study, the analysis will focus on the following indicators, as they are most relevant to assessing the labour market integration of Ukrainian refugees in Poland: Educational Attainment, Language Proficiency, Employment and Labor Market Participation, Unemployment, Job Skills, and Overqualification.

These selected indicators are key to understanding how individual characteristics such as education, language skills, and professional experience influence the labour market outcomes of Ukrainian refugees. In the subsequent analysis, I will explain each of these indicators in detail and explore how they contribute to the broader understanding of labour market integration.

1. Educational Attainment

Educational attainment is a critical factor influencing labour market outcomes. While high educational attainment does not solely guarantee successful integration, it is strongly associated with better labour market outcomes compared to low educational attainment. The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) divides educational attainment into three levels: i) low, no higher than lower-secondary (ISCED levels 0-2); ii) medium, upper-secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED Levels 3-4); iii) high, tertiary education

(ISCED Levels 5-8). While high educational levels typically correlate with better job opportunities, it is essential to assess how the educational qualifications of Ukrainian refugees compare to those of the native Polish workforce. Many Ukrainian refugees possess high levels of education; however, the recognition of their credentials remains a challenge, often leading to underemployment or overqualification (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

In the EU, 35% of immigrants are classified as low-educated, nearly double the rate of native-born individuals (20%). This disparity is particularly pronounced among non-EU migrants. The share of highly educated immigrants has risen, particularly among women; by 2020, 39% of recent EU migrants and 50% in the OECD held tertiary degrees. Notably, over half of these highly educated immigrants obtained their degrees abroad (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

2. Language Proficiency

Language proficiency in Polish plays a crucial role in labour market participation. Proficiency in the host country's language is vital for effective communication in the workplace. In the EU, 62% of immigrants report advanced proficiency in the host language, with rates varying significantly across countries. Language skills generally improve with longer residence in the host country. (OECD & European Commission, 2023). Many Ukrainian refugees face language barriers, which hinder their ability to find stable employment. The availability of language training programs can facilitate integration and improve employment prospects (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

3. Employment and Labor Market Participation

Employment and labour market participation rates provide insight into the economic engagement of Ukrainian refugees. Employment is a primary source of income for immigrants and is vital for their social

inclusion. The employment rate is defined as the share of 15–64-year-olds who, during the reference week, worked at least one hour or who had a job but were absent from work, while the participation/activity rate is the share of 15–64-year-olds who are active (employed and unemployed) (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

Despite strong labour demand in Poland, employment rates among Ukrainian refugees vary, influenced by factors such as prior work experience, education, and language proficiency. Understanding these dynamics is essential for identifying barriers to stable employment. Across the EU, 65% of immigrants are employed, compared to 69% of native-born workers. However, in several Central European countries, including Poland, immigrant employment rates exceed 70%. Immigrants now constitute 13% of the workforce in both the EU and OECD, yet employment disparities favouring native-born workers remain significant, particularly in Nordic countries (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

4. Unemployment

The unemployment rate, which is the percentage of unemployed individuals in the labour force (the sum of employed and unemployed individuals), highlights the challenges of entering the labour market, particularly in the context of discrimination and a lack of social networks. Long spells of unemployment rob immigrants of the opportunity to improve their language skills and socialize in the workplace (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

Immigrants in the EU face higher unemployment rates, averaging 12%, which is double that of natives. Factors contributing to these disparities include education levels and the duration of residence in the host country, with recent migrants often facing higher unemployment rates compared to those who have settled longer (OECD & European

Commission, 2023).

5. Job Skills

The job skills indicator compares shares of workers in low- and highly skilled jobs, categorized by the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

Immigrants are often overrepresented in low-skilled occupations, but with increasing education levels, the gap in highly skilled jobs has started to decrease. This indicator is critical for understanding the mismatch between the skills of Ukrainian refugees and the jobs available to them in Poland (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

In my study, these indicators will be used to assess the labour market outcomes of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, focusing on the barriers they face and the potential for their economic inclusion.

3. UKRAINIAN MIGRATION TO POLAND: HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND RECENT TRENDS

This chapter explores the evolution of Ukrainian migration to Poland, emphasizing its historical roots and the significant trends shaping the current landscape. It examines how shared histories, economic transitions, and geopolitical events have influenced migration patterns, and highlights the critical role of labour market policies in shaping these dynamics. By providing this context, the chapter aims to deepen understanding of the factors that facilitate or hinder the integration of Ukrainian migrants into Poland's workforce.

3.1 Historical and Early Migration Patterns

Migration from Ukraine to Poland has evolved significantly, driven by both historical ties and contemporary economic and political developments. With origins stretching back to the 14th century, the relationship between Poland and Ukraine has long been characterized by shared territories and population movements. Before World War II, five million Ukrainians lived in Polish territories, but forced displacement, border shifts, and ethnic policies during and after the war drastically reduced this number to 200,000. Following the war, many Ukrainians were resettled to the Soviet Union as part of population exchanges (Brunarska, Kindler, Szulecka, & Toruńczyk-Ruiz, 2016), while others were forcibly relocated to northern and western Poland during Operation Vistula in 1947, an effort by Polish authorities to suppress Ukrainian nationalist movements (Brunarska et al., 2016).

These historical movements created a legacy of cultural and familial ties between the two countries, which continue to influence contemporary migration patterns. Recent migration from Ukraine to

Poland, particularly after the 1990s and the 2014 Russian invasion, has been shaped by these shared historical connections (Górny et al., 2024). The familiarity between the two populations, bolstered by geographic proximity and overlapping histories, has facilitated the integration of Ukrainian migrants into Polish society and labour markets (Duszczyk et al., 2024).

The modern wave of Ukrainian migration to Poland began in the 1990s, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as new opportunities for mobility arose. Scholars identify several factors that shaped migration trends in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including economic disparities, labour surpluses, and unstable borders (Brunarska et al., 2016; Górny, 2017). Ukraine, experiencing economic decline, became a primary source of migrants seeking better opportunities in neighbouring Poland, which was undergoing its transition to a market economy (Brunarska et al., 2016; Duszczyk, 2024). During this period, a distinctive migration space developed in the region, with movements between Ukraine and Poland being driven largely by temporary labour needs and characterized by frequent cross-border mobility (Brunarska et al., 2016).

This early stage of Ukrainian migration was characterized by informal and short-term labour arrangements, with migrants primarily working in agriculture and construction without legal residency (Iglićka & Gmaj, 2013). These short-term, repetitive movements were facilitated by Poland's relatively liberal visa policies at the time, which allowed Ukrainians to enter the country without a visa until 2003, and with tourist visas thereafter (Górny, 2017). The temporary nature of this migration, combined with the proximity of the two countries, enabled Ukrainian workers to travel back and forth with relative ease, making Poland an attractive destination for those seeking higher wages and


better working conditions than were available in Ukraine (Brunarska et al., 2016).

3.2 Recent Trends in Ukrainian Migration

The situation for Ukrainian migrants began to change in 2003 with the introduction of stricter visa requirements. Although these regulations introduced some barriers, Poland maintained flexibility in issuing seasonal work permits, allowing migrants to stay for up to six months per year (Górny, 2017).

Since Poland acceded to the European Union in 2004, it has experienced a significant shift from being a primary emigration country to becoming a growing destination for immigrants. While approximately two million Polish citizens left the country, primarily for work opportunities in Western Europe, Poland started to attract an increasing number of foreign workers, particularly from Ukraine. The liberalization of labour immigration between 2007 and 2011 played a pivotal role in this transformation (Górny et al., 2024).

Figure 2- First residence permits issued in the EU countries, 2008-2023 Source: EUROSTAT




This shift in Poland's migration patterns is evident in the trends of first residence permits issued across EU countries between 2008 and 2023 (see Figure 2). The graph highlights Poland's steady rise, particularly after 2011, reflecting its growing role as a destination for migrants. This increase aligns with the liberalization of labour immigration policies and Poland's economic transformation during this period.

During this period, Poland introduced an innovative immigration system, allowing employers to easily file declarations to employ foreign workers without the need for traditional work permits. Initially designed for seasonal labourers from Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, this system soon expanded, particularly benefitting the agricultural sector, which faced labour shortages (Duszczuk, 2024; Brunarska et al., 2016). This system, combined with Poland's geographic proximity to Ukraine and cultural ties, established Poland as a primary destination for Ukrainian labour migrants (Górny & Van Der Zwan, 2024). By 2017, this simplified system accounted for around 94% of the 1.8 million declarations of intent to hire foreign workers being issued to Ukrainians, underscoring the importance of Ukrainian labour migration for Poland's economy (Górny & Śleszyński, 2019). The migration was characterized by "circular migration," where migrants engaged in temporary, seasonal work while maintaining strong ties with their home country. This form of mobility became a defining feature of Ukrainian migration to Poland, as most workers viewed their stay as temporary and driven by short-term economic needs (Iglicka & Gmaj, 2013). The growing presence of Ukrainian workers, particularly in urban centres like Warsaw and surrounding rural areas, reflected the increasing demand for foreign labour in Poland's rapidly expanding economy (Brunarska et al., 2016). Furthermore, the spatial distribution of foreign workers, especially those employed through the simplified procedure,

has become increasingly concentrated in certain regions of Poland. This trend is visualized in Figure 3, which illustrates the spatial distribution of foreign workers from 2012 to 2017.

Figure 3: Changes in intensity of registration of employers' declarations of consent to employ a foreigner (no. of documents per 100 persons of productive age), by gminas in Poland, 2012-2017 Source: Górny & Śleszyński 2019: 338



Over this period, the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, including Warsaw, maintained the highest concentration of Ukrainian workers, particularly in rural areas where agriculture dominates. However, the graph also highlights a noticeable spread to other regions, such as Lubuskie and Dolnośląskie, driven by rising demand for foreign labour in construction, manufacturing, and services (Górny & Śleszyński, 2019). These patterns demonstrate how immigration, initially focused on urban centres, is now impacting both rural and peripheral areas across

the country, reflecting Poland's growing reliance on foreign labour to sustain economic growth.

The liberalization of labour migration to Poland gained momentum with the simplification of employment procedures. The two-step process for work permits was removed, which initially made it easier for employers to hire foreign workers, especially from Ukraine. However, this rapid expansion was not without challenges. The visa processing system became overwhelmed, particularly in Ukrainian consulates, which struggled to handle the increasing demand for work visas. This bottleneck led to the increasing reliance on private recruitment agencies, which varied widely in their practices. Some agencies were found to exploit workers, failing to ensure fair working conditions, which led to labour rights violations (Brunarska et al., 2016; Górny, 2017). Despite these challenges, Poland's labour migration policies have largely been shaped by short-term objectives, based on the assumption that most foreign workers would eventually return to their home countries. This expectation contributed to the lack of significant integration efforts, as policymakers did not anticipate long-term settlement among migrant workers (Duszczuk, 2024). A similar approach was observed in early labour migration policies in Germany and Sweden, where foreign workers were initially recruited to fill labour shortages without a structured plan for their integration into society. Although Poland's limited focus on integration was initially justified by the belief that migration would remain temporary, persistent labour migration trends and a growing foreign workforce have increasingly challenged this assumption. Over time, the absence of integration strategies has become more evident, as many migrant workers—particularly from Ukraine—have not only stayed longer but have also played an essential role in Poland's labour market (Górny,

2024). Moreover, research by Górny and van der Zwan (2024) indicates a shift in migration patterns, with a rising number of foreign workers settling permanently rather than returning home, presenting new challenges that Poland has yet to fully address.

Poland's migration policy from 2012 to 2016 aimed to formalize labour migration through selective immigration, particularly focusing on people of Polish descent, supported by the "Karta Polaka" (Pole's Card). However, the migration crisis of 2015 heightened public anxiety, and migration policies were halted in 2016 by the government, resulting in a lack of cohesive strategies. Despite this, labour shortages persisted, and by 2018, Poland advanced one of the most open labour immigration policies in the EU, focusing on sectors like IT, manufacturing, and agriculture. Public sentiment remained largely anti-immigrant, and while policies allowed foreign workers, particularly Ukrainians, to fill labour gaps, integration remained minimal (Duszczuk et al., 2024).

Poland's 2012 migration policy aimed to regulate labour migration by facilitating legal employment pathways for foreign workers. Key measures included extending the validity of temporary residence permits and establishing bilateral agreements with Ukraine to streamline migration processes (MIA, 2012). While these policies effectively managed the influx of Ukrainian workers, they did not translate into a broader integration framework. Despite the significant presence of Ukrainian migrants, Poland still lacks a comprehensive national integration policy. Many Ukrainians continue to perceive their stay as temporary, often working in low-wage sectors with limited opportunities for social and economic mobility (Górny & Kindler, 2018). The absence of structured long-term integration planning remains a major challenge, as many Ukrainian migrants remain outside mainstream Polish society, with little access to integration programs or

pathways for long-term inclusion. This reflects a broader trend in Poland's migration approach, which has prioritized labour market regulation over integration policies, leaving a gap in addressing long-term settlement needs (Duszczuk, 2024). Further policy liberalization in 2018 allowed immigrants from Ukraine and other countries to work for up to 24 months on employer declarations, making Poland one of the most accessible labour markets in the EU. However, despite these flexible employment policies, the country still lacks an overarching migration strategy (Duszczuk, 2024).

The political crisis in Ukraine, beginning with the 2013 Euromaidan protests and culminating in the ongoing conflict with Russia, dramatically reshaped migration flows from Ukraine to Poland. These events triggered a surge in migration, with many Ukrainians fleeing not only economic instability but also political unrest (Górny & Van Der Zwan, 2024). The aftermath of the 2014 Russian invasion saw a significant shift in migration dynamics, as Ukrainians increasingly sought refuge in Poland. Post-war migrants, often motivated by humanitarian factors, displayed a tendency for longer stays in Poland, breaking the previously established model of circular mobility (Duszczuk, 2024). This influx of migrants opened new sectors for employment, particularly in industries such as construction, agriculture, and services, reflecting a growing demand for labour across various sectors in Poland (Górny & Kaczmarczyk, 2024).

Poland emerged as a key destination for Ukrainian migrants, largely due to its geographic proximity and flexible labour market policies (Drbohlav & Jaroszewicz, 2016). By 2015, Ukrainians accounted for nearly one-third of the 211,869 residence permit holders in the country. That same year, Poland issued 782,222 seasonal work invitations, with an overwhelming 97.5% allocated to Ukrainians. Migration patterns

were particularly concentrated in the Mazowieckie region, especially in Warsaw, influenced in part by the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Górny, 2017). Despite progressive labour policies, Poland maintained limited integration measures, reinforcing what scholars describe as a “temporary migration regime”—a system designed to facilitate work-related mobility while discouraging long-term settlement (Iglićka & Gmaj, 2013). According to Brunarska et al. (2016), Poland and Ukraine’s historical and cultural ties, along with their shared post-socialist experience, fostered the emergence of a localized migration network. This dynamic created an environment where migration was perceived as relatively low-risk and accessible, reinforcing patterns of circular mobility rather than permanent resettlement.

By 2019, Ukrainians comprised 70-90% of foreign workers in Poland, with their presence expanding beyond traditional roles in agriculture and construction to include hospitality, trade, and services (Górny & van der Zwan, 2024).

Additionally, the migration patterns revealed notable gendered differences. Female migrants often faced distinct challenges and opportunities compared to their male counterparts, influencing their labour market trajectories. The regional concentration of Ukrainian migrants, with cities like Warsaw and Wrocław emerging as new migration hubs, highlights the evolving landscape of Ukrainian migration in Poland, driven by both economic and humanitarian factors (Górny & van der Zwan, 2024).

3.2.1 The Need for a Comprehensive Migration Policy in Poland

The Polish government now faces the challenge of developing a cohesive migration strategy that not only addresses immediate labour shortages but also considers the long-term integration of immigrants,

especially given the significant Ukrainian community of around two million in Poland, with approximately 1.3 million actively engaged in the workforce (Duszczuk, 2024; Górny & van der Zwan, 2024).

Poland's migration policy has evolved in response to these changes, though it has often been characterized by reactive rather than proactive measures. For over two decades, Poland lacked a coherent migration strategy, focusing instead on facilitating the entry of foreign workers to meet labour market demands, particularly in border regions. (Brunarska et al., 2016). Nevertheless, Poland has continued to prioritize migrants from culturally and geographically close countries like Ukraine, and policies have gradually been liberalized to accommodate the growing demand for foreign labour.

The liberalization of employment policies in 2022 allowed immigrants from Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia to work under-declarations for up to 24 months, providing greater job stability for foreign workers in Poland. This extension was particularly crucial as the COVID-19 pandemic had left many migrant workers unable to return home (Duszczuk, 2024). However, despite these regulatory changes, Poland still lacks a structured integration policy, raising concerns about the long-term sustainability of its immigration system. Without formal integration measures, Poland risks encountering challenges similar to those experienced in Germany and Sweden, where inadequate integration efforts have contributed to social exclusion within immigrant communities (Duszczuk, 2024).

As Poland's labour market increasingly recruits workers from countries beyond its immediate neighbours—such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Vietnam—the need for a comprehensive integration strategy becomes more pressing. The Ukrainian community, now estimated at around two

million people, with approximately 1.3 million actives in the workforce, further underscores this issue. Following the 2023 parliamentary elections, the newly formed government faces a pivotal decision: should it implement policies that facilitate the full social and economic integration of immigrants to help address demographic shifts and labour shortages, or will it continue to focus on short-term labour solutions without promoting deeper integration? The answer to this question will be crucial for Poland's social cohesion and economic stability as it navigates its evolving role as a key immigration destination (Duszczyk, 2024).

On October 15th, 2024, the Polish government adopted the Comprehensive and Responsible Migration Strategy for 2025–2030, titled "Regain Control. Provide Security." This document represents a pivotal moment in Poland's migration policy, outlining measures to address both the practical demands of immigration and its societal impacts (Council of Ministers, 2024). The strategy reflects a growing recognition of Poland's transition from a country of emigration to one of immigration, particularly considering the significant influx of Ukrainian migrants and refugees. Central to the strategy is the prioritization of security and social cohesion. It introduces stricter border controls, enhanced visa procedures, and updated policies for legal residency to better manage migration flows. In the labour market context, the strategy acknowledges the importance of foreign workers in addressing demographic challenges but emphasizes selective immigration for strategic sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and IT (Council of Ministers, 2024).

For Ukrainian migrants specifically, the strategy includes tailored measures aimed at their integration into Polish society. A key innovation is the establishment of Foreigners' Integration Centres in all

49 regions of Poland, providing services such as Polish language courses, legal support, and job search assistance. These centres aim to bridge gaps in existing integration efforts, particularly for Ukrainians, who make up a substantial portion of Poland's immigrant workforce (Council of Ministers, 2024). Additionally, the strategy highlights the importance of pre-integration measures, including language and cultural orientation programs, to facilitate smoother adaptation.

The document emphasizes the need for a two-way integration process, fostering not only the adaptation of immigrants to Polish norms but also the host society's acceptance of diverse cultural influences. Employers and NGOs are identified as critical partners in these efforts, with a focus on providing language support, addressing workplace discrimination, and ensuring fair treatment of foreign workers. Specific policies also aim to address challenges faced by Ukrainian women and children, who form a significant demographic of recent arrivals (Council of Ministers, 2024). Despite these advances, the strategy has been critiqued for its reactive approach, as much of its content focuses on immediate needs rather than long-term solutions. For example, while integration policies have been expanded, questions remain about resource allocation and the capacity of public institutions to implement these programs at scale. Furthermore, the emphasis on security and control risks overshadowing the humanitarian needs of migrants, particularly considering the ongoing war in Ukraine (Council of Ministers, 2024).

This new strategy underscores Poland's evolving migration landscape and the urgent need to balance economic demands with social integration. As the country navigates its future as a major destination for migrants, the success of these initiatives will depend on their ability to foster inclusion, support labour market participation, and address public concerns about migration.

In conclusion, the transformation of Poland from an emigration to an immigration country has reshaped the nation's approach to migration, particularly in the context of Ukrainian refugees. Historically, Poland was primarily viewed as a country from which millions emigrated, especially after joining the European Union. However, today it bears the hallmarks of a destination for migrants. The interplay of historical ties, policy changes, and recent geopolitical events, such as the war in Ukraine, has driven significant migration flows into Poland.

As the country adapts to this new reality, it is essential to develop integration measures that foster social cohesion and support labour market participation. These efforts must account for the complex motivations behind migration and the diverse backgrounds of Ukrainian refugees and other migrants. Only through a comprehensive and inclusive approach can Poland effectively manage its role as an immigration country while promoting long-term integration and stability.

3.3 Recent developments post-2022 conflict

In February 2022, Russia's military aggression resulted in the displacement of millions of Ukrainians, prompting a significant humanitarian crisis. In response, the European Union activated the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, a key mechanism established in 2001 to manage exceptional situations involving a sudden and large influx of refugees. This directive aims to provide immediate and collective protection to displaced persons while alleviating pressure on national asylum systems across EU member states (Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382, 2022).

In the case of Ukraine, the mechanism was triggered in March 2022,

shortly after the start of the conflict, to support the millions fleeing the war. This marked the first time the EU activated the temporary protection directive since its adoption. The mechanism grants displaced persons from Ukraine immediate legal status in the EU, allowing them access to residency, employment, healthcare, education, and other social services without the need to go through lengthy asylum processes. The measure also enables Ukrainians to move freely between EU countries and choose where they would like to reside, creating flexibility within the system. As of June 2024, 4.2 million Ukrainian refugees have registered under this mechanism across various EU member states. The original duration of temporary protection was set for one year, but recognizing the prolonged nature of the conflict, the EU has extended the protection multiple times, with the latest extension running until March 4, 2026 (Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382, 2022).

The temporary protection mechanism is part of a broader EU humanitarian response, which includes several other forms of support. The EU has coordinated humanitarian aid for internally displaced people still in Ukraine, providing civil protection support to neighbouring countries that are hosting refugees, including Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Moldova, as well as to organizations such as the UN Refugee Agency. Additionally, the EU has offered financial and technical assistance to member states to help them cope with the influx of refugees. This includes specific aid to ensure the effective management of borders, especially in the frontline states hosting most refugees. Overall, the temporary protection mechanism allows for a streamlined and efficient system to provide collective refuge for Ukrainians while ensuring that national asylum systems in EU countries are not overwhelmed. The mechanism not only offers immediate support to millions of displaced Ukrainians but also gives the EU

flexibility to adapt as the crisis continues, exemplified by its extension through 2026. Through this approach, the EU has demonstrated solidarity and commitment to protecting those fleeing the war while maintaining stability within its member states (Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382, 2022).

The term “refugee” is used in this document to include persons who obtained some sort of international protection, including not only formal refugee status (as per the Geneva Convention) but also temporary protection or other similar national protection statuses (as in the case of most refugees from Ukraine). The number of refugees from Ukraine across Europe is substantial, reaching 5,905,000, with Poland hosting the highest number, recording 954,599 refugees actively registered for temporary protection (as per the UNHCR). The scale of refugees in Poland stands out as the largest in Europe, making it a pivotal focus for detailed examination. This significant concentration underscores the urgency and importance of understanding and addressing the challenges faced by this substantial refugee population in Poland. Refugees frequently face an ambiguous outlook, uncertain asylum status, and the prospect of provisional permission subject to periodic reassessment. Certain refugees may aspire to return to their home countries once conditions permit, creating uncertainty that could diminish motivations to invest in host-country-specific skills, impeding the integration process. Moreover, refugees' distinctive experiences, such as exposure to conflict and persecution, contribute to prevalent health concerns, particularly issues related to mental well-being.

The Polish government enacted a "special law" on March 12, 2022, to complement the EU Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) and provide tailored support for Ukrainian citizens seeking refuge in Poland. This legislation, among the most generous in Europe,

establishes a quasi-free movement regime for Ukrainians. It expands upon the TPD's protections by granting rights akin to those enjoyed by Polish citizens, including unrestricted access to the labour market, economic activities, public services, and financial support. These measures significantly enhance integration prospects and mark a shift in Poland's approach to refugee protection (Górny et al., 2024).

By mid-2023, around one million Ukrainian refugees remained registered under PESEL UKR status, while over 600,000 had lost it, either due to returning to Ukraine or relocating elsewhere. When considering broader registration categories, the total Ukrainian population in Poland likely surpasses two million. However, inconsistencies in available data make it difficult to determine the exact number of those still residing in the country (Górny et al., 2024).


3.4 Demographic Shifts Among Ukrainian Refugees in Poland

The demographic composition of Ukrainian refugees, based on PESEL UKR registration data, reveals stark contrasts with pre-war migration patterns. Approximately 75% of adult refugees are women, largely due to Ukrainian laws restricting male mobility during the war. Children under 18 account for 45% of the population, while elderly individuals form a smaller proportion. This influx has significantly altered the age and gender balance of Ukrainians in Poland, resulting in a population that is younger on average than Poland's general demographic (Górny, Kaczmarczyk, et al., 2023).

This demographic shift is further illustrated in Figure 4, which details the number of Ukrainian residents under temporary protection on March 31st 2023 by sex and age. The chart highlights the predominance of women and children within the refugee population, a reflection of

both the war's impact and Ukrainian legislation restricting male

Figure 4- Number of Ukrainian residents under temporary protection by sex and age in 2023. Source: Statistics of Poland, 2023



mobility. Notably, women aged 30–39 and children aged 5–14 form the largest groups, underlining the unique challenges Poland faces in addressing their specific needs (Statistics Poland, 2023).

By the 2022/23 school year, approximately 190,000 Ukrainian children were enrolled in Polish schools. However, only 46% of Ukrainian children attend Polish schools, while many others engage in remote learning under the Ukrainian curriculum or lack access to formal education. This educational gap poses long-term challenges, particularly for integration and future economic participation (Górny et al., 2023). These demographic patterns emphasize the necessity of integration policies focused on women and children. Improving access to childcare and education is critical for enabling mothers to enter the labour market and ensuring children’s educational continuity, which is essential for their future societal and economic contributions (Górny et al., 2023).


Despite the high educational qualifications of this population—over

60% of adults holding higher education degrees—language barriers pose significant challenges, with about 50% reporting no proficiency in Polish. Interestingly, many Ukrainian refugees are supporting themselves through their work or savings, with less reliance on state assistance or organized support centres, indicating a preference for informal networks and personal resources (Górny et al., 2024).

Uncertainty surrounds the future of Ukrainian refugees, with 30–40% unsure about their stay in Poland. However, more are considering long-term residency. Beyond the one million registered refugees, up to 1.3 million more may qualify for protection if they return, underscoring the conflict’s demographic impact. (Górny et al., 2024).

The following graph (Figure 5) highlights the changes in the intentions of Ukrainian war refugees regarding their duration of stay in Poland. The data compares two periods: July-September 2022 and February 2023—providing insights into how their perceptions and plans evolved during the early stages of displacement.

Figure 5 - Ukrainian war refugees by plans regarding duration of stay in Poland in July-September 2022 and February 2023 (Data in %). Source: Górny et al. 2023



As shown in Figure 5, the largest segment of respondents in both periods indicated uncertainty about their future, with 40% unsure in mid-2022 and 33% by early 2023. This decline reflects a gradual clarification of intentions, likely influenced by prolonged conflict and integration measures in Poland. Notably, there is a slight increase in the proportion of refugees planning to stay "for good," suggesting that some have begun to view Poland as a potential long-term or permanent home. Meanwhile, the percentage planning to stay for several years remained stable, underscoring a cautious approach to long-term commitments among many refugees. These shifts have significant implications for Poland's integration policies, particularly in terms of labour market inclusion, housing, and education (Górny, Kaczmarczyk, et al., 2023).

4. DATA AND METHODS

4.1 Data Sources

This study is based on two comprehensive datasets of 2022 and 2023 collected by the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw. These datasets provide critical insights into the experiences, labour market participation, and aspirations of Ukrainian migrants and war refugees in Poland.

4.1.1 The 2022 Dataset

Between July 16 and October 1, 2022, the programme “Between Ukraine and Poland” collected the data for the 2022 Dataset. The survey, with more than 60 questions, captured different aspects of the interviewed refugees: demographic characteristics, migration motivations, and integration challenges faced by Ukrainian migrants and Ukrainian war refugees residing in Poland. It included 7,617 respondents, all of whom respected the criteria below:

- Residency: Living in Poland at the time of the survey.
- Age: At least 18 years old.
- Citizenship: Ukrainian nationality. This distinction is important, as the dataset includes both war refugees and pre-war migrants, rather than exclusively focusing on those displaced by the 2022 invasion.

The survey’s questions cover a wide range of topics:

- Demographics: Age, marital status, children, education, and legal status in Poland.
- Migration motivations: Economic, war-related, family-related, and other reasons for migration.
- Employment: Job status, conditions, and strategies for entering the Polish labour market.

- Language proficiency: Self-reported skills in speaking, reading, writing, and understanding Polish.
- War-related experiences: Impact of the conflict and respondents' future aspirations.

The sample includes:

- Those who arrived before February 24, 2022, who were asked additional questions about their lives in Poland before the war.
- Those who arrived after February 24, 2022, who were asked more focused questions about displacement and adaptation challenges.

Data collection relied on a wide variety of distribution channels, including:

- Social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram.
- NGOs, local news outlets, and personal blogs.
- Advertising campaigns and leaflet distribution.

The diversity of the sample makes this dataset particularly valuable for understanding the nuanced experiences of both economic migrants and war refugees. It highlights the structural and social challenges they face in integrating into Polish society and labour markets (Vasilenko, 2024).

4.1.2 The 2023 Dataset

Building on the 2022 sample, the 2023 dataset was collected between February 9 and March 3, 2023, and includes a sample of 1,034 respondents, all of whom arrived in Poland during the current war. This dataset provides a specific focus on people who arrived for war-related reasons, and how they are integrating into the Polish labour market and society.

The 2023 survey used a mixed-methods approach, combining:

- Quantitative Methods: An online survey designed to capture

structural characteristics of war refugees, including employment, education, and migration motivations.

- Qualitative Methods: In-depth interviews with 30 respondents to explore their personal aspirations, challenges, and the role of social networks in their integration process.

The survey topics included:

- Employment and skills: Job status, professional aspirations, and task-based assessments of work experience.
- Social networks: The importance of personal and professional relationships in finding work and adapting to life in Poland.
- Challenges and goals: Refugees' perspectives on the difficulties they face and their hopes for the future.

The sample was drawn from respondents who had previously participated in the 2022 survey and consented to further studies. The data was adjusted using gender and regional weights derived from the PESEL registry to enhance representativeness. However, the dynamic nature of migration flows between Poland and Ukraine necessitates caution in generalizing the findings (Górny et al., 2023).

4.1.3 Comparison Between the Datasets

The 2022 and 2023 datasets complement each other, offering distinct but interconnected perspectives:

1. Temporal Coverage:
 - The 2022 dataset includes both economic migrants and war refugees, allowing for comparisons between these groups.
 - The 2023 dataset focuses exclusively on war refugees who arrived after February 2022, providing a more detailed analysis of their unique challenges.
2. Sample Size:

The 2022 dataset is larger, with 7,617 respondents, whereas the 2023 dataset is smaller, with 1,034 respondents, enabling deeper exploration of war refugees' experiences.

3. Focus:

- The 2022 dataset provides a comprehensive overview of migration motivations, labour market participation, and integration challenges, additionally, it captures the early reception experiences of war refugees.
- The 2023 dataset emphasizes aspirations, social networks, and adaptation, complemented by qualitative insights.

4. Methodological Scope:

- The 2022 dataset relies primarily on quantitative data collected via a standardized survey.
- The 2023 dataset adopts a mixed-methods approach, integrating qualitative interviews for a richer understanding of individual experiences.

Together, these datasets provide a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the migration and integration experiences of Ukrainians in Poland, with important implications for labour market policy and social support system.

4.2 Understanding the Dataset: Characteristics and Structure

The datasets offer a detailed picture of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, focusing on demographic, social, and legal aspects. This section explores the demographic structure, family composition, educational background, language proficiency, migration motivations, and employment characteristics of the Ukrainian refugee population in Poland, as captured in the 2022 and 2023 datasets. These variables are critical for analysing the factors that influence refugees' integration into Polish society and the labour market.

4.2.1 Gender and Age Distribution

The datasets from 2022 and 2023 reveal the gender and age composition of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, shaped by martial law and conflict.

In the 2022 dataset, which includes both pre-war migrants and war refugees, women dominate the population, but the presence of men is higher due to the inclusion of labour migrants. Conversely, the 2023 dataset, focused exclusively on war refugees under the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), reflects a greater proportion of women and children, as martial law limits men of military age from leaving Ukraine.

These distinctions are critical for understanding the differing migration dynamics captured in each dataset.

4.2.1.1 2022 Dataset

The analysis of the 2022 dataset, which includes 7,615 respondents, showed a significant gender imbalance. 75.25% of the population are women, and this was predictable since after February 2022 martial law was enacted in Ukraine, making emigration for men from 18 to 60 years


old illegal. Despite this, the percentage of males still emigrating after February 2022 can be explained by specific exemptions, informal channels, or special permissions.

- Younger Adults (18–29 years): Males slightly outnumber females in the 22–25 (51.82%) and 26–29 (51.70%) age groups among post-February arrivals, contrasting with lower male proportions (36.93% and 32.79%, respectively) before February. This indicates that younger men, possibly students or those with fewer familial responsibilities, found ways to leave Ukraine despite martial law.
- Prime Working Age (30–54 years): This age group dominates the dataset, reflecting the migration of individuals in their most economically active years. Gender dynamics shift significantly post-February, with males achieving near parity in some groups, such as 48.94% in the 30–33 age group and 50.59% in the 34–37 age group. Before February, males constituted a much smaller proportion, such as 23.08% in the 30–33 age group.
- Older Adults (55+ years): Women dominate in older age groups, although male representation increases slightly after February. For example, in the 62–65 age group, males comprise 35.90% of respondents post-February, up from 19.05% before February. This increase aligns with exemptions granted to older men or those with health conditions.

The Figure 6 graph illustrates the age and gender distribution in 2022, emphasizing the predominance of women and variations in male

representation across age groups.


Figure 6 - Age and Gender distribution of Ukrainian Refugees in Poland (2022 Dataset).
Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



The war refugee subgroup in the 2022 dataset is characterized by an even more pronounced gender imbalance. Among this subgroup, 90.23% of respondents are female, compared to only 9.59% male.

Age distribution data further highlights this imbalance, as women consistently outnumber men across all age groups. Younger age groups, such as those aged 18–29, show slightly higher male representation (11.95–19.83%), probably due to a higher presence of students or individuals exempt from military service. In contrast, older age groups exhibit an increasingly female-dominated demographic, with the proportion of men decreasing significantly in groups aged 30 and above. As we can see in Figure 7, in the age and gender distribution of the war refugees’ subgroup, the predominance of women across all age groups.

Figure 7 - - Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



This subgroup illustrates the profound demographic shifts caused by the war, with women and children forming the majority of displaced individuals. Their integration into Polish society poses unique challenges, including access to childcare, education, and employment opportunities tailored to their circumstances.

By comparing the whole 2022 sample to the war refugee subgroup, the data underscores how migration patterns differ significantly depending on whether respondents were pre-war migrants or refugees fleeing the conflict. These differences are critical for understanding and addressing the specific needs of displaced populations in Poland.


4.2.1.2 2023 Dataset

The 2023 dataset, though smaller with 1,033 respondents, provides additional insights. The age range spans 19–93 years, with a significant concentration in prime working-age groups. Notably, the 34–37, 38–41, and 42–45 age groups each represent over 14% of the sample.

Younger adults (18–33 years) make up 18.88%, while older adults (62+ years) constitute 6.69%, reflecting a gradual inclusion of elderly family members.

Women dominate across all age groups, particularly among working-age adults, where they make up over 90% in key intervals (e.g., 96.88% in the 30–33 age group). Male representation is highest in older cohorts, such as 35.90% in the 62–65 age group and 42.86% in the 70–73 age group. The youngest age group (18–21 years) includes only 8.33% males, highlighting the restrictive impact of martial law on men of conscription age. The increased presence of older adults in 2023 reflects broader migration patterns, where elderly family members joined relatives already in Poland or relocated due to the ongoing conflict. Figure 8 graph from the 2023 dataset visualizes these trends, highlighting the predominance of women and the relatively higher proportion of men in older age groups.

Figure 8 - Age and Gender distribution of Ukrainian Refugees in Poland (2023 Dataset) Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



The combined analysis of 2022 and 2023 datasets reveals a refugee population dominated by women, particularly among working-age groups, with notable increases in male representation among younger and older cohorts.

These demographic dynamics emphasize the need for tailored integration strategies. Women, as the majority, require support in childcare, employment, and housing, while younger men, who successfully migrated despite restrictions, may require tailored support to access employment and integration opportunities. Older adults will likely need greater access to healthcare and social services. The realities of migration under martial law underscore the complexity of refugee flows.

4.2.2 Family Composition


The 2022 and 2023 datasets provide valuable insights into the family structures, marital statuses, and age distributions of children among Ukrainian refugees in Poland. These findings illuminate how the ongoing conflict has reshaped family dynamics, migration patterns, and the challenges faced by refugee families.

4.2.2.1 Marital and Relationship Status

The 2022 dataset highlights that 75.61% of respondents (3,847 individuals) were married, reflecting the prominence of family-led migration. Women accounted for 77.62% of this group, a pattern strongly influenced by martial law restrictions preventing men aged 18–60 from leaving Ukraine. Additionally, 24.39% of respondents reported being in a stable relationship outside of marriage, emphasizing the importance of partnerships in the migration experience. Single individuals constituted 17.57%, with a higher proportion of men (31.10%), possibly reflecting fewer family obligations or increased mobility within this group. Smaller groups of respondents identified as divorced (6.01%) or widowed (0.75%), with women disproportionately represented in these categories, reflecting the burdens of displacement on women in vulnerable circumstances.

As illustrated in Figure 9: Marital Status and Number of Children (2022 Dataset), married respondents predominantly have one or two children, while single individuals are less likely to have children, underscoring the role of family units in shaping migration patterns.

Figure 9 - Marital Status and Number of Children (2022 Dataset) Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



The war refugee subgroup (those who arrived after February 24, 2022) displays a more pronounced focus on family-oriented migration. Married respondents make up 81.92% of this subgroup, further emphasizing the importance of family units in the migration process. Among these, families with one or two children are most common, respectively 35.53% and 42%. Single individuals, as we could predict, are more likely to not have children (77.42%), highlighting differences in family dynamics between single and married respondents.

The 2023 dataset similarly highlights diverse marital patterns, with 54.26% of respondents identifying as married, 20.89% as single, and smaller proportions as divorced (18.76%) or widowed (4.93%). These findings continue to underscore the significance of family migration while highlighting the varied relational contexts among refugees.


4.2.2.2 Family Composition and Children Staying in Poland

The role of children in the refugee experience is a central theme in both datasets. In 2022, 63.74% of respondents reported having one or two children, with only 8.98% having three children and less than 2% having four or more. The war refugee subgroup reflects similar trends,

with families of two children being the most common (42.00%), followed by families with one child (35.53%).

In the 2023 dataset, 74.56% of the sample declare to have children staying with them in Poland, highlighting the importance of family among Ukrainian refugees' population. However, 11.03% indicated that their children were not with them, reflecting the strain of family separation. As visualized in Figure 10: Marital Status and Children Staying in Poland (2023 Dataset), married respondents were most likely to have their children with them (88.41%), while single individuals were less likely (32.87%). This aligns with demographic expectations, as many single respondents represent younger individuals without dependents.

Figure 10 - Marital Status and Children Staying in Poland (2023 Dataset).
Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel ("Between Ukraine and Poland").



The separation of families remains a poignant issue. In 2022, 57.94% of respondents reported their partners were in Poland, while 38.92% indicated their partners were still in Ukraine. A similar trend is seen in the 2023 dataset, where 35.49% had partners in Poland, and 30.27% reported partners remaining in Ukraine. Notably, 92.88% of those with


partners still in Ukraine were women, highlighting the emotional and logistical challenges faced by women-led households.

The findings from the war refugee subgroup in the 2022 dataset emphasize the role of family-oriented migration during the conflict. Married individuals and families with children represent the bulk of the displaced population, indicating a strong focus on maintaining family structures during this humanitarian crisis. These insights provide a critical context for tailoring policies and support mechanisms to the needs of Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

4.2.2.3 Age Distribution of Children

The age distribution of children highlights their diverse needs. In 2023, 32.69% of children were aged 6–12 years, underscoring the demand for robust educational resources. Younger children (0–5 years) comprised 20.23%, requiring access to childcare and early education. Adolescents aged 13–17 years made up 15.34%, facing unique challenges in educational continuity and social integration. A smaller group (3.73%) were young adults aged 18–24 years, likely requiring vocational training, higher education, or employment opportunities. These trends are visualized in Figure 11, which emphasizes the significant presence of school-age children and the corresponding implications for education and integration policies.

Figure 11 - Age Distribution of Children Among Refugees (2023 Dataset)
 Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



4.2.3 Educational Background

The educational background of Ukrainian refugees, in both the 2022 and 2023 datasets, is particularly high, providing an opportunity for Polish society with their potential contributions. Both datasets show a population with high academic qualifications, emphasizing the importance of tailored support to facilitate their integration into Poland’s labour market.


4.2.3.1 Educational Attainment

As we already mentioned, the 2022 dataset reveals a highly educated refugee population. Among the 5,088 respondents, 66.16% (3,366 individuals) hold high education qualifications, including university degrees and equivalent programs. This group represents a significant resource for Poland’s labour market, particularly in highly skilled jobs. Another 24.41% (1,242 individuals) hold general secondary or post-secondary education, while respondents with primary or secondary vocational education are 8.22% (418 individuals), showcasing practical skills suitable for industries requiring technical expertise. Only 1.22%

(62 individuals) reported basic or lower education, underscoring the unique composition with a strong academic profile of this population.

As shown in Figure 12, the educational distribution highlights the predominance of higher education. However, the smaller proportions of refugees with vocational or lower education emphasize the need for inclusive support mechanisms, such as training programs and upskilling opportunities, to address varying educational backgrounds.

Figure 12 - Educational Level among Refugees (2022 Dataset) Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).




The war refugee subgroup (those who arrived after February 24, 2022) within the 2022 dataset shows even higher levels of educational attainment. Among the 3,264 respondents, 69.64% reported higher education qualifications, highlighting the significant presence of skilled and educated individuals. An additional 22.21% of respondents had completed general secondary or vocational education, while 6.92% had primary or secondary vocational qualifications. Only 1.23% had basic or lower education, reflecting an overwhelmingly strong academic profile.

As illustrated in Figure 13, the data emphasizes the predominance of

higher education within this group, followed by general secondary and vocational education. The minimal representation of individuals with basic or lower education highlights the strong academic profile of this subgroup.

Figure 13 - Educational Level of War Refugees Subgroup (2022 Dataset) Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).




The educational distribution within this subgroup suggests that individuals with higher education were more likely to migrate during the war, potentially as part of strategic decisions by skilled professionals seeking opportunities abroad. This trend underscores the need for tailored support in areas such as credential recognition and professional integration, particularly for highly educated refugees.

The 2023 dataset reinforces these trends, with 57.74% (597 respondents) reporting higher education qualifications (e.g., Specialist, PhD, or equivalent). An additional 9.19% (95 individuals) held a bachelor’s degree, while 20.31% (136 respondents) achieved vocational or industry-specific qualifications. General secondary education was reported by 6.00% (62 respondents), and 9.96% (40 individuals) attained primary vocational or industry-specific secondary

education. Only 1.65% (17 individuals) reported basic education or lower. The educational background presented in Figure 14 reflects both the strong academic profile and the practical skills of the refugee population, emphasizing their potential contributions to skilled and technical sectors in Poland.

Figure 14 - Educational Level among Refugees (2023 Dataset) Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



Women, comprising 77.52% (5,905 individuals) of the refugee population, dominate across all education levels. While this reflects their majority in the dataset, their higher educational attainment is noteworthy:

- Higher Education: Women account for 80.93% (3,849 individuals) of those with advanced qualifications, positioning them strongly for skilled and professional roles.
- General Secondary or Post-Secondary Education: Women constitute 73.18% (1,509 individuals).
- Primary or Secondary Vocational Education: Women represent 68.07% (469 individuals).
- Basic or Lower Education: Women make up 70.91% (78 individuals).

These trends underscore women's central role and potential in the Polish labour market. Targeted support, like for example professional re-certification and career development programs, can help them maximize their contribution to the labour market.

We can see some differences in educational attainment based on migration timing. Among respondents who arrived in Poland before the war, 59.95% reported higher education qualifications, compared to 69.64% among those who arrived after the conflict began. This suggests that individuals who migrated during the war were even more highly qualified.

The educational profile of the war refugee subgroup emphasizes the potential of skilled individuals to contribute to Poland's labour market, while also highlighting the need for diverse integration strategies to support the full spectrum of educational backgrounds.

4.2.3.2 Current Educational Engagement

The 2022 dataset highlights diverse educational engagement among refugees, with notable differences between the overall refugee population and the war refugee subgroup (those who arrived after February 24, 2022). The trends below illustrate the educational involvement of both groups:

- High School Education: Among the overall refugee population, 0.39% (20 individuals) are currently enrolled in high school, primarily concentrated among younger refugees aged 18–25. In the war refugee subgroup, this percentage is even lower, at 0.18% (6 individuals). This minimal representation is expected, as the dataset includes only individuals aged 18 years and older, excluding the majority of typical high school students. The low percentage reflects the fact that most individuals in this age range have either

completed secondary education or moved on to other forms of engagement.

- Full-Time or Evening University Studies: 3.73% (190 individuals) of the overall population are pursuing full-time or evening university programs, primarily among younger adults. In the war refugee subgroup, this proportion drops to 2.85% (93 individuals), indicating slightly reduced engagement in higher education programs.
- Part-Time University Studies: 2.40% (122 individuals) of the overall refugee population are engaged in part-time or weekend university programs, reflecting the need for flexibility to balance other responsibilities. In contrast, the war refugee subgroup has a lower participation rate of 1.75% (57 individuals), further emphasizing the barriers they face in accessing flexible educational opportunities.
- Post-Secondary or Further Training Courses: 7.11% (362 individuals) of the overall population are enrolled in post-secondary or upskilling programs, particularly among individuals aged 34–45. In the war refugee subgroup, this figure is slightly lower at 6.46% (211 individuals), suggesting that war refugees also prioritize practical skills development but face slightly more constraints than the general refugee population.
- Not Currently Studying: The majority of refugees are not engaged in any form of education, with 86.75% (4,414 individuals) of the overall population falling into this category. Among the war refugee subgroup, this percentage is slightly higher at 88.91% (2,902 individuals), reflecting their immediate need for economic stability and the challenges of balancing work and family responsibilities.

The data highlights limited participation in formal education programs across both groups, with slightly lower engagement in the war refugee subgroup. The fact that the dataset only includes individuals aged 18 and above naturally limits the representation of high school students, as most individuals in this age group have already completed secondary education. This trend is further compounded by the immediate challenges faced by war refugees, including economic pressures, adaptation to a new country, and family obligations. These findings underscore the need for tailored interventions to address the barriers to education faced by refugees. Expanding flexible educational programs, such as part-time and online courses, and providing support for childcare and financial aid, could enable more refugees, particularly war refugees, to engage in education and training. These efforts are critical for improving their integration into Polish society and the labour market.

4.2.3.3 Impact of War on Education

The war disrupted the education of 10.54% (109 individuals) of respondents in 2023, directly affecting their academic trajectories. These individuals face challenges such as catching up on missed coursework or transitioning into Polish institutions. However, 44.95% (49 individuals) of those with interrupted education have resumed their studies, demonstrating resilience and a strong commitment to academic and professional advancement. Among those whose education was not interrupted, 26.38% (244 respondents) are currently studying, indicating ongoing efforts to enhance their qualifications despite displacement.

4.2.3.4 Aspirations and Current Studies in 2023

The 2023 dataset highlights the educational aspirations of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, offering insight into their future goals and perceived

pathways for integration and career advancement. When asked about their willingness to upgrade qualifications, 23.6% (244 respondents) expressed a clear desire to enhance their educational or professional credentials. This group views further education as an essential step toward better job prospects and successful integration into Polish society. However, 31.04% (321 respondents) reported uncertainty about pursuing additional qualifications. This hesitation may stem from barriers such as financial constraints, difficulties navigating the educational system, or the challenges of balancing studies with other responsibilities. A smaller proportion, 17.02% (176 respondents), stated they did not intend to upgrade their qualifications, perhaps prioritizing immediate needs such as employment, caregiving, or resettlement. Meanwhile, 28.34% (293 respondents) indicated that the question did not apply to them, likely reflecting those who had already completed their education or were not considering further studies. Focusing on the 244 respondents who expressed a desire to upgrade their qualifications, the dataset provides insights into their specific areas of interest:

- Full-Time or Evening Studies: Only 8.20% (20 respondents) indicated an interest in pursuing traditional, time-intensive full-time or evening programs. This low percentage reflects the practical challenges associated with these options, such as the need for flexible schedules.
- Weekend Studies: A slightly larger group, 25.00% (61 respondents), expressed interest in weekend courses, likely valuing the flexibility they offer for managing other commitments.
- Post-Secondary or Further Training: 55.74% (136 respondents) highlighted an aspiration to engage in vocational training or professional development programs.

These intentions reflect a focus on acquiring practical skills and certifications that align with labour market demands.

- Polish Language Courses: 76.23% (186 respondents) expressed a strong interest in improving their Polish language proficiency. This aspiration underscores the recognition of language acquisition as a crucial tool for integration and career opportunities in Poland.
- Courses in Other Foreign Languages: 36.07% (88 respondents) expressed an interest in learning other foreign languages, likely reflecting ambitions to expand their international mobility or pursue careers in multilingual environments.

The findings reflect the diverse educational aspirations of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, revealing both ambition and the challenges of planning for further qualifications in a new country. The relatively high interest in Polish language courses and vocational training indicates a strong focus on immediate, practical skills needed for integration into the labour market. However, the significant proportion of respondents who are uncertain about pursuing further education highlights the importance of addressing systemic barriers such as financial constraints, access to resources, and the need for tailored support.

4.2.4 Language Proficiency

4.2.4.1 Polish Language Skills

The linguistic abilities of Ukrainian refugees, as reflected in the 2022 and 2023 datasets, provide valuable insights into their integration into Polish society and the labour market. Analysing proficiency in Polish across four key dimensions—understanding, speaking, reading, and writing—reveals both foundational strengths and critical areas

requiring improvement. While many refugees demonstrate competence in certain skills, significant challenges remain, particularly in speaking and writing, underscoring the need for targeted language interventions. Figures 15 and 16 illustrate Polish language proficiency levels across key dimensions (understanding, speaking, reading, and writing) for the overall 2022 dataset and the 2023 dataset, respectively.

Understanding Polish emerges as the strongest skill in both datasets. In 2022, 12.4% rated their comprehension as "Very Good," and 19.3% as "Good," representing a substantial portion of the population with a strong grasp of the language. Similarly, in 2023, 20.6% rated their understanding as "Very Good," and 33.3% as "Good." However, challenges persist, with 9.3% in 2022 and 12.4% in 2023 rating their comprehension as "Poor," and smaller groups identifying it as "Very Weak." For the war refugee subgroup in the 2022 dataset, understanding Polish remains the strongest skill compared to other dimensions: Very Good: 9.50%; Good: 26.32%; As Such: 36.34%; Poor: 19.00%; Very Weak: 8.85%. These findings indicate a significant portion of the subgroup possesses at least a basic functional understanding of Polish, while others face barriers in comprehension.

Speaking Polish consistently emerges as the most challenging skill. In 2022, only 6.0% rated their speaking proficiency as "Very Good," and 11.2% as "Good," compared to 20.4% who categorized it as "Poor," and 7.9% as "Very Weak." Similar trends are evident in 2023, where just 4.9% described their speaking skills as "Very Good," and 16.9% as "Good," while 30.2% rated them as "Poor," and 7.2% as "Very Weak." For the war refugee subgroup in 2022, speaking proficiency shows significant weaknesses: Very Good: 2.30%; Good: 8.82%; As Such: 31.00%; Poor: 40.53%; Very Weak: 17.34% These results highlight the need for targeted interventions to improve conversational fluency,

which is essential for everyday interactions and professional engagement.

Reading Polish displays a moderate level of competence. In 2022, 8.7% rated their reading proficiency as "Very Good," and 15.1% as "Good," while 13.5% identified it as "Poor," and 5.8% as "Very Weak." In 2023, a similar distribution is observed, with 12.6% rating their reading skills as "Very Good," and 29.4% as "Good," while 13.4% categorized them as "Poor," and 5.3% as "Very Weak." Among the war refugee subgroup, reading proficiency shows slightly better results compared to speaking: Very Good: 4.78%; Good: 18.72%; As Such: 37.38%; Poor: 26.53%; Very Weak: 12.59%. These results indicate that while some refugees possess functional literacy, a significant proportion struggle with reading comprehension, which may limit access to essential resources.

Writing Polish consistently emerges as the weakest skill across both datasets. In 2022, only 4.5% rated their writing proficiency as "Very Good," and 6.8% as "Good," while 21.7% assessed their writing as "Poor," and 19.2% as "Very Weak." Similarly, in 2023, 3.8% rated their writing as "Very Good," and 10.5% as "Good," compared to 32.4% who categorized it as "Poor," and 22.7% as "Very Weak." For the war refugee subgroup, writing proficiency is the most significant challenge: Very Good: 1.50%, Good: 4.50%, As Such: 18.50%, Poor: 36.98%, Very Weak: 38.51%.

These findings emphasize the urgent need for interventions focused on written Polish, as writing skills are critical for formal communication, including job applications and official documentation.

The findings across all skills—particularly for the war refugee subgroup—highlight significant linguistic barriers that may limit integration into Polish society and the labour market. While understanding and reading skills show some foundational strengths, speaking and writing remain critical areas for improvement. To address these challenges, tailored language education programs focusing on conversational fluency and practical writing skills are essential. Immersive opportunities, such as community interactions and job-based language learning, alongside formal courses, can enhance refugees’ linguistic abilities and support their successful integration.

Figure 15 - Polish language proficiency levels (2022 Dataset). Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).





Figure 16 - Polish language proficiency levels (2023 Dataset). Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



4.2.4.2 Foreign Languages Skills

The analysis of foreign language proficiency among respondents from both the 2023 dataset and the war refugee subgroup of the 2022 dataset highlights their significant multilingual capabilities, which could play a crucial role in their integration into Polish society and the labour market.

Russian emerges as the most spoken language, with 94.20% (974 individuals) indicating communicative proficiency, reflecting its widespread use as a second language in Ukraine. English follows as the most widely spoken global language, with 56.48% (584 respondents) reporting proficiency. This suggests that many respondents may be well-positioned for roles requiring English in professional or international contexts. Proficiency in German was noted by 6.38% (66 individuals), while French and Spanish were spoken by smaller proportions, at 2.51% (26 respondents) each. Italian proficiency was the least common, reported by only 1.06% (11 respondents).

Insights from the War Refugees Subgroup (2022 Dataset)

The war refugee subgroup in the 2022 dataset reveals similar patterns of multilingual proficiency:

- Russian: 61.06% of respondents reported communicative proficiency in Russian. This highlights its importance as a common second language in Ukraine, enabling easier communication within the refugee community and with Russian speakers in Poland.
- English: A significant 57.23% of the subgroup indicated proficiency in English, aligning with its status as a global lingua franca. This skill positions many war refugees for opportunities in professional, academic, or international settings.
- German: Only 4.56% reported proficiency in German, reflecting limited prior exposure to the language or connections with German-speaking countries.
- French: Proficiency in French is notably low, with only 1.96% reporting communicative ability, indicating minimal exposure to this language.

The multilingual capabilities of both groups underscore their potential to integrate into Poland's labour market and society. While Russian remains the dominant language, English proficiency stands out as a key asset, particularly for roles in international businesses, academia, or tourism. The smaller proportions of individuals proficient in German, French, and other European languages highlight niche opportunities, particularly in sectors like trade, tourism, and cultural exchange.

At the same time, these findings underscore the need for tailored interventions to address linguistic challenges in Polish. While many migrants demonstrate foundational skills in Polish, particularly in

understanding and reading, significant gaps remain in speaking and writing. These gaps could hinder their ability to fully integrate into Polish society and the labour market.

The analysis of foreign language skills highlights the multilingual strengths of Ukrainian refugees, particularly in Russian and English. Leveraging these linguistic capabilities, alongside targeted Polish language training, could significantly enhance their professional and social integration in Poland. Investments in tailored language programs and efforts to match migrants with roles that utilize their linguistic strengths are crucial steps toward successful integration.

4.2.5 Motivations for Migration

The motivations driving migration offer valuable insights into the socio-economic and political contexts influencing the decisions of Ukrainian refugees. The analysis of these motivations, particularly before and after February 24, 2022, underscores the significant shifts prompted by the changing geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, the reasons behind choosing Poland as a destination reveal the interplay of geographic, social, and cultural factors that shaped migration decisions.

Before February 24, 2022, migration to Poland was primarily driven by economic instability. Among the most frequently cited factors were dissatisfaction with work conditions or earnings, identified by 973 respondents, and financial challenges, with 675 individuals pointing to a lack of funds. Additionally, 423 respondents cited unemployment as a major driver of migration. Social ties also played an important role, as 329 individuals migrated to join family, friends, or acquaintances, emphasizing the value of personal networks. Conversely, political and safety-related factors were comparatively minor during this period. Only 280 respondents cited the political situation in Ukraine, and 85

indicated direct threats to life or health. Predictably, pre-war migration motivations were mostly economic challenges, with political and safety concerns taking a secondary role.

After February 24, 2022, the outbreak of war in Ukraine dramatically reshaped migration motivations. Political instability became the primary motivation, with 3,054 respondents citing the political situation as the key reason for leaving Ukraine. This shift reflects the escalation of conflict and insecurity caused by the invasion. Social connections, while slightly less prominent than political factors, remained critical; 537 individuals migrated to join family, friends, or acquaintances. Although economic factors—such as unemployment (387 respondents) and lack of funds (436 respondents)—continued to influence migration, they became secondary to political and safety concerns. Education remained a minor factor, with only 109 respondents expressing a willingness to undertake or continue studies abroad. Similar to the pre-war data, a significant number of responses (2,645 per variable) were marked as "Not applicable," reflecting those who migrated before the war. These findings highlight a stark transition from economically motivated migration before February 2022 to migration primarily driven by political instability and conflict after the invasion.

To further analyse migration motivations, respondents were grouped into broad categories reflecting shared themes:

- **Economic Reasons:** This group includes individuals driven by unemployment, financial challenges, or dissatisfaction with work. Approximately 7.44% of respondents migrated for economic reasons, indicating that while economic instability remained relevant, it was not the dominant factor in the post-war period.

- War-Related Reasons: This category encompasses those fleeing due to political instability, direct threats to safety, or the desire to join family and friends already abroad. Nearly 59.55% of respondents fell into this group, highlighting the profound influence of the war on migration decisions.
- Family-Related Reasons: Approximately 5.21% of respondents cited joining family members as their primary motivation for migration. While less common than other reasons, this group reflects the enduring importance of social networks in shaping migration patterns.
- Other Reasons: This group, representing 5.34% of respondents, includes individuals motivated by education or other unspecified factors.

The data also provides insights into why Ukrainian refugees specifically chose Poland as their destination. Geographic proximity emerged as the most influential factor, cited by 2,149 respondents. Poland's social and cultural connections further strengthened its appeal, with 2,097 respondents emphasizing the presence of family or relatives and 2,322 highlighting the friendly attitude of Poles. The availability of support systems for migrants and refugees, selected by 855 respondents, also played a critical role. Linguistic similarities between Ukrainian and Polish were cited by 1,256 individuals, facilitating integration and communication. Conversely, economic factors, such as returning to a previous job, were less significant, with only 125 respondents selecting this as a reason. A small but consistent number of responses (358 per variable) were marked as "Not applicable," underscoring the diversity of individual experiences.

4.2.6. Employment Characteristics

In this study, employment status in Poland serves as the independent variable to analyse its relationship with other aspects of respondents' migration experiences and integration. To operationalize this concept, a binary variable was created for both the 2022 and 2023 datasets, distinguishing between respondents who were employed in Poland and those who were not.

In the 2022 dataset, employment status in Poland was captured through question A45, which asked respondents to identify their main activity in Poland. This question provided a range of options, including full-time employment, part-time work, self-employment, odd jobs, not working but looking for a job, and not working and not looking. To operationalize this information, a binary variable, employment, was created to distinguish between respondents who were working and those who were not. Respondents were classified as "working" if they reported being employed full-time, part-time, self-employed, or engaged in odd jobs. Conversely, those who indicated they were not working—whether actively looking for a job or not—were categorized as "not working." This classification provided a clear and concise distinction between active participants in the labour market and those not currently engaged in employment. The variable, labelled Employment Status in Poland (Binary: Working/Not Working), was designed to focus exclusively on labour market participation within Poland.

In the 2023 dataset we had the opportunity to distinguish between types of employment and locations of work. To construct this variable, respondents were classified as employed if they had worked for at least one hour during the past week or if they had a job but were temporarily not working due to reasons such as illness or leave (questions P25 and

P26). Those who neither worked nor had a job were categorized as not employed.

The dataset also accounted for job types and locations through question P33, which distinguished between local work, remote work for employers in Poland or other countries, and undefined employment situations. Respondents whose employment was tied to Ukrainian employers, employers in other countries, or undefined job settings were excluded from being categorized as employed in Poland. However, cases where P33 was marked as "Not Applicable" were reassessed based on responses to P25 and P26 to ensure their employment status reflected their actual work activity. This multi-step process allowed the study to capture employment within Poland more accurately, excluding work activities unrelated to the Polish labour market. The final variable was labelled as "employment_poland", where respondents were classified as "Employed" (1) or "Not Employed" (0), ensuring clarity and consistency.


4.2.6.1 Employment Status (2022 Dataset)

The data reveals that 67.55% of respondents (5,145 individuals) were employed in Poland, while 32.45% (2,472 individuals) were not employed. Among those employed, the majority worked in full-time positions, accounting for 47.20% of the entire sample, while smaller shares engaged in part-time work (7.40%), self-employment (5.33%), and odd jobs (7.61%). The presence of respondents working odd jobs highlights the reliance of some migrants on informal or temporary employment arrangements. Among the non-working group, 18.21% were actively seeking employment, while 14.24% were not looking for work, reflecting a range of personal and structural barriers to labour market participation.

A deeper analysis of employment activities by date of arrival in Poland highlights key differences between individuals who arrived before February 24, 2022, and those who arrived on or after this date. Full-time employment remains the most common category for both groups, yet those arriving earlier demonstrate a far greater share of full-time workers, with 76.93% of this group (2,036 individuals) employed in such positions, compared to only 31.36% (1,559 individuals) of recent arrivals. This contrast underscores the challenges faced by recent migrants in securing stable and formal employment opportunities. In contrast, part-time work is more prevalent among those arriving after February 24, 2022, as 8.31% (413 individuals) of recent arrivals reported working part-time, compared to just 5.71% (151 individuals) of earlier migrants. Similarly, self-employment shows a modest increase among recent arrivals, with 5.53% (275 individuals) compared to 4.95% (131 individuals) of earlier arrivals. The rise in odd jobs is particularly notable, as only 2.65% (70 individuals) of earlier migrants reported such work, compared to 10.26% (510 individuals) of recent arrivals, highlighting the increased reliance on informal and temporary roles among this group.

As shown in Figure 17, the distribution of employment categories varies significantly between those who arrived in Poland before February 24, 2022, and those who arrived on or after this date. The graph highlights the dominance of full-time employment among earlier arrivals, while recent arrivals are more likely to be engaged in part-time work, self-employment, or odd jobs, as well as facing higher rates of unemployment.

Figure 17 - Employment Status among Refugees (2022 Dataset). Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



Unemployment trends also show stark differences between the two groups. Earlier arrivals demonstrate lower rates of unemployment, with only 5.37% (142 individuals) not working but actively looking for a job, compared to 25.05% (1,245 individuals) among recent arrivals. Furthermore, the number of respondents not working and not seeking employment increased from 4.35% (115 individuals) before February 24, 2022, to 19.52% (970 individuals) among later arrivals. The figure reflects the heightened barriers to labour market participation faced by more recent migrants, potentially due to the timing of their arrival amidst a larger influx of people and the limited capacity of the Polish labour market to integrate them.

To better understand non-employment cases, we analysed question A46 (respondents who selected "not working and not looking for a job") and A45, where they specify their reasons for not seeking employment. The most frequently cited reason was childcare or pregnancy, accounting for 4.74% of the total sample (361 individuals), followed by retirement at 2.44% (186 individuals) and health problems at 1.33% (101 individuals). Some respondents indicated studying as their reason for

not working (1.08%, or 82 individuals), while 2.84% (216 individuals) provided other explanations. Less commonly mentioned were systemic barriers such as lack of language knowledge (0.98%), being not mentally ready to work (0.51%), and the inability to work in their profession (0.33%). A substantial majority of respondents (85.76%) did not provide reasons for not seeking work, likely because they were either employed or actively looking for work at the time of the survey.

This employment data offers a nuanced understanding of respondents' integration into the Polish labour market. While a significant portion of the sample has managed to secure full-time employment, the prevalence of informal or temporary roles, such as odd jobs or self-employment, indicates that many respondents face precarious labour market conditions. The challenges experienced by recent arrivals further emphasize the evolving nature of labour market integration, with earlier migrants benefiting from more stable opportunities compared to those arriving after February 24, 2022. Moreover, the reasons cited for non-participation in the labour market reflect a combination of personal circumstances, such as caregiving responsibilities, and structural barriers, such as health issues and language difficulties.

Overall, the analysis of employment status provides valuable insights into the broader migration and integration patterns of respondents in Poland. By defining employment as the key independent variable, this study establishes a foundation for exploring its impact on various dependent variables, such as economic stability, social integration, and overall adaptation outcomes.

4.2.6.2 Types and Sectors of Work in Poland


Employment patterns in Poland among respondents reveal diverse job

roles and highlight significant participation in various employment types. Among those employed, 19.10% (1,455 individuals) reported performing simple work, the most common type of employment, often reflecting unskilled or entry-level roles. Skilled workers or craftsmen accounted for 7.27% (554 individuals), while service workers or sellers comprised 5.25% (400 individuals), emphasizing engagement in customer-facing industries.

Specialist positions were reported by 5.49% (418 respondents), showing roles requiring advanced qualifications. Office workers, technicians, and mid-level staff made up 2.99% (228 respondents), while managerial positions, both low and high-level, collectively accounted for 1.26% of the sample (96 respondents). A small percentage (5.28% or 402 respondents) selected "other" types of work, highlighting roles that do not fit conventional categories.

In Figure 18 we can see the types of work distribution, that shows the predominance of simple work and skilled labour, while managerial roles are underrepresented. However, the high number of "not applicable" responses limits the completeness of this representation.

Figure 18 - Types of Work (2022 Dataset). Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel ("Between Ukraine and Poland").



However, it is important to note that the data has certain limitations. While 5,145 respondents reported being employed in Poland (as indicated by their working status), 4,064 individuals selected "Not Applicable" when asked about the specific type of work performed. This suggests that a significant proportion of respondents, despite being employed, did not provide further details about their roles, and possible reasons could include reluctance to classify their work, incomplete responses, or engagement in informal or irregular jobs. Therefore, while the chart provides valuable insights into the general distribution of job types in Poland, it should be interpreted as a partial representation of the employment landscape.

With the analysis of A49 variable we can have more details about the employment sector. The most frequently cited sector was production (9.74% or 742 respondents), indicating substantial involvement in manufacturing and industrial activities. Gastronomy (5.36% or 408 respondents) and wholesale and retail trade (3.18% or 242 respondents) were other notable sectors, reflecting significant participation in food service and commerce. Hospitality and tourism accounted for 2.31% (176 respondents), aligning with findings on service-oriented jobs. Professional sectors such as education/translation (2.82% or 215 respondents) and healthcare/care services (2.10% or 160 respondents) indicate engagement in essential services, while IT/technology/communication (2.13%) and finance/banking/accounting (0.77%) represent roles requiring specialized skills. Construction and repair services (2.43% or 185 respondents) and transport (1.35% or 103 respondents) highlight contributions to infrastructure and logistics. However, as with A48, over half the sample (53.35% or 4,064 individuals) selected "not applicable," indicating a significant portion of respondents were outside

the labour force. This highlights barriers to labour market participation that may include personal, social, or systemic factors.

The analysis of the variable A47 offers insights into employment transitions. Among respondents, 20.90% (1,592 individuals) continued the same job with the same employer after arriving in Poland, reflecting continuity in professional roles across borders. In contrast, 35.09% (2,673 respondents) started a new job in Poland, highlighting the labour market transitions undertaken by many migrants to adapt to the host country's economy. A substantial 44.01% (3,352 respondents) selected "not applicable," aligning with high levels of unemployment or non-participation seen in other variables.

These findings emphasize the challenges faced by migrants in maintaining employment continuity, as only a small proportion were able to continue working with their previous employers. Many respondents likely encountered barriers such as legal restrictions, logistical challenges, or differences in demand for specific skills between the Polish and Ukrainian labour markets. The predominance of new job starts highlights the dynamic nature of employment transitions and the reliance on new opportunities in the Polish labour market.

4.2.6.3 Employment in Ukraine Before Migration

The analysis of employment in Ukraine prior to migration reveals important insights into the professional backgrounds of respondents, shedding light on their economic activities before relocating to Poland. These findings offer a comprehensive overview of their professional roles, sectors, and potential challenges faced during their transition to the Polish labour market.

A substantial majority of respondents (80.20% or 6,109 individuals)

reported being employed in Ukraine before migrating to Poland. This high percentage highlights the professional engagement of most respondents in their home country prior to the war. In contrast, 19.80% (1,508 individuals) indicated they were already working in Poland before February 24, 2022, reflecting pre-existing employment connections in the host country. These results underscore the significant labour market participation of Ukrainian migrants, with most respondents rooted professionally in Ukraine while a smaller group had prior integration into the Polish labour market.

4.2.6.4 Types of Jobs Held in Ukraine

The types of jobs performed by respondents in Ukraine illustrate the diversity of their professional roles. A significant portion (25.29% or 1,926 respondents) worked as specialists, making this the most common job type. This indicates that many migrants held skilled professional positions before their migration, reflecting a well-educated and qualified workforce.

Lower-skilled roles were also prominent, with 11.11% (846 individuals) employed as service workers or sellers and 9.70% (739 individuals) performing simple works. Additionally, 9.48% (722 respondents) worked as skilled workers or craftsmen, while 7.47% (569 respondents) held positions in low or middle-level management. Senior leadership roles were less common, with only 2.46% (187 respondents) working as high-level managers. Similarly, 5.47% (417 individuals) were employed as office workers, technicians, or mid-level staff. Another 9.23% (703 respondents) selected "other," reflecting roles that may not align with the predefined categories in the survey. The proportion of respondents selecting "not applicable" (19.80% or 1,508 individuals) in A43 likely corresponds to those who reported not working in Ukraine before migration, as indicated in A41, or who

worked in Poland or another country instead. This underscores the varied pre-migration employment contexts of the sample and provides additional clarity regarding the professional backgrounds of respondents.

The analysis of employment in Ukraine before migration demonstrates a diverse range of professional experiences among respondents. A majority of individuals were actively employed in their home country, with a significant share engaged in skilled or specialized roles such as specialists, educators, healthcare workers, and IT professionals. Key sectors like trade, production, education, and IT/technology emerged as dominant areas of employment, reflecting the economic structure of the Ukrainian labour market.

The 19.80% of respondents who reported not working in Ukraine are reflected in the "not applicable" category for job type (A43) and job sector (A44). This alignment highlights that these individuals either worked in Poland or another country or were not employed at all prior to migration. Understanding this distinction is essential for accurately interpreting the employment data and recognizing the variety of experiences within the sample.

This detailed understanding of respondents' employment backgrounds provides valuable context for analysing their transitions into the Polish labour market. The data highlights both the strengths and potential challenges these individuals bring to their new economic environments, setting the stage for further exploration of their integration experiences.

4.2.6.5 Employment Status and Job Types (2023 Dataset)

The 2023 dataset provides a far more nuanced view of employment dynamics and integration into the Polish labour market than its predecessor. While the 2022 dataset primarily offered general insights into employment status, the 2023 dataset introduces distinctions

between different job types, temporary inactivity, and employment specifically in Poland. This added specificity allows for a deeper understanding of how Ukrainian refugees navigate the Polish labour market, shedding light on critical aspects of their integration journey.

A key focus of the analysis is employment status, assessed through questions about whether respondents worked at least one hour in the past week or were temporarily inactive despite holding a job. Nearly half (46.42%) reported being employed, while a significant share (34.33%) were not working. Meanwhile, 17.70% indicated that the question didn't apply to their situation. Among those with jobs but temporarily not working, only a small fraction (3.19%) cited reasons like illness or leave. These findings reveal a clear divide between active employment, temporary inactivity, and unemployment, providing a more nuanced understanding of how refugees are engaging with the labour market. The dataset also examines whether respondents have worked in Poland since the onset of the war. The findings reveal that only a small fraction (8.80%) have engaged in paid work in Poland, while 22.82% have not, and a large majority (68.38%) deemed the question not applicable. This highlights the limited labour market integration among many Ukrainian refugees, reflecting either a lack of employment opportunities or circumstances preventing participation in the Polish workforce.

A particularly insightful variable explores the types of jobs held by respondents. Of those employed, the majority (41.20%) reported working locally for a Polish employer, demonstrating successful integration into the Polish labour market. 2.42% works remotely for a Polish employer, while the 2.61% maintain employment ties to Ukrainian employers. However, 47.10% were not applicable, underlining the high number of individuals not currently employed.

These findings underscore the variety of employment settings among refugees.

4.2.6.6 Barriers to Job Searching (2023 Dataset)

Barriers to job searching reveal important insights: among all respondents, 18.96% actively searched for work in the past four weeks, while 13.73% reported they were not looking for a job. A significant majority, 67.31%, marked this question as "not applicable," likely because they were already employed. From this, we evaluated that 142 individuals explicitly stated they were not searching for work.

For these 142 individuals, several barriers to job searching emerged. The most common challenge was caregiving responsibilities, cited by 35.21% (50 out of 142), highlighting the burden of family and dependent care. Retirement was the second most frequent reason, reported by 27.46% (39 out of 142), indicating a subset of older individuals who are likely no longer active in the labour market. Health problems also played a significant role, with 21.13% (30 out of 142) of respondents identifying this as a barrier, while language barriers prevented 19.01% (27 out of 142) from actively seeking employment—a reflection of the critical need for language integration support. Other notable barriers included an inability to work in one's profession (10.56%, 15 out of 142), which may point to systemic challenges such as credential recognition or lack of opportunities in specific fields. Similarly, psychological readiness was an issue for 9.15% (13 out of 142), likely reflecting the emotional toll of displacement and the broader mental health challenges faced by refugees. A smaller proportion, 8.45% (12 out of 142), reported not needing a job, possibly due to financial support or other resources. Finally, 10.56% (15 out of 142) mentioned "other reasons," likely reflecting diverse individual circumstances not captured by the main categories.

These findings paint a detailed picture of the diverse and often overlapping challenges faced by those not actively engaging in the labour market. Caregiving responsibilities, retirement, and health issues emerged as dominant factors, while language barriers and systemic hurdles, such as difficulties in credential recognition, underscore the need for targeted support. Addressing these barriers is essential to fostering better labour market integration and enabling refugees to fully contribute to their host communities.

4.2.6.7 Work Experience and Employment Satisfaction (2023 Dataset)

The dataset also provides valuable insights into respondents' prior work experience. The overwhelming majority (91.78%) reported having at least one year of general work experience, with only 7.06% having less than one year, and a mere 1.16% indicating they had never worked. On average, respondents had nearly 24 years of work experience, though the wide standard deviation of 24.05 years suggests significant variability, ranging from individuals early in their careers to those nearing retirement. This wealth of experience highlights the potential for successful labour market integration, though the variability may impact the types of roles individuals can pursue.

Job satisfaction isn't uniform across all aspects—people feel differently depending on what's being measured. When asked to rate their experiences across eight key dimensions, from salary to workplace atmosphere, respondents showed the highest satisfaction in areas related to interpersonal relationships. Notably, nearly a quarter (23.98%) reported being "very satisfied" with their work environment, particularly their relationships with colleagues and supervisors. Similarly, 20.70% expressed the same level of satisfaction with social interactions at work. These insights highlight the importance of workplace relationships and suggest that many workplaces are

successfully fostering a sense of social connection and integration. However, challenges remain in other areas. Satisfaction with remuneration was notably low, with only 6.29% "very satisfied" and a significant portion expressing dissatisfaction. Similarly, opportunities for promotion and personal development received some of the lowest satisfaction ratings. Only 10.44% were "very satisfied" with promotion opportunities, and over 30% expressed dissatisfaction. These results highlight a lack of upward mobility and growth potential, which may hinder long-term job satisfaction and career advancement.

Stability and flexibility, on the other hand, received more favourable reviews. Nearly 40% of respondents expressed satisfaction with stability in terms of working hours and contracts, and flexibility in working arrangements also garnered relatively high satisfaction levels. While alignment between tasks and respondents' education and competences showed mixed results, with 16.44% "very satisfied" and a comparable portion dissatisfied, it highlights a potential mismatch between skills and job roles for some. The 2023 dataset provides a detailed snapshot of how Ukrainian refugees are navigating the Polish job market, revealing both progress and ongoing challenges. Many refugees bring valuable work experience and thrive in workplaces with supportive colleagues and positive social interactions. However, obstacles such as caregiving responsibilities, language barriers, and bureaucratic challenges, like the recognition of foreign qualifications, continue to limit their full participation. Additionally, frustration over low wages, limited career growth, and mismatched job roles suggests that more targeted efforts are needed to improve their employment experiences. By addressing these barriers, policymakers and organizations can create better opportunities for refugees to integrate successfully into the workforce and build more stable, fulfilling lives in Poland.

4.3 Methods

The empirical analysis is centred around the following core research questions: *What are the demographic, social, and migration-related factors that influence the likelihood of employment among Ukrainian war refugees in Poland? How do migration motivations affect employment outcomes for Ukrainian refugees in Poland?*

4.3.1 Analytical Framework

To address this, a multi-step analytical framework was adopted:

1. Exploratory Correlation Analysis

The first step examines the relationships between employment status and key independent variables to identify initial patterns. Statistical techniques include:

- Spearman's rank correlation: Used for continuous variables (e.g., age, language proficiency) to explore potential non-linear relationships.
- Pearson's chi-square tests: Applied to categorical variables (e.g., gender, education level, migration motivations) to identify significant associations.

2. Bivariate Regression Analysis

Bivariate analyses are conducted to identify the correlation between each independent variable and employment status. This step provides an initial exploration of associations between individual characteristics (Q1) and migration motivations (Q2) without accounting for potential confounding effects. However, since bivariate regressions do not control for omitted variable bias, they do not isolate causal effects but rather highlight broad patterns of association.

3. Multivariate Regression Modelling

Multivariate regression models are employed on the 2022 Dataset and the 2023 Dataset to address both research questions comprehensively. This step allows for the simultaneous evaluation of individual characteristics (Q1) and migration motivations/arrival circumstances (Q2).

The multivariate analysis incorporates:

- OLS Regression Models: Used specifically to study interaction effects between variables. OLS regression provides a linear relationship between variables, the model explores especially how the relationship between independent variables and employment outcomes changes when interaction terms are included (Own notes from econometrics class).
 - Gender and Age Interaction: how employment likelihood varies by age for men versus women.
 - Marital Status and Caregiving Responsibilities Interaction: How marital status interacts with having children to affect employment outcomes.

Including interactions into the models offers deeper insights into the mechanisms of labour market integration.

- Logit Regression Models: Logit Regression: Better suited for binary outcomes like employment (employed vs. unemployed). The logit model estimates the probability of employment and provides a clearer understanding of how each predictor impacts the likelihood of employment.
- Marginal Effects Analysis: To interpret the magnitude and direction of predictors, offering actionable insights into how different factors influence employment probabilities.

By including all variables in a single framework, these models account

for potential interactions and confounding effects, enabling a holistic understanding of both individual characteristics and contextual factors influencing employment outcomes.

3.1 Models on the 2022 Dataset

The 2022 Dataset, which includes over 7,000 individuals, enables the differentiation of migration motivations through the identification of two key subgroups using dummy variables:

- War Refugees: Individuals who fled Ukraine due to conflict. A dummy variable is created (coded as 1 for war refugees, 0 otherwise), encompassing 2,276 observations.
- Economic Migrants: Individuals who migrated primarily for economic reasons. A separate dummy variable identifies these migrants (coded as 1 for economic migrants, 0 otherwise), consisting of 1,409 observations.

By including these dummy variables, the models capture how migration motivations influence employment outcomes. For instance: Economic Migrants may have higher probabilities of employment due to proactive planning and prior economic integration strategies. War Refugees, on the other hand, may face additional challenges such as trauma, disrupted careers, or urgent displacement, leading to different structural barriers in the labour market.

The analysis on the 2022 Dataset includes:

- A model for the entire 2022 sample, incorporating both war refugees and economic migrants with their respective dummy variables to evaluate differences between these two groups.
- A model for the subgroup of individuals arrived after February 2022. This model allows for a more targeted understanding of

the challenges and opportunities faced by recent arrivals.

3.2 Models on the 2023 Dataset

The 2023 Dataset is exclusively focused on war refugees and includes over 1,000 observations. This targeted dataset enables the analysis of employment outcomes for individuals directly affected by the ongoing conflict. By comparing results with the 2022 dataset, the models identify trends, disparities, and unique challenges faced by war refugees over time. For instance, the 2023 dataset captures potential shifts in employment outcomes as refugees spend more time in the host country.

4.3.2 Operationalization of Variables

The study focuses on the following variables, categorized by their relevance to Q1 and Q2:

- **Dependent Variable:** Employment status, operationalized as a binary variable (employed = 1, not employed = 0).
- **Independent Variables:**
 - **Q1 Variables (Individual Characteristics):** Gender, age, marital status, education level, caregiving responsibilities, and Polish language proficiency.
 - **Q2 Variables (Migration Motivations and Arrival Circumstances):** Economic reasons, war-related displacement, and family reunification as self-reported motivations for migration.

4.3.3 Hypotheses Testing

The analysis tests the following hypotheses, which correspond to Q1 and Q2:

- **H1 (Human Capital Hypothesis):** Refugees with higher education levels, professional experience, and Polish language

proficiency are more likely to secure employment.

- H2 (Family Structure Constraint Hypothesis): Refugees with caregiving responsibilities are less likely to participate in the labour market.
- H3 (Migration Motivation Hypothesis): Refugees motivated by economic reasons are more likely to be employed than those fleeing war-related circumstances.

4.3.4 Statistical Software and Tools

All statistical analyses are conducted using Stata. The software is chosen for its advanced capabilities in handling large datasets, running complex regression models, and calculating marginal effects. Data cleaning and preparation are also performed within Stata to ensure consistency and reproducibility.

For effectively communicate through visual representations our Data Excel is utilized, aiding in the interpretation and presentation of findings.

5. DRIVERS AND MECHANISMS OF LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF UKRAINIAN WAR REFUGEES

5.1 Correlates of Employment Status

5.1.1 Introduction

Understanding the factors influencing employment status is crucial for assessing the overall integration of Ukrainian refugees into the Polish labour market, as employment plays a central role in the integration process. Employment, as the dependent variable, serves as a critical indicator of economic stability, social inclusion, and successful adaptation. By analysing correlations between employment status and key variables such as language proficiency, education level, marital status, gender, caregiving responsibilities, age, and migration motivations, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of the facilitators and challenges of labour market integration.

The operationalization of employment status as a binary variable, "employed" (1) and "not employed" (0), ensures consistency in the analysis while capturing the employment experiences of refugees in Poland. To contextualize the analysis, it draws on two datasets, described in detail earlier:

- 2022 Dataset: This dataset encompasses migrants who arrived both before and after February 2022, offering a basis for comparing employment outcomes between longer-term migrants and those recently displaced by the war.
- 2023 Dataset: Exclusively focused on war refugees who, this dataset provides a targeted perspective on the employment experiences of individuals directly affected by the ongoing conflict.

This sub-chapter examines the relationships between employment and variables that reflect broader dimensions of integration:

- Gender: Analysing disparities in employment outcomes between men and women, particularly challenges faced by women.
- Age: Exploring how employment likelihood varies across different life stages.
- Marital Status and Family Responsibilities: Investigating the impact of caregiving and family structures on employment participation.
- Language Proficiency: Highlighting Polish language skills as a critical determinant of employment success.
- Education Level: Examining the role of qualifications and training in accessing job opportunities.
- Migration Motivations: Assessing how reasons for migration—whether economic, war-related, or family-related—influence employment outcomes. This variable reflects the primary driver of displacement and its impact on refugees' readiness and ability to integrate into the labour market.

By evaluating these relationships, the analysis uncovers patterns and disparities within the refugee population. For instance, it highlights how language proficiency and education disproportionately impact specific subgroups, such as women or older refugees, and reveals how caregiving responsibilities intersect with gender and marital status to shape employment probabilities.

This sub-chapter begins with an overview of key variables, followed by correlation analyses as an initial check for relationships. Next, bivariate linear regression explores direct associations, and finally, logit regression models provide a more detailed analysis by controlling for

additional factors and estimating employment probabilities. This step-by-step approach ensures a thorough understanding of the factors influencing the labour market integration of Ukrainian refugees.

5.1.1.1 Variables in the Analysis

This section outlines the key variables analysed in relation to employment status, which serves as the dependent variable in this study. Employment status is operationalized as a binary variable (employed = 1, not employed = 0) and is central to understanding the integration of Ukrainian refugees into the Polish labour market. The other variables included in the analysis reflect demographic, social, and skills-related dimensions that influence employment outcomes.

1. Demographic Variables

- Gender: Gender differences reveal disparities in labour market access and employment outcomes. Women, who often face unique challenges such as caregiving responsibilities, may experience lower employment rates than men (Górny et al., 2023) This variable is categorical, distinguishing between male and female respondents.
- Age: Age is a significant determinant of employment status, reflecting both life-cycle trends and barriers such as age-related discrimination or retirement. This variable is continuous and based on respondents' year of birth.
- Number of Children: Capturing caregiving responsibilities, this variable reflects the total number of children reported by respondents. Caregiving often poses a barrier to employment, particularly for women, limiting their ability to participate in the workforce (Górny et al., 2023).
- Marital Status: Marital status intersects with family

responsibilities and stability, influencing workforce participation (Górny et al., 2023). This variable is categorical, with options such as married, divorced, widowed, and single.

2. Skills and Competencies

- Language Proficiency in Polish: Language skills are critical to navigating the labour market, enabling communication with employers and colleagues (Górny, Duszczyk, et al., 2023). This variable captures self-reported proficiency in understanding, speaking, reading, and writing Polish, measured on a 5-point ordinal scale (from "very weak" to "very good). For clarity, a composite variable (`lang_composite`) was created by averaging four language proficiency scores. A reversed version (`lang_composite_reversed`) was also generated, where higher values indicate better proficiency. This was used in correlation and regression analyses.
- Education Level: Education is a key predictor of employability and job quality. Higher education levels often correlate with better employment opportunities, higher earnings, and access to skilled positions (Kubiciel–Lodzińska et al., 2024). This variable is categorical, ranging from basic or lower education to higher education.

3. Migration Motivations

- Migration motivations include economic reasons (e.g., seeking financial stability or job opportunities), war-related reasons (e.g., fleeing conflict or violence), and family-related reasons (e.g., reunification with family). These motivations shape employment outcomes by influencing refugees' readiness and priorities for labour market integration.

5.1.1.2 Purpose of the Analysis

This study investigates the integration of Ukrainian refugees into the Polish labour market, focusing on how demographic characteristics, migration motivations, and skills-related factors influence employment outcomes. Employment serves as both a critical indicator of successful integration and a determinant of economic and social stability in the host country (Kaczmarczyk et al., 2020).

The selection of variables reflects the multifaceted nature of labour market participation, incorporating not only language proficiency, education, family responsibilities, age, and gender but also the motivations behind migration. By identifying the factors that facilitate or hinder employment, this research contributes to the growing body of literature on refugee integration and provides actionable insights for policymakers and organizations seeking to support the socioeconomic inclusion of refugees.

5.1.2 Analysis of the Relationship between Gender and Employment Status

5.1.2.1 2022 Dataset

This analysis examines the relationship between gender and employment status in the full 2022 dataset and the war refugee's subgroup (individuals who arrived in Poland after February 2022). By applying Chi-Square tests and linear regression, notable gender disparities in employment outcomes are identified, with variations between the two groups.

The relationship between gender and employment status was examined using both a Chi-Square test and a linear regression model. Among the total sample of 7,617 individuals, 77.18% (5,145 individuals) reported being employed, while 22.82% (2,472 individuals) were not employed.

Gender distribution showed that females comprised the majority of the sample (77.5%, N = 5,905), followed by males (22.1%, N = 1,686), with a small proportion (0.3%, N = 26) not declaring their gender.

A Chi-Square test was conducted to determine whether employment status is associated with gender. The results revealed a statistically significant relationship between these variables, $\chi^2 (2, N = 7,617) = 290.27, p < 0.001$.

Table 1 - Employment Status by Gender (2022 Dataset: Whole Sample). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Gender	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
Female	3,698 (62.6%)	5,905 (77.5%)	7,603 (77.5%)
Male	261 (84.5%)	1,425 (84.5%)	1,686 (22.1%)
Total	2,472 (32.4%)	5,145 (67.6%)	7,617 (100%)

These results highlight a disparity in employment rates between genders, with males being significantly more likely to be employed than females (84.5% vs. 62.6%). Individuals who did not declare their gender exhibited employment rates similar to males (84.6%).

The war refugee’s subgroup includes 3,264 individuals, with 53.8% (1,754) employed and 46.2% (1,510) not employed. Females comprise 88.7% (2,895), males 11.1% (363), and 0.2% (6) did not declare their gender.

The Chi-Square test revealed a statistically significant relationship between gender and employment status ($\chi^2 (2, N = 3,264) = 9.32, p = 0.009$).

Table 2 - Employment Status by Gender (2022 Dataset: War Refugees Subgroup) Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and

Poland”).

Gender	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
Female	1,360 (47.0%)	1,535 (53.0%)	2,895 (88.7%)
Male	150 (41.3%)	213 (58.7%)	363 (11.1%)
Total	1,510 (46.2%)	1,754 (53.8%)	3,264 (100.0%)

These results show that males are slightly more likely to be employed (58.7%) compared to females (53.0%), with the gender difference being statistically significant.

A linear regression analysis found a significant effect of gender on employment status ($F(2, 7614) = 150.83, p < 0.001, R^2 = 0.0381$).

- Females: 21.89% lower employment probability than males ($p < 0.001$).
- Constant: Male employment probability = 84.52%.

Results align with the Chi-Square test, confirming a disadvantage for females.

For war refugees:

- Females: 5.66% lower employment probability ($p = 0.042$).
- Constant: Male employment probability = 58.68%.

The comparison highlights key differences in gender disparities between the full sample and war refugees:

- The gender gap in employment is wider in the full sample, where males have a 21.89% higher probability of employment compared to females.
- Among war refugees, this gap narrows to 5.66%.
- In both groups, males are more likely to be employed than females, though the disparity is less pronounced for war refugees.

These findings suggest that migration context may influence gender dynamics in the labour market. Among war refugees, shared challenges like displacement and adaptation to a new environment may reduce traditional gender disparities, though they do not eliminate them. Addressing these disparities requires targeted policies, including support for female refugees, access to childcare, and interventions to mitigate structural barriers in the labour market. These efforts can improve labour market integration and reduce gender inequalities for both war refugees and the broader migrant population (Górny, Duszczuk, et al., 2023).

5.1.2.2 2023 Dataset

The 2023 dataset includes 746 respondents, with 57.10% (426) employed and 42.90% (320) not employed. The gender distribution shows that 90.7% (677) of the sample were female, while 9.1% (68) were male. Table 3 shows the results of the cross-tabulation analysis:

Table 3 - Employment Status by Gender (2023 Dataset: War Refugees). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Gender	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
Female	292 (43.13%)	385 (56.87%)	677 (90.7%)
Male	28 (41.18%)	40 (58.82%)	68 (9.1%)
Total	320 (42.90%)	426 (57.10%)	746 (100%)

- Among females, 43.13% were not employed, and 56.87% were employed.
- Among males, 41.18% were not employed, and 58.82% were employed.
- The overall employment rate for the sample was 57.10%.

A Pearson Chi-Square test revealed no statistically significant

association between gender and employment status (χ^2 (2, N = 746) = 0.8486, p = 0.654). This suggests that gender does not significantly influence employment outcomes in this dataset. Linear regression (Table 17) showed no significant gender difference in employment (Females: -0.020, p = 0.063).

5.1.2.3 Interpretation and Conclusion

The smaller proportion of males in the 2023 dataset (9.1% vs. 22.1% in the 2022 dataset) is a critical factor in interpreting these results. This demographic imbalance may dilute the observed impact of gender on employment status, as the sample may not fully capture gender-specific patterns in labour market integration. Additionally, the narrowing of gender disparities in employment outcomes in both the 2022 war refugee subgroup and the 2023 dataset suggests that shared challenges among recently arrived refugees, such as displacement, language barriers, the urgency of finding work, and potential equal access to targeted integration programs, may temporarily diminish traditional gender differences (Górny, Duszczyk, et al., 2023).

However, the findings from the 2022 full sample, where males had a clear advantage in employment, highlight the persistence of structural gender inequalities in the broader labour market. The lack of significant gender differences in the 2023 dataset may reflect changes in labour market conditions, the structure of refugee assistance programs, or the demographic composition of the sample, particularly the lower proportion of males. These circumstances suggest that the specific conditions faced by refugees in 2023 may differ from those of the broader refugee population in 2022.

Future research should explore potential interactions between gender and other variables, such as caregiving responsibilities, language proficiency, or education levels, to uncover nuanced determinants of employment outcomes. Additionally, examining changes in labour

market conditions and refugee integration policies between 2022 and 2023 may shed light on the observed differences.

5.1.3 Analysis of the Relationship between Age and Employment Status

5.1.3.1 2022 Dataset

The relationship between age and employment status was examined using correlation analysis and linear regression in both the full 2022 dataset and the war refugee's subgroup of the 2022 dataset. This analysis aimed to explore how age influences the likelihood of employment and whether this relationship is linear or exhibits non-linear patterns.

In the full 2022 dataset, age was calculated based on respondents' year of birth, ranging from 18 to 92 years. The sample displayed an average age of 42.3 years (SD = 12.4), with a median age of 40 years. To capture potential non-linear effects, a quadratic term (age^2) was included in the regression model, reflecting how employment likelihood might increase and then decrease at different stages of life.

Correlation Analysis A point-biserial correlation revealed a statistically significant but weak negative relationship between age and employment status ($r = -0.1456$, $p < 0.001$), suggesting that as age increases, the likelihood of being employed slightly decreases.

Regression Analysis: The linear regression model, including both age and age^2 , was statistically significant overall ($F(2, 7614) = 144.16$, $p < 0.001$, with an R^2 value of 0.0365, indicating that 3.65% of the variance in employment status is explained by age and age^2 , as we can see in Table 15. The results are summarised as follow:


- **Linear Term (Age):** A one-year increase in age corresponds to a 1.89% increase in the likelihood of employment at younger ages.

- Quadratic Term (Age^2): The negative coefficient reflects an inverted U-shaped relationship, where employment likelihood initially increases with age but begins to decline after a certain point.
- Constant: The baseline probability of employment is 42.68% when age is zero (theoretical and not meaningful).

The analysis highlights a life-cycle pattern where employment likelihood increases during early adulthood, peaks in middle age, and declines as individuals approach retirement. This pattern aligns with broader labour market trends influenced by factors such as retirement, health issues, and age-related discrimination.

The following graph (Figure 19) illustrates the relationship between age and the predicted probability of employment. The scatterplot represents individual predicted probabilities, while the smoothed line shows the general trend, highlighting the inverted U-shaped relationship.

Figure 19 . Predicted probability of Employment by Age. Source: Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).



The findings reveal a clear non-linear relationship between age and employment status, following a distinct life-cycle pattern. At younger ages, the likelihood of employment steadily increases as individuals

transition into the workforce, gain experience, and establish their careers. Employment rates peak during middle age, a stage often characterized by professional stability, established careers, and fewer barriers to labour market participation. However, as individuals reach older ages, the likelihood of being employed begins to decline. This decline can be attributed to several factors:

- Retirement: Many older individuals exit the workforce as they reach retirement age.
- Health Issues: Physical or mental health challenges may limit the ability to work.
- Discrimination: Older workers often face biases in hiring, retention, or career advancement opportunities.

This life-cycle pattern aligns with broader labour market trends, where employment increases during early adulthood, peaks in middle age, and gradually declines as individuals approach retirement. These dynamics highlight the changing relationship between age and labour market participation throughout the life course.

Focusing on the war refugee's subgroup, the age range remained similar, but the dynamics of employment varied slightly. Correlation analysis revealed a weaker negative relationship between age and employment ($r=-0.1071$, $p<0.001$), suggesting a diminished effect of age compared to the full 2022 sample.

The regression model for the war refugee's subgroup also included age and age² (Table 16). The results were statistically significant ($F(2,3261) = 27.23$, $p<0.001$), but the R² value was lower at 0.0164, indicating that only 1.64% of the variance in employment status is explained by age and age².

- Linear Term (Age): Each additional year of age corresponds to a 1.03% increase in the likelihood of employment for younger individuals, holding other variables constant.

- Quadratic Term (Age²): The inverted U-shaped relationship is still evident, but the magnitude of the effect is smaller compared to the full 2022 sample.
- Constant: The baseline probability of employment is 42.99% when age is zero (again, theoretical).

Comparison Between Groups:

- Magnitude of Effects: The coefficients for age and age² are smaller in the war refugee's subgroup than in the full 2022 sample, indicating that age has a less pronounced effect on employment among recently arrived refugees.
- Explained Variance: The R² value is lower for the war refugee's subgroup (1.64%) than for the full sample (3.65%), suggesting that additional factors beyond age may play a larger role in determining employment outcomes for war refugees.
- Life-Cycle Patterns: Both groups exhibit an inverted U-shaped relationship between age and employment, consistent with broader labour market trends. However, the peak employment age may differ slightly, reflecting the unique challenges faced by war refugees, such as immediate integration barriers and displacement-related stress.

The findings highlight the need for targeted policies to address age-specific challenges in labour market integration:

- Younger Refugees: Initiatives such as vocational training and job placement programs can support their transition into the workforce.
- Older Refugees: Flexible work arrangements, retraining opportunities, and anti-discrimination policies can help sustain their labour market participation.

While age remains a significant determinant of employment, the

diminished effect observed in the war refugee's subgroup underscores the importance of considering the unique experiences and challenges of this group in policy and program design. By addressing these challenges, equitable access to employment opportunities across all age groups can be promoted (Górny, Duszczyk, et al., 2023).

5.1.3.2 2023 Dataset

In the 2023 dataset, age effects were similarly analysed using correlation and regression techniques. The inclusion of age2 allowed for capturing non-linear relationships.

- Correlation Analysis: A Spearman correlation revealed a weak but statistically significant negative relationship ($\rho = -0.0749$, $p = 0.0409$).
- Regression Analysis: The regression model ($F(2,743) = 13.02$, $p < 0.0001$) had an R^2 value of 0.0339, explaining 3.39% of the variance in employment status, as we can see in table 17.

The non-linear relationship remains evident, with younger individuals benefiting more from age-related increases in employment likelihood, while the probability declines for older individuals. The weaker constant suggests lower baseline employment rates for this group.

5.1.3.3 Conclusion

Age significantly influences employment status across all datasets, following a non-linear pattern consistent with broader labour market trends. While younger individuals benefit from increased employment likelihood, this advantage diminishes for older age groups due to factors such as retirement, health challenges, or discrimination (Górny, Duszczyk, et al., 2023).

The diminished age effects in the 2022 war refugee's subgroup and the 2023 dataset underscore the importance of considering displacement-

related challenges in labour market integration. Tailored interventions are needed to address the unique needs of these populations, ensuring equitable access to employment opportunities across all age groups.

5.1.4 Analysis of Marital Status and Employment Status

5.1.4.1 2022 Dataset

The relationship between marital status and employment status was examined using both Chi-Square tests and linear regression models in the full 2022 dataset and the war refugee's subgroup of the 2022 dataset. This analysis aimed to explore how marital status influences the likelihood of employment and whether the observed patterns differ between the general refugee population and those who arrived in Poland after February 2022. By comparing these groups, the analysis seeks to highlight potential differences in labour market integration based on marital status, while accounting for the unique challenges faced by war refugees.

In the full 2022 dataset, the association between marital status and employment status was statistically significant, as demonstrated by the Chi-Square test ($\chi^2 = 88.06$, $p < 0.001$). Married individuals, who comprised the largest group (75.6% of the sample), had an employment rate of 63.17%. In contrast, divorcees and singles demonstrated significantly higher employment rates of 78.48% and 77.49%, respectively. Widowed individuals showed an employment rate of 64.10%, slightly higher than that of married individuals but lower than that of singles and divorcees.

Table 4 - Employment Status by Marital Status (2022 Dataset: Whole Sample). Own

elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Marital Status	Not Working	Working	Total
Married	1,420 (36.83%)	2,437 (63.17%)	3,857
Divorcee	66 (21.52%)	241 (78.48%)	307
Widow/Widower	14 (35.90%)	25 (64.10%)	39
Single	203 (22.51%)	699 (77.49%)	902
Total	1,703 (33.36%)	3,402 (66.64%)	5,105

Regression results (Table 15) highlight employment disparities based on marital status, using 'Single' as the baseline. Being married (-12.32 points, $p < 0.001$), divorced (-3.64 points, $p = 0.028$), or widowed (-23.14 points, $p < 0.001$) significantly reduces employment probability compared to singles. Singles have the highest employment likelihood, with a baseline probability of 75.50% ($p < 0.001$), likely benefiting from greater flexibility and fewer family-related constraints. Married and widowed individuals face notable disadvantages, possibly due to caregiving roles or structural barriers, while divorcees experience a smaller but still significant employment gap.

The war refugee’s subgroup revealed a significant association between marital status and employment status ($\chi^2 = 23.899$, $p < 0.001$). However, the employment rate for married individuals was notably lower at 52.02%, compared to 63.17% in the full dataset. Singles and divorcees exhibited higher employment rates of 61.54% and 64.63%, respectively, like trends observed in the full sample. Widowed individuals in the war refugee’s subgroup faced the most significant challenges, with an employment rate of just 35.00%.

Table 5 - Employment Status by Marital Status (2022 Dataset: War Refugees Subgroup). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Marital Status	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
Married	1,283 (47.98%)	1,391 (52.02%)	2,674
Divorcee	58 (35.37%)	106 (64.63%)	164
Widow/Widower	13 (65.00%)	7 (35.00%)	20
Single	155 (38.46%)	248 (61.54%)	403
Total	1,510 (46.26%)	1,754 (53.74%)	3,264

Regression results (Table 16) for the war refugee subgroup (Table 16) show that being married (-9.89 points, $p < 0.001$) or widowed (-17.54 points, $p < 0.001$) significantly reduces employment probability compared to singles. Divorcees show a minimal, non-significant effect ($p = 0.843$). Baseline employment for singles is 61.91% ($p < 0.001$).

The comparison highlights key differences between the full dataset and the war refugee’s subgroup:

- Employment Rates: Employment probabilities are generally lower among war refugees compared to the full sample, with the largest decline observed among married individuals (63.17% in full sample vs. 52.02% in war refugee’s subgroup).
- Widowed Individuals: Widows face significant challenges in both groups, but their employment probability is even lower in the war refugee’s subgroup (35.00% vs. 64.10% in the full sample).
- Singles: Single individuals retain the highest employment probabilities in both groups, although the baseline is lower

for war refugees (61.91% vs. 75.50% in the full dataset).

The results shows that marital status continues to influence employment probabilities, with war refugees facing additional challenges than the whole sample.

5.1.4.2 2023 Dataset

The 2023 dataset also revealed a significant association between marital status and employment ($\chi^2 = 15.36$, $p = 0.004$).

Table 6 - Employment Status by Marital Status (2023 Dataset: War Refugees). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Marital Status	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
Married	182 (56.88%)	216 (50.70%)	398 (53.35%)
Divorcee	53 (36.30%)	93 (63.70%)	146 (19.57%)
Widow/Widower	23 (60.53%)	15 (39.47%)	38 (5.09%)
Single	62 (39.74%)	94 (60.26%)	156 (20.91%)
Total	320 (42.90%)	426 (57.10%)	746 (100%)

- Married individuals continued to show lower employment rates (50.70%) compared to singles and widows/widowers.
- Divorcees had relatively low employment rates in this dataset (3.52%), differing significantly from the 2022 dataset.

Linear regression results (Table 17) examine the relationship between marital status and employment, using 'Single' as the baseline. Widowed individuals face a significant employment disadvantage, being 20.78 percentage points less likely to be employed than singles ($p = 0.020$). Married individuals are 5.99 percentage points less likely to be employed, though this result is not statistically significant ($p = 0.198$). Divorcees have a slight advantage (+3.44 percentage points), but the effect is also not significant ($p = 0.543$). The baseline employment probability for singles is 60.26% ($p < 0.001$).

5.1.4.3 Comparative Insights and conclusions

Employment trends across different marital groups reveal notable shifts between 2022 and 2023, highlighting evolving challenges in the Polish labour market. Married individuals had lower employment rates in 2023 (50.70%) compared to both the war refugee subgroup from 2022 (52.02%) and the full 2022 dataset (63.17%). While regression results suggest a slightly lower employment likelihood for married individuals, the lack of statistical significance indicates that other factors, such as family responsibilities or limited work flexibility, may play a role.

Divorcees experienced the most dramatic shift, with employment rates dropping sharply from 78.48% in 2022 to just 3.52% in 2023. This decline suggests either worsening labour market conditions or specific challenges disproportionately affecting this group, warranting further investigation into potential systemic or temporary barriers.

Among all groups, widowed individuals consistently face the greatest employment disadvantage. Their employment rate fell from 35.00% in the 2022 war refugee subgroup to 22.07% in 2023. This trend is not unexpected, as widowed individuals are often older and may face health limitations, retirement considerations, or reduced motivation to seek employment.

Overall, the findings underscore persistent disparities in employment outcomes based on marital status. While singles consistently show the highest employment rates, married individuals may struggle due to caregiving responsibilities, and widowed individuals continue to face significant barriers. Addressing these disparities through targeted policies, such as improved childcare support, flexible work arrangements, and tailored employment programs, will be crucial to ensuring equitable labour market integration for all marital groups (Górny, Duszczyk, et al., 2023).

5.1.5 Analysis of the Relationship Between Having Children and Employment Status

5.1.5.1 2022 Dataset

The binary variable “has_children” has been created to study the relationship between employment and parental responsibilities (No children = 0, At least one child = 1). Missing or ambiguous responses were excluded to maintain data quality. The analysis utilized both a Chi-Square test and a linear regression model to explore whether having children is associated with employment status.

The Chi-Square test revealed a significant association between having children and employment status ($\chi^2=184.6164$, $p<0.001$):

Table 7 - Employment Status by Having Children (2022 Dataset: Whole Sample). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Has Children	Not Working	Working	Total
No	500 (21.39%)	1,838 (78.61%)	2,338
Yes	1,947 (37.20%)	3,288 (62.80%)	5,235
Total	2,447 (32.30%)	5,126 (67.70%)	7,573

Respondents without children have a significantly higher employment rate (78.61%) compared to those with children (62.80%). This result suggests that having children is associated with a lower likelihood of being employed, likely due to caregiving responsibilities and other constraints.

Linear regression results (Table 15) show that having children is associated with a 15.81 percentage point lower employment likelihood ($\beta = -0.1581$, $p < 0.001$). Respondents without children have a baseline employment probability of 78.61% ($\beta = 0.7861$). This disadvantage likely stems from caregiving responsibilities, limited childcare access,

and workplace flexibility barriers.

The same process was conducted for the war refugee subgroup. The Chi-Square test revealed a significant association between having children and employment status ($\chi^2 = 38.89$, $p < 0.001$). The employment distribution is as follows:

- Without Children: Among individuals without children, 64.01% (683 out of 1,067) were employed, while 35.99% were not employed.
- With Children: For individuals with children, the employment rate is lower at 53.31% (2,061 out of 3,867), while 46.69% were not employed.

This finding suggests that having children is associated with a lower probability of employment in the war refugee subgroup, consistent with the general trend in the full dataset.

A linear regression (Table 16) quantifies the impact of having children on employment. Having children is associated with a 10.71 percentage point lower employment likelihood ($\beta = -0.1071$, $p < 0.001$). Baseline employment for individuals without children is 64.01% ($\beta = 0.6401$). The negative effect may reflect caregiving challenges, especially in a refugee context with limited support systems.

5.1.5.2 2023 Dataset

The variable "Children Staying in Poland" (P44) was analysed to explore its relationship with employment status. P44 categorizes children as either "Yes, staying with me," "No, not staying with me," or "Not applicable, no children."

Table 8 - Employment Status by Children Staying in Poland (2023 Dataset: War Refugees). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Children	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total
Yes, Staying with me	250 (44.72%)	309 (55.28%)	559 (74.93%)
No, not staying with me	34 (38.64%)	88 (61.36%)	88 (11.80%)
No children	36 (36.36%)	63 (63.64%)	99 (13.27%)
Total	320 (42.90%)	426 (57.10%)	746 (100%)

The chi-square test ($\chi^2 = 3.1380$, $p = 0.208$) suggests that the observed differences in employment rates across the categories are not statistically significant.

A linear regression (Table 17) assessed the impact of 'Children Staying in Poland' (P44) on employment. Baseline employment for respondents without children was 61.36% ($p < 0.001$). Having children in Poland showed a slight negative association (-0.0609 , $p = 0.284$), while 'Not Applicable' (no children) had a small positive effect (0.0228 , $p = 0.754$), though neither result was statistically significant.

5.1.5.3 Conclusion

The analysis across the datasets demonstrates a consistent relationship between having children and employment status, with nuanced variations between the general 2022 dataset, the war refugee’s subgroup of 2022, and the 2023 dataset.

In the 2022 dataset, both the Chi-Square test and regression analysis reveal a significant negative association between having children and employment likelihood. Respondents without children are substantially more likely to be employed, with the regression results quantifying this

impact as a 15.81 percentage point reduction in employment probability for those with children. These findings highlight the structural barriers faced by parents, such as caregiving responsibilities and limited access to support systems like childcare and workplace flexibility, which hinder their labour market participation.

For the war refugee's subgroup of the 2022 dataset, a similar negative association is observed, albeit with a smaller magnitude. Having children reduces employment likelihood by 10.71 percentage points, compared to those without children. This subgroup's slightly better outcomes might reflect differences in support mechanisms or employment dynamics specific to war refugees. However, the lower baseline employment rate for individuals without children (64.01%) in this subgroup compared to the general dataset underscores the unique challenges faced by refugees, such as adapting to new labour markets and the absence of robust social networks.

The 2023 dataset introduces the variable "Children Staying in Poland" to analyse the employment dynamics more granularly. While the employment rates vary across categories, the differences are not statistically significant, as evidenced by the Chi-Square test results. Regression analysis also fails to find a significant relationship between having children staying in Poland and employment likelihood. These results suggest that while caregiving responsibilities remain a challenge, their direct impact on employment might be mitigated over time, possibly due to evolving labour market conditions or improved access to childcare services.

Overall, the findings emphasize the need for targeted interventions to support parents, particularly refugees, in balancing caregiving and employment. Policies such as affordable childcare, flexible work arrangements, and tailored job training programs can mitigate the negative effects of caregiving responsibilities on employment.

5.1.6 Analysis of the Relationship Between Language Proficiency and Employment Status

5.1.6.1 2022 Dataset

Language proficiency plays a critical role in labour market integration, particularly for refugees. This section analyses the relationship between language skills and employment status across the whole sample and the war refugee subgroup. By utilizing self-reported Polish language proficiency data and composite variables, the study quantifies the impact of language skills on employment likelihood.

A Spearman correlation was conducted to explore the relationship between overall language proficiency (reversed) and employment status (binary: Working = 1, Not Working = 0):

- Whole Sample: Spearman's rho (ρ) = 0.2403, $p < 0.001$. This moderate positive correlation indicates that better language proficiency is significantly associated with a higher likelihood of employment.
- War Refugees Subgroup: Spearman's rho (ρ) = 0.1006, $p < 0.001$. While weaker than the full sample, this statistically significant correlation suggests that better language proficiency is also associated with higher employment likelihood among war refugees, albeit to a lesser degree.

For the War refugee's subgroup, the results were as follows: Spearman's rho (ρ): 0.1006; p-value: < 0.001 . This weak but statistically significant positive correlation suggests that better language proficiency is associated with a higher likelihood of employment among war refugees, albeit to a lesser degree than in the whole sample.

A linear regression (Table 15 & 16) quantifies the impact of language proficiency on employment ($F(1, 5106) = 316.57, p < 0.001, R^2 =$

0.0584). Each one-unit increase in reversed language proficiency raises employment probability by 11.19 percentage points. Baseline employment for 'Very Weak' proficiency (coded as 1) is 45.23% ($0.3404 + 0.1119$ per unit increase). These results underscore the strong association between language skills and employment status, although other factors also contribute.

For war refugees, linear regression ($F(1, 3262) = 35.35, p < 0.001, R^2 = 0.0107$) shows that each one-unit increase in reversed language proficiency raises employment probability by 6.14 percentage points. Baseline employment for 'Very Weak' proficiency (coded as 1) is 44.47% ($0.3813 + 0.0614$ per unit increase). This indicates that while language proficiency plays a role, other factors may be more influential in determining employment outcomes for this group.

5.1.6.2 2023 Dataset

Following the analysis of the 2022 dataset, the 2023 dataset offers additional insights into the relationship between language proficiency and employment outcomes. While the methodology remains consistent, the 2023 analysis highlights new patterns reflecting changes in population composition and integration conditions. The regression results are presented in Table 17, with the main findings summarized below.

For the 2023 dataset, a Spearman correlation was conducted between reversed language proficiency (`lang_composite_reversed_2023`) and employment status (`employment_poland`):

- Spearman's rho (ρ): 0.1973, $p < 0.001$.
- Interpretation: This moderate positive and statistically significant correlation shows that higher language proficiency is associated with an increased likelihood of

employment in Poland.

A linear regression (Table 17) quantifies the impact of language proficiency on employment. Each one-unit increase in reversed language proficiency raises employment probability by 11.03 percentage points. For individuals with 'Very Weak' proficiency (coded as 1), baseline employment probability is 34.86% ($0.2354 + 0.1103$ per unit increase). The model is statistically significant ($F = 28.92$, $p < 0.001$) and explains 3.74% of the variance in employment outcomes ($R^2 = 0.0374$).

5.1.6.3 Comparison with the 2022 Dataset and Conclusions

Language proficiency is a significant predictor of employment across all datasets, including the 2023 dataset of war refugees. However, the impact of language proficiency varies in magnitude:

- The whole sample and the 2023 dataset demonstrate a stronger relationship between language skills and employment, likely due to broader integration efforts or less severe structural barriers in Poland.
- The smaller effect size and lower correlation observed in the 2022 war refugee subgroup suggest that this group faces compounded challenges, such as ongoing displacement or systemic barriers, that weaken the direct impact of language proficiency on employment.

The findings emphasize the dual importance of language training programs and addressing broader systemic barriers. This comprehensive approach is crucial for improving labour market integration for all refugee populations, particularly war refugees.

5.1.7 Analysis of the Relationship Between Education Level and Employment Status

Education level is a critical factor influencing employment outcomes, providing individuals with qualifications, skills, and access to better opportunities. This section examines the relationship between respondents' education levels and their likelihood of employment, integrating insights from the 2022 dataset (whole sample and war refugee subgroup) and the 2023 dataset (war refugees).

We aggregated the educational categories into three groups for simplicity and better interpretability:

- Less than Secondary + Secondary Vocational: Combines individuals with basic and vocational education.
- Secondary: Includes high school or equivalent education.
- Tertiary or More: Covers individuals with higher education, such as a bachelor's or higher.

The Chi-Square Test result from the tabulate command reveals the relationship between educational groups and employment status. The table below shows the frequency of individuals in each education group and their employment status (Working/Not Working). The Pearson Chi-Square statistic of 49.65 with a p-value of 0.000 confirms the statistical significance of the relationship between education level and employment status.

Table 9 - Employment Status by Education Level (2022 Dataset: Whole Sample). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel ("Between Ukraine and Poland").

Employment Status	Less than Secondary	Secondary	Tertiary or more	Total
Not Working	205 (25.7%)	587 (28.5%)	1,680 (35.3%)	2,472
Working	594 (74.3%)	1,475 (71.5%)	3,076 (64.7%)	5,145
Total	799 (100%)	2,062 (100%)	4,756 (100%)	7,617

For the subgroup of war refugees, the Pearson Chi-Square statistic of 13.5547 with a p-value of 0.001 indicates a statistically significant association between education level and employment status.

Table 10 - Employment Status by Education Level (2022 Dataset: War Refugees Subgroup). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Employment Status	Less than Secondary	Secondary	Tertiary or more	Total
Not Working	179 (39.5%)	518 (41.6%)	1,518 (46.5%)	2,215
Working	274 (60.5%)	728 (58.4%)	1,755 (53.5%)	2,757
Total	453 (100%)	1,246 (100%)	3,273 (100%)	4,972

In summary, the Chi-Square tests confirm a statistically significant relationship between education level and employment status across all datasets. The data consistently show that higher education is associated with a higher likelihood of employment.

The regression analysis examines the impact of education level on employment status, where the dependent variable is whether an individual is employed (Working) or not. The results from the regression analysis are displayed in the table 15, 16 and 17.

- Whole Sample: $F(2, 7614) = 24.98, p < 0.001; R^2 = 0.0065$.
The variable for Tertiary or More showed a statistically significant effect on employment status ($p = 0.000$), indicating a strong negative relationship between higher education and employment. However, the Secondary education level did not show a statistically significant effect ($p = 0.149$), suggesting that secondary education alone does not have a significant impact on employment status compared to the reference group.
- War Refugees Subgroup: $F(2, 4969) = 6.79, p = 0.0073; R^2$

= 0.0027. The variable for Tertiary or More showed a statistically significant effect on employment status ($p = 0.006$), indicating a stronger likelihood of employment for individuals with higher education. However, the Secondary education level did not show a statistically significant effect ($p = 0.450$), suggesting that secondary education alone does not significantly influence employment status compared to the reference group.

- 2023 Dataset: $F(2, 743) = 4.95$, $p = 0.0073$; $R^2 = 0.0131$. The Secondary education level showed a statistically significant effect on employment status ($p = 0.002$), suggesting that individuals with secondary education are more likely to be employed compared to those with lower than secondary education. However, the Tertiary or More group did not show a statistically significant effect ($p = 0.285$), indicating no significant difference in employment status for individuals with tertiary education compared to the reference group.

The results showed that:

- Chi-Square Results: Statistically significant associations were found in the 2022 datasets (whole sample and war refugees), indicating that education level influences employment outcomes. The 2023 dataset showed no significant association, suggesting that education alone may not predict employment outcomes for this group.
- Regression Findings: The 2022 war refugees subgroup showed a statistically significant negative effect for education, where higher education was associated with a reduced likelihood of unemployment. However, for both the whole sample (2022) and the 2023 dataset, education levels

did not show significant effects on employment after adjustment, implying that factors beyond education are more influential. The conflicting results between the datasets—where 2022 shows education significantly affecting employment and 2023 does not—suggests that other contextual or systemic factors might explain these differences, making the regression analysis unclear and difficult to interpret.

- **Explained Variance:** The 2022 war refugee subgroup exhibited the smallest R^2 (0.27%), suggesting that additional factors—such as language proficiency, local labour market conditions, or systemic barriers—are more influential in determining employment outcomes.
- **Sample Characteristics:** It is important to note that the war refugee subgroup represents a very specific and uncommon group of refugees. In these samples, lower education levels are notably underrepresented, which might skew the analysis. As a result, the regression findings might not fully reflect the employment dynamics of refugees with lower educational backgrounds, which are typically more challenging to employ due to factors such as language barriers or a lack of relevant skills.
- Another key consideration is that the Polish labour market may face difficulties in finding suitable work for highly qualified workers, particularly those from the war refugee subgroup. Despite their advanced qualifications, these individuals often encounter barriers such as mismatches between their skills and available job opportunities, as well as challenges in integrating into the local labour market. These factors make it harder for highly qualified refugees to

secure employment that aligns with their qualifications, despite their education levels.

While education level shows varying degrees of significance in relation to employment across different datasets, the regression analysis raises questions due to inconsistent results between the 2022 and 2023 datasets. This inconsistency points to the possibility that other external factors, such as language proficiency, cultural adaptation, or legal and systemic barriers, may have a greater influence on employment outcomes, particularly for war refugees. Additionally, the underrepresentation of refugees with lower education levels in the sample may limit the generalizability of the findings. Further research should focus on these variables to offer a clearer understanding and develop more comprehensive strategies for integrating refugees into the labour market. The challenges faced by the Polish labour market in employing highly qualified refugees also warrant further investigation to identify how these individuals can be better integrated into the workforce.

5.1.8 Analysis of the Relationship between migration motivations and employment

This section focuses exclusively on the subgroup of refugees from the 2022 dataset who arrived after February 2022. The analysis investigates the relationship between migration motivations and employment outcomes, exploring how different reasons for migration—economic, war-related, family-related, and others—shape refugees' ability to integrate into the labour market.

To facilitate the analysis, migration motivations were categorized into four primary groups:

- Economic Reasons: Financial or employment-related

motivations, such as lack of funds or unemployment in the country of origin.

- War-Related Reasons: Safety concerns and conflict-driven displacement, including direct threats to life or health.
- Family-Related Reasons: Social or familial ties as the main driver, such as reuniting with family members or joining acquaintances who had already migrated.
- Other Reasons: Motivations related to education, political context, or miscellaneous factors.

This targeted analysis aims to uncover how specific migration drivers influence refugees' employment outcomes in the host country. By distinguishing between various motivations, the study provides a nuanced understanding of how refugees' experiences and priorities affect their labour market integration. Regression results are showed in table 15.

5.1.8.1 Economic Reasons

A Chi-Square test was conducted to determine whether employment status is associated with economic reasons for migration. The results revealed no statistically significant relationship between these variables, $\chi^2(1, N = 5,108) = 0.181, p = 0.670$.

Table 11 - Employment Status by Economic Reasons for Migration. Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Economic Reasons for Migration	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
No	1,581 (33.4%)	3,147 (66.6%)	4,728 (100%)
Yes	123 (32.4%)	257 (67.6%)	380 (100%)
Total	1,704 (33.4%)	3,404 (66.6%)	5,108 (100%)

These results suggest that economic reasons for migration are not a

significant determinant of employment outcomes.

The regression model shows that economic reasons are not significantly associated with employment outcomes (coefficient: 0.011, $p = 0.670$). This suggests that citing economic motivations, such as unemployment or lack of funds, does not directly translate into higher or lower employment probabilities in the host country.

5.1.8.2 War-Related Reasons

A Chi-Square test revealed a statistically significant relationship between employment status and war-related reasons for migration, $\chi^2(1, N = 5,108) = 615.188, p < 0.001$.

Table 12 - Employment Status by War-Related Reasons for Migration. Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

War-Related Reasons for Migration	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
No	279 (13.5%)	1,787 (86.5%)	2,066 (100%)
Yes	1,425 (46.8%)	1,617 (53.2%)	3,042 (100%)
Total	1,704 (33.4%)	3,404 (66.6%)	5,108 (100%)

Refugees with war-related reasons show significantly lower employment rates, indicating potential barriers such as trauma or difficulty integrating into the labour market.

Regression Analysis: War-related motivations are significantly and negatively associated with employment (coefficient: -0.334, $p < 0.001$). Refugees citing war-related reasons have a lower likelihood of employment, possibly reflecting psychological trauma, lack of preparation for labour market entry, or other barriers related to forced displacement.

5.1.8.3 Family-Related Reasons

The Chi-Square test also showed a statistically significant relationship

between employment status and family-related reasons for migration, $\chi^2 (1, N = 5,108) = 24.772, p < 0.001$.

Table 13 - Employment Status by Family-Related Reasons for Migration

Family-Related Reasons for Migration	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
No	1,578 (32.6%)	3,264 (67.4%)	4,842 (100%)
Yes	126 (47.4%)	140 (52.6%)	266 (100%)
Total	1,704 (33.4%)	3,404 (66.6%)	5,108 (100%)

Family-related motivations show lower employment rates, possibly reflecting a focus on reunification and caregiving responsibilities over immediate labour market participation.

Regression Analysis: Family-related motivations are significantly and negatively associated with employment outcomes (coefficient: -0.148, $p < 0.001$). This implies that refugees moving to join family members may prioritize family reunification over immediate labour market participation. These findings emphasize the heterogeneous effects of migration motivations on employment outcomes, with war-related and family-related reasons acting as barriers, while economic reasons exhibit no direct effect.

5.1.8.4 Other Reasons

The Chi-Square test revealed a statistically significant relationship between employment status and "other reasons" for migration, $\chi^2 (1, N = 5,108) = 299.133, p < 0.001$.

Table 14 . Employment Status by Other Reasons for Migration. Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

Other Reasons for Migration	Not Working (%)	Working (%)	Total (%)
No	722 (23.9%)	2,301 (76.1%)	3,023 (100%)
Yes	982 (47.1%)	1,103 (52.9%)	2,085 (100%)
Total	1,704 (33.4%)	3,404 (66.6%)	5,108 (100%)

Individuals citing "other reasons," such as education or unspecified motivations, are significantly less likely to be employed.

Regression Analysis: "Other reasons" for migration are negatively associated with employment outcomes (coefficient: -0.232, $p < 0.001$). Refugees citing these motivations have a lower likelihood of employment, reflecting possible mismatches between their reasons for migration and the demands of the labour market.

5.1.8.5 Conclusion

These findings emphasize the heterogeneous effects of migration motivations on employment outcomes. War-related and family-related reasons act as barriers, likely reflecting psychological trauma, caregiving responsibilities, or difficulty integrating into the labor market. Conversely, economic reasons show no direct effect, while 'other reasons' highlight structural challenges in aligning motivations with host-country opportunities. Notably, tests confirmed that all considered variables are valid, as they correlate with employment. However, individual variables explain only a small share of employment variance, underscoring the need for a comprehensive model. Using regression models further allows for controlling additional influencing factors, providing a more accurate assessment of employment determinants.

5.2 OLS and Logit Regression Model Analysis (Including Marginal Effects)

As previously mentioned in Section 4.3 (Methods), this analysis investigates employment outcomes among Ukrainian refugees in Poland using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Logit regression models. Each model serves distinct purposes: the OLS model explores interaction effects between variables (e.g., gender and age, marital status and caregiving responsibilities), while the Logit model evaluates binary employment outcomes and calculates marginal effects to quantify the practical significance of predictors.

The analysis focuses on the 2022 dataset and the 2023 dataset, incorporating the following models:

- A model for the full 2022 dataset, including dummy variables for war refugees and economic migrants, to capture how migration motivations influence employment outcomes.
- A separate model for individuals arriving after February 2022, isolating the experiences of people who arrived after the war started.
- A model for the 2023 dataset, which exclusively analyses war refugees to examine evolving challenges and opportunities over time.

By combining these models, the analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of employment outcomes, accounting for individual characteristics, migration motivations, and interaction effects. Robust standard errors ensure statistical reliability across all models.

Key Variables for Hypotheses and Research Questions:

- **Education Level:** This variable is central to H1 (Human Capital Hypothesis), as it measures the individual's qualifications and their relationship to labour market

participation. The categories include Less than Secondary, Secondary (reference) Tertiary or More.

- Language Proficiency: A critical variable for H1, representing the individual's level of Polish language skills. It directly tests how language acquisition facilitates employment outcomes.
- Number of Children: Integral to H2 (Family Structure Constraint Hypothesis), this binary variable (1 = Yes, 0 = No) examines how caregiving responsibilities impact employment.
- Migration Motivations: These variables are key to addressing H3 (Migration Motivation Hypothesis). In the full 2022 sample, motivations are broadly categorized into economic and war-related reasons. For the subgroup of individuals who arrived after February 2022, more detailed categories are included: Economic Reasons, War-Related Reasons, Family-Related Reasons, Other Reasons

Control Variables:

- Gender: This variable (Male as the reference category) accounts for differences in employment patterns by gender. While it provides insights into disparities, it is not directly tied to the hypotheses but helps adjust for gender-based effects.
- Age and Squared Age: These variables capture both the linear and non-linear effects of age on employment. Age contributes to the overall robustness of the model, but the relationship itself is not a focal point of the hypotheses.
- Marital Status: Categories include Single (reference), Married, and Divorcee. While it moderates caregiving responsibilities, marital status alone serves as a control

variable rather than a central focus of the hypotheses.

- Interaction terms are included to explore potential moderating effects:
- Gender and Age: Tests how age influences employment differently by gender.
- Marital Status and Having Children: Captures how the effect of marital status varies depending on caregiving responsibilities.

5.2.1 Whole Sample 2022

This analysis focuses on the 2022 dataset, which includes information on over 7,000 individuals. After running the model controlling for the variables war refugees and economic migrants and observing that they were significant, I decided to divide the dataset into two separate models for these dummy variables. This approach was undertaken to better understand the differences between the two categories and to address the second research question, which explores how migration motivations and arrival circumstances affect employment outcomes. It also assumes that there are some differences in mechanisms explaining employment in the case of both groups.

For example, individuals identified as war refugees may face unique challenges in the labour market, such as disrupted careers or psychological trauma, compared to economic migrants who may have planned their move and were more prepared to integrate into the workforce. By splitting the dataset, I aimed to capture these differences more precisely.

Two distinct subgroups are identified using dummy variables:

- War Refugees: Individuals who fled due to conflict (dummy variable = 1 for war refugees, 0 otherwise). This subgroup

contains 2,276 observations.

- Economic Migrants: Individuals who migrated primarily for economic reasons (dummy variable = 1 for economic migrants, 0 otherwise). This subgroup contains 1,409 observations.

By including these dummy variables, the models capture how migration motivation influences employment outcomes. The split models allow for deeper insights into how each group experiences unique barriers or opportunities in the labour market.

The regression results, summarized below and detailed in Table 18 in Appendix A, highlight several key findings.

5.2.1.1 War Refugees

The analysis highlights several key variables that directly address the hypotheses and research questions, alongside control variables to ensure robust findings.

Among the most critical predictors is education level, a central variable for testing the Human Capital Hypothesis (H1). *Education* reflects individuals' qualifications and their potential influence on labour market participation. However, the findings reveal a counterintuitive relationship between education and employment outcomes. Tertiary education is associated with a 9.3 percentage point decrease in employment likelihood (OLS coefficient, $p < 0.001$), with the logit marginal effect showing a 6.4% reduction ($p = 0.030$).

This surprising result can be explained by two primary factors. First, there is a substantial overrepresentation of well-educated individuals within the refugee group, intensifying competition for a limited number of high-skilled positions. Many refugees with tertiary education bring credentials and qualifications that may not easily transfer to the Polish labour market due to differences in certification standards, recognition

of foreign diplomas, or lack of alignment with local requirements (Kubiciel–Lodzińska et al., 2024). These barriers make it difficult for highly educated refugees to secure jobs that match their skills and qualifications. Second, the structure of demand in the Polish labour market is heavily concentrated in low- and medium-skilled occupations, such as manufacturing, logistics, and services. These sectors often do not align with the aspirations or qualifications of highly educated refugees, who may be reluctant to accept roles they perceive as misaligned with their education and professional experience. As a result, highly educated refugees face a higher risk of underemployment or unemployment due to this mismatch between their qualifications and the available job opportunities (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

In contrast, secondary education has no significant impact on employment outcomes, suggesting that intermediate qualifications neither hinder nor facilitate access to the labour market. This reflects the broader labour market demand for mid-level skills, which are more easily transferable and applicable across sectors. Overall, these findings highlight the challenges of skill transferability and labour market alignment for highly educated refugees. Targeted policies that address credential recognition, skill matching, and support for accessing higher-skilled roles are essential to overcoming these barriers (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

Another pivotal variable is *language proficiency*, which emerges as one of the strongest predictors of employment outcomes. Refugees with higher Polish language skills were 9.4 percentage points more likely to be employed (OLS coefficient, $p < 0.001$), with a marginal effect of 8.7 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). This finding emphasizes how language acquisition directly facilitates employment, enabling individuals to

navigate the workplace, communicate effectively, and access better-quality job opportunities. The practical significance of this result reinforces the critical role of language training in integration policies (Górny, Duszczyk, et al., 2023).

Family responsibilities, captured through the number of children variable, play a significant role in shaping employment outcomes and align closely with the Family Structure Constraint Hypothesis (H2). Parents were 27.5 percentage points less likely to be employed (OLS coefficient, $p = 0.000$), highlighting the challenges of balancing caregiving duties with workforce participation. However, interaction terms revealed a more nuanced dynamic: married parents were 23.3 percentage points more likely to be employed compared to married individuals without children ($p = 0.005$). This suggests that financial necessity often compels parents, particularly those supporting families, to seek employment despite caregiving constraints. Similarly, divorced parents exhibited a 37.4 percentage point increase in employment likelihood compared to divorced individuals without children ($p = 0.031$), reinforcing the role of economic pressures in driving workforce participation among certain subgroups. These findings point to the need for policies that provide affordable childcare and family support to alleviate caregiving-related employment barriers (Górny, Duszczyk, et al., 2023).

Control variables, such as gender, age, and marital status, were included to account for additional factors influencing employment outcomes. Being female significantly reduced the likelihood of employment, with women being 25.9 percentage points less likely to be employed (OLS coefficient, $p = 0.003$). The marginal effect from the logit model confirmed this, showing a 17.6 percentage point reduction ($p = 0.000$). This gender disparity reflects systemic barriers,

such as caregiving expectations, discrimination, and cultural norms, that disproportionately affect women, particularly among war refugees. Age also played a significant role, with older individuals being 2.5 percentage points more likely to be employed per additional year ($p = 0.000$), although the quadratic effect showed diminishing returns at older ages ($p = 0.000$). This suggests that middle-aged refugees are best positioned for employment, while younger individuals may face inexperience, and older individuals may encounter declining adaptability or health challenges. Marital status, though not a focal variable, showed a complex relationship with employment. Married individuals were 5.1 percentage points less likely to be employed ($p = 0.036$), although this effect varied significantly when combined with caregiving responsibilities, as seen in the interaction terms.

Statistically, the models explain a modest portion of employment variability, with an R-squared of 7.97% for the OLS model and a pseudo-R-squared of 6.27% for the logit model. Statistically, the models explain a modest portion of employment variability, with an R-squared of 7.97% for the OLS model and a pseudo-R-squared of 6.27% for the logit model. While the identified predictors are significant, much variability remains unexplained, likely due to unobserved factors such as work experience, social networks, psychological barriers, and intangible aspects like soft skills, future plans, and orientation toward employment.

5.2.1.2 Economic Migrants

For economic migrants, several variables central to the hypotheses and research questions significantly influence employment.

Language proficiency, a critical factor for the Human Capital Hypothesis (H1), is strongly associated with employment outcomes.

Migrants with stronger Polish language skills are 5.1 percentage points more likely to be employed (marginal effect, $p = 0.000$), demonstrating how linguistic integration facilitates access to job opportunities and better roles.

Caregiving responsibilities, measured by the number of children, also play a significant role and align with the Family Structure Constraint Hypothesis (H2). Parents are 13.5 percentage points less likely to be employed than non-parents (marginal effect, $p = 0.000$). However, financial necessity again drives a compensatory effect for divorced parents, who are significantly more likely to be employed (log-odds = 2.064, $p = 0.024$). These results highlight the need for policies supporting affordable childcare and family assistance.

Education demonstrates a surprising pattern. Tertiary education is associated with a 6.6 percentage point reduction in employment likelihood (marginal effect, $p = 0.000$), likely due to systemic barriers such as credential non-recognition and overqualification. Secondary education, however, has no significant impact on employment outcomes, suggesting mid-level qualifications are better aligned with the demands of the local labour market.

Control variables add depth to the analysis. Women are 12.1 percentage points less likely to be employed than men (marginal effect, $p = 0.000$), reflecting cultural and structural challenges faced by female migrants. Age positively influences employment, with each additional year increasing employment likelihood by 1.7 percentage points ($p = 0.000$), though this effect diminishes for older individuals, as shown by the negative squared age term (-0.00015 , $p = 0.002$).

The models for economic migrants explain a larger portion of employment variability than those for war refugees (R-squared =

10.61% for OLS; pseudo-R-squared = 15.82% for logit). These findings emphasize the importance of language proficiency, caregiving responsibilities, and credential recognition in shaping employment outcomes, highlighting the need for targeted policies to support these areas. Detailed results are available in Table 18 in Appendix A.

5.2.1.3 Comparison and conclusions

The comparison between war refugees and economic migrants reveals critical distinctions in how migration motivations and circumstances influence employment outcomes. A key difference lies in the fact that economic migrants made an active choice to relocate, often with a degree of preparation for integrating into the labour market. In contrast, war refugees were forced to flee under urgent and often traumatic circumstances, which likely exacerbates challenges such as disrupted careers, psychological burdens, and caregiving responsibilities.

Based on this distinction, it could be hypothesized that caregiving responsibilities would pose a greater barrier for war refugees, as they might lack the time, resources, and support systems to prepare for balancing work and family obligations in the host country (Górny, Duszczuk, et al., 2023). The results, however, present a more nuanced picture. While caregiving responsibilities significantly reduce employment likelihood for both groups, parents among war refugees are 27.5 percentage points less likely to be employed, compared to 13.5 percentage points for economic migrants. This disparity aligns with the hypothesis, reflecting how the sudden and unplanned nature of displacement for war refugees may intensify the challenges of juggling caregiving with workforce participation.

Interestingly, the interaction effects provide additional insight. Among war refugees, financial pressures compel married and divorced parents to seek employment despite caregiving constraints, with divorced

parents exhibiting particularly high levels of employment likelihood. A similar dynamic is observed among economic migrants, though the magnitude of these effects is somewhat lower. This suggests that while economic necessity drives workforce engagement for parents in both groups, war refugees face a heightened need to overcome caregiving barriers due to the more precarious circumstances of their migration and resettlement.

For war refugees, the challenges are primarily from systemic barriers related to education and caregiving responsibilities. Tertiary education, instead of enhancing employment prospects, reduces employment likelihood due to credential non-recognition and a mismatch between refugee qualifications and the demand for low- and medium-skilled labour in Poland. Language proficiency, however, emerges as a critical factor of employment, demonstrating the value of linguistic integration programs.

In contrast, economic migrants demonstrate a different set of dynamics. While language proficiency remains a strong predictor of employment, their challenges with education are more likely tied to overqualification and non-recognition of foreign credentials, mirroring but lessening the barriers faced by war refugees. Economic migrants with tertiary education similarly experience reduced employment likelihood, although the impact is less severe compared to war refugees. This difference may partly stem from the substantial variation in gender composition between the two groups.

The models for economic migrants have *slightly higher explanatory power*, as their employment outcomes are more closely linked to observable factors like age, gender, and language proficiency. This aligns with expectations, as war refugees face additional unobserved barriers, such as trauma, health issues, or disrupted work histories, that

are harder to quantify within the models. This highlights the unique challenges faced by displaced individuals and the need for targeted interventions.

While both war refugees and economic migrants face barriers to employment, the challenges are more severe and multifaceted for war refugees. They experience greater gender disparities, more complex interactions between marital status and caregiving responsibilities, and a heavier reliance on language proficiency for integration. Economic migrants, by contrast, benefit from slightly more predictable employment patterns and face fewer unobserved barriers.

Ultimately, the results confirm that the voluntary versus forced nature of migration shapes the extent and type of challenges migrants face. While economic migrants may navigate caregiving responsibilities with greater ease due to their planned transition, war refugees encounter compounded difficulties, reinforcing the importance of differentiated support systems to address their specific needs.

5.2.2 War Refugees Arrived After February 2022 (2022 dataset)

The analytical process applied to the entire 2022 dataset was also conducted for the war refugee subgroup, examining the factors influencing their employment outcomes. This included both OLS regression and logit models, along with their marginal effects. The analysis incorporated demographic and contextual variables, adding migration motivations categorized as economic, war-related, family-related, and other reasons. The detailed statistics are presented in Appendix A, and the key results are summarized below, with the main findings displayed in Table 19.

Language proficiency is one of the strongest predictors of employment for this subgroup. Refugees with higher Polish language skills are 10.2% more likely to be employed (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.001$).

This result reinforces the importance of linguistic integration as a cornerstone of labour market participation, enabling refugees to secure jobs, navigate workplace interactions, and access higher-quality opportunities. Language acquisition programs remain a critical policy focus for improving labour market outcomes (Górny, Duszczyk, et al., 2023).

Education presents a more complex dynamic. Refugees with tertiary education are 6.4% less likely to be employed (logit marginal effect, $p = 0.041$). This counterintuitive finding reflects systemic barriers, including the non-recognition of foreign credentials and overqualification, which prevent highly educated individuals from accessing roles aligned with their skills. The structural mismatch between their qualifications and the demand for low- and medium-skilled labour in the Polish market exacerbates this issue, often leaving highly educated refugees underemployed or excluded from the workforce (Kubiciel–Lodzińska et al., 2024).

Having children alone is associated with a strong and statistically significant negative effect on employment likelihood. Refugees with children are 30.1 percentage points less likely to be employed (OLS coefficient = -0.301 , $p < 0.001$). This finding highlights the substantial caregiving burden faced by parents, which limits their ability to participate in the labour market. The reduced likelihood of employment can be attributed to several factors, including the lack of access to affordable childcare, the prioritization of caregiving responsibilities, and the challenges of balancing work and family duties, particularly in the context of forced migration (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

The interaction terms with marital status, however, reveal important nuances. Married refugees with children are 26.8 percentage points

more likely to be employed compared to married individuals without children (OLS coefficient = 0.268, $p < 0.001$). This suggests that financial pressures associated with supporting a family may drive married parents to seek employment despite caregiving responsibilities. The interaction effect highlights the role of economic necessity in moderating the negative impact of having children on employment outcomes.

For divorced refugees with children, the compensatory effect is even more pronounced. Divorced parents are 39 percentage points more likely to be employed compared to their counterparts without children (OLS coefficient = 0.390, $p < 0.01$). As sole providers, divorced parents may face intensified financial pressures, compelling them to enter the workforce despite the significant caregiving challenges they face. This finding underscores the heightened economic vulnerability of divorced parents and their stronger reliance on employment to meet family needs.

Migration Motivations emerge as a pivotal factor in understanding employment outcomes for this subgroup. Refugees citing economic motivations are 13.5% more likely to be employed (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.001$). This result suggests that economically motivated refugees are better prepared to engage with the labour market. These individuals may have specific skills or qualifications aligned with labour market needs, or they may be driven by a heightened sense of urgency to achieve financial stability. For these refugees, employment is not only a means of economic security but also a core objective of their migration journey, making them more proactive in seeking and securing jobs. Additionally, economically motivated refugees might also be less affected by psychological trauma or logistical challenges compared to other groups, enabling them to focus more effectively on

integrating into the workforce (OECD & European Commission, 2023). In contrast, war-related motivations do not show a significant effect on employment outcomes (logit marginal effect = +1.9%, $p = 0.297$). This lack of impact may stem from the unique challenges faced by individuals fleeing conflict, such as psychological trauma, disrupted family structures, or uncertainty about their long-term future. Many war refugees arrive in host countries with little preparation or support systems, limiting their capacity to prioritize employment. Furthermore, the instability associated with their migration circumstances may delay their ability to establish a foothold in the labour market (OECD, 2021; OECD & European Commission, 2023).

Refugees citing family-related motivations are 4.2% less likely to be employed (logit marginal effect, $p = 0.064$), reflecting the dual pressures of migration and caregiving responsibilities. Individuals motivated by family reunification may prioritize caregiving roles or depend on other family members for financial support, reducing their urgency to join the workforce. This outcome may also highlight cultural or structural barriers that reinforce caregiving expectations for women, particularly in traditional family structures, further limiting their labour market participation.

Finally, refugees citing other motivations exhibit no significant differences in employment likelihood (logit marginal effect = -2.8%, $p = 0.121$). This group likely encompasses a wide variety of less-defined reasons for migration, such as seeking safety, pursuing better living conditions, or accompanying family members, which may not directly correlate with labour market engagement. For such individuals, employment may not be an immediate priority or may be constrained by factors unrelated to their motivations.

The findings on migration motivations emphasize the diverse circumstances of war refugees and their varying capacities to integrate

into the labour market. Refugees driven by economic motivations tend to perform better, likely because of their goal-oriented approach and stronger alignment with labour market needs. In contrast, war- and family-related motivations highlight additional vulnerabilities, such as caregiving pressures and psychological barriers, that complicate labour market participation. Policies tailored to address these distinct challenges—such as trauma counselling, childcare support, and targeted job placement programs—can help bridge the gap between different motivation groups and improve employment outcomes for all refugees (OECD, 2021; OECD & European Commission, 2023).

Control variables provide additional context but are not the central focus of the analysis. Gender disparities persist, with women being 10.2% less likely to be employed than men (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.001$). This reflects caregiving responsibilities and systemic barriers that disproportionately affect female refugees. While age positively influences employment likelihood by 3% per year (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.001$), the quadratic term shows diminishing returns for older refugees (logit marginal effect = -0.0006 , $p < 0.001$), suggesting that middle-aged individuals are best positioned for workforce participation.

5.2.3 2023 Dataset

The 2023 dataset consists exclusively of war refugees, allowing for a focused analysis of employment outcomes within this group. The results highlight language proficiency, education, and caregiving responsibilities as the most significant factors shaping employment, while age, gender, and marital status serve as control variables providing additional context. The results are showed in Table 20.

Core Variables

As in 2022, language proficiency remains the most significant determinant of employment. Each unit increase in Polish proficiency is associated with a 9.1% higher likelihood of employment (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.001$). The consistency of this finding across years underscores the critical role of language acquisition in labour market integration. Refugees with stronger language skills are better positioned to access job opportunities, communicate effectively in the workplace, and secure more stable employment. These findings reinforce the importance of expanding language training programs to improve employability.

Education: Secondary Education as a Clear Advantage

Education continues to shape employment outcomes, but its effects vary by level:

- Secondary education increases employment likelihood by 18.2% compared to those with less than secondary education (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.01$). This suggests that foundational education plays a key role in labour market access, equipping individuals with skills that are in demand.
- Tertiary education, however, is associated with a 16.1% lower employment likelihood (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.01$).

This result mirrors findings from 2022 and reflects persistent challenges such as non-recognition of foreign credentials, overqualification, and a mismatch between refugee qualifications and job availability. These barriers highlight the need for policies that support foreign credential recognition and skill-matching programs to improve employment prospects for highly educated refugees.

Caregiving Responsibilities: A Shift from 2022

A notable change from 2022 is that having children now correlates with a higher likelihood of employment. Refugees with children are 6.8% more likely to be employed (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.05$). This suggests that financial necessity drives many refugee parents to seek employment despite caregiving constraints. Alternatively, this trend may also reflect improved childcare arrangements, either through personal adaptation or increased state support.

In contrast to 2022, the interaction effects between marital status and having children are no longer statistically significant, meaning that the employment effects of caregiving responsibilities are less dependent on marital status. This could indicate greater access to childcare, improved labour market conditions for parents, or increased financial pressures making employment a necessity regardless of marital status.

Control Variables: Additional Context

Age remains positively associated with employment, with each additional year increasing employment likelihood by 4.4% (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.001$). However, the quadratic term (-0.001 , $p < 0.001$) indicates diminishing returns, meaning that while middle-aged refugees benefit from experience and stability, older individuals may face age-related employment challenges such as adaptability concerns or employer preferences for younger workers.

Unlike in 2022, the employment gap between male and female refugees is not statistically significant in 2023 (logit marginal effect = -6.9% , $p = 0.221$). While previous findings showed significant gender disparities in employment, this result suggests that the labour market conditions, or integration policies may have improved employment opportunities for women. Factors such as greater childcare support, expanded female

workforce participation initiatives, or shifts in employer hiring practices may have contributed to this outcome. However, further research is needed to determine whether this trend reflects long-term structural changes or temporary labour market dynamics.

The influence of marital status on employment is weaker than in previous models:

- Being married slightly decreases employment likelihood (-8.8%), though the effect is only weakly significant ($p < 0.05$).
- Being divorced has no significant effect on employment likelihood.

This suggests that broader economic conditions and labour market demands now have a greater impact on employment than marital status. The decline in significance may reflect stronger external pressures, such as financial necessity or changing workplace flexibility, that affect employment decisions more than relationship status.

5.2.4 Comparison of the Four Models and Conclusion

The comparison of the four models, war refugees (2022), economic migrants (2022), war refugees who arrived after February 2022, and war refugees (2023), reveals key patterns in how migration motivations, education, language proficiency, and caregiving responsibilities shape employment outcomes. War refugees (2022) refer to all individuals classified as war refugees in that dataset, regardless of their exact arrival date. These findings align closely with the study's hypotheses, particularly the Human Capital Hypothesis (H1), the Family Structure Constraint Hypothesis (H2), and the Migration Motivation Hypothesis (H3). While some variables remain consistently influential, others evolve over time, reflecting changing labour market conditions and integration processes.

5.2.4.1 Comparison of Core Variables

Language Proficiency: The Strongest and Most Consistent Predictor

Across all models, language proficiency emerges as the strongest determinant of employment outcomes, providing direct support for H1 (Human Capital Hypothesis). Increases in Polish language proficiency is consistently associated with higher employment probabilities, with an effect size of 9-10% for war refugees and 5.1% for economic migrants. This highlights the universal importance of language acquisition in labour market integration, though economic migrants appear to be less dependent on language proficiency, likely due to greater pre-migration preparation or existing linguistic skills.

For war refugees, who often arrive without prior Polish proficiency, language acquisition plays a fundamental role in their ability to access employment. This reinforces the crucial role of language training programs in supporting integration, particularly for forced migrants. These findings confirm that limited language skills, as outlined in H1, are a major barrier to employment, especially for those who arrived suddenly and without preparation (Dustmann & Fabbri, 2003).

Education: A Persistent Barrier for Highly Educated Refugees

The role of education in employment outcomes aligns with H1, but the findings also highlight systemic barriers that limit the potential benefits of tertiary education. While secondary education significantly increases employment likelihood, particularly for war refugees in 2023 (+18.2%) and economic migrants (+19.1%), tertiary education decreases employment likelihood across all models. War refugees experience a notable employment penalty (-9.3% in 2022 and -16.1% in 2023), while economic migrants face a similar but less severe disadvantage (-6.6%). These results suggest that credential non-recognition, overqualification, and job mismatches disproportionately affect highly

educated refugees, preventing them from securing roles that match their skill levels. Economic migrants, while also experiencing challenges in credential recognition, may have had more opportunities to prepare for labour market entry, making the impact of tertiary education slightly less severe.

This aligns with H1, which emphasizes the importance of human capital, but also highlights the structural barriers preventing the full utilization of skills. Policies that facilitate foreign credential recognition, skill validation, and job-matching programs are essential to maximize the economic contributions of highly educated refugees (OECD & European Commission, 2023).

Caregiving Responsibilities: A Shift in Employment Dynamics Over Time

The impact of caregiving responsibilities on employment outcomes strongly supports H2 (Family Structure Constraint Hypothesis). In 2022, having children significantly reduced employment chances for both war refugees (-27.5%) and economic migrants (-13.5%), reflecting the caregiving burden that limits workforce participation. The penalty was most severe for war refugees arriving after February 2022 (-30.1%), reinforcing the idea that displaced individuals face even greater challenges balancing caregiving and employment due to disrupted social support systems.

By 2023, refugee parents were 6.8% more likely to be employed, suggesting economic necessity now outweighs caregiving constraints. The lack of significant interaction effects with marital status may reflect better childcare access, increased employer flexibility, or shifting labour market conditions. This shift provides nuanced support for H2, showing that caregiving responsibilities initially act as a significant barrier, but under changing economic conditions and policy support, this constraint can lessen over time. Policies that promote affordable

childcare, work-life balance, and financial support for working parents remain crucial for improving labour market participation among refugees with caregiving duties.

Migration Motivations: A Key Differentiator Between Groups

The role of migration motivations in shaping employment likelihood aligns with H3 (Migration Motivation Hypothesis). Economic migrants typically make an active choice to relocate, often arriving with some preparation for labour market participation. In contrast, war refugees are forced to flee under sudden and often traumatic circumstances, facing disrupted careers, psychological burdens, and a lack of pre-established networks.

The data confirms that migration motivations significantly influence employment trajectories. War refugees who cited economic motivations are 13.5% more likely to be employed (logit marginal effect, $p < 0.001$), supporting H3's assertion that economically motivated refugees integrate more successfully. This suggests that those who migrated with an economic goal in mind are better positioned to integrate into the workforce, possibly due to skills alignment or the urgency to secure financial stability.

In contrast, those who migrated due to war-related reasons show no significant impact on employment likelihood (logit marginal effect = +1.9%, $p = 0.297$). This finding aligns with H3's argument that war-related migration can create additional barriers, such as psychological trauma, instability, and logistical challenges that hinder immediate labour market participation. Similarly, family-related migration motivations negatively impact employment, reducing employment likelihood by 4.2% ($p = 0.064$). This reflects the caregiving burden and prioritization of family responsibilities, which may delay workforce entry.

These findings provide strong empirical support for H3, confirming that economic migrants integrate into the workforce more smoothly, while war refugees—particularly those fleeing conflict or reuniting with family—face greater obstacles to employment (George J. Borjas, 2014)

5.2.4.2 Control Variables: Broader Structural Influences

Age consistently increases employment likelihood, though with diminishing returns at older ages. Middle-aged individuals appear best positioned for employment, balancing experience and adaptability, while younger individuals may struggle with lack of experience, and older individuals may encounter age-related employment barriers.

In 2022, female war refugees were 25.9% less likely to be employed, but this gap disappeared by 2023. For economic migrants, the gender gap was 12.1%. The decline suggests policy changes, economic shifts, or labour market demands improved women's employment opportunities. Similarly, marital status, which played a significant role in shaping employment outcomes in 2022, loses its importance by 2023. While in earlier models, married and divorced individuals experienced different employment dynamics due to caregiving responsibilities, by 2023, marital status no longer plays a significant role in employment likelihood.

6. CONCLUSION

The economic integration of Ukrainian refugees into the Polish labour market is a complex process with different aspects to consider, influenced by previous migration mechanisms, labour market structure, and the unprecedented scale of forced displaced people after Russian aggression in 2022. In this research, different challenges and opportunities that characterise the experience of Ukrainian refugees emerged.

Historically immigration in Poland has been characterized more by temporary labour migration than immigration with long-term prospects. Before 2022, Ukrainian migration to Poland largely followed a circular pattern, supported by flexible visa policies, seasonal work permits, and employer declarations (Duszczuk, 2024). However, the 2022 refugee crisis has been a radical shift, because many displaced individuals cannot return home, and this created new pressures on Poland's labour market and social policies. In response to this crisis, the European Union activated the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), allowing Ukrainians immediate access to employment, residency, healthcare, and education without going through the standard procedure for asylum seekers. However, while the TPD guaranteed free labour market access, it did not think of a long-term solution for integration, causing the reliance of refugees on short-term employment solutions.

Poland introduced the Special Law on March 12, 2022, offering one of Europe's most generous protection schemes. It granted Ukrainian refugees rights nearly equivalent to those of Polish citizens, including unrestricted access to the labour market, public services, and financial support. While this legislation significantly improved

short-term integration prospects, its long-term sustainability remains uncertain, particularly as the refugee crisis extends beyond initial expectations. Moreover, while Ukrainians have full access to Poland's welfare system, it is important to consider that the system itself is relatively modest. This, in turn, may encourage labour market participation, as many refugees cannot rely solely on social benefits for financial stability.

Key Findings and Their Implications

A key factor influencing employment outcomes across all models is language proficiency. Supporting the Human Capital Hypothesis (H1), Polish language skills significantly increase employment likelihood, particularly for war refugees, whose lack of initial proficiency is a major barrier to entry. Economic migrants, in contrast, appear less dependent on language acquisition, likely due to better pre-migration preparation and their presence in already well-established migrant niches. These findings reinforce the crucial role of language training programs in facilitating integration while also highlighting the advantage of existing migrant networks in easing labour market entry.

The relationship between education and employment presents a contradiction. Secondary education has a positive impact on employment, while tertiary education has the opposite effect in most cases. Many refugees with high-education levels struggle to find work that matches their qualifications, encountering non-recognition barriers, skill mismatches, and overqualification. A key explanation for this problem is the mismatch between qualifications and labour market demand. Poland's economy relies heavily on low- and medium-skilled sectors, which do not align with the expertise of many highly educated refugees (Górny & Kindler, 2018). This mismatch often results in underemployment or unemployment.

Economic migrants encounter similar challenges, but to a lesser degree, likely because they enter the labour market with clearer expectations and strategies for navigating job placement. Addressing these barriers requires policy interventions focused on diploma recognition, skills validation, and improved access to professional employment to fully utilize the potential of highly educated refugees.

Results showed that family responsibilities are a fundamental factor that influence employment status, confirming the Family Structure Constraint Hypothesis (H2). From the analysis emerged that parents of the 2022 sample, especially war refugees, were less likely to be employed. However, the trend reversed for the 2023 dataset, with parents becoming more likely to enter the workforce. This shift can be explained by the increase of economic necessity and financial pressure on parents, pushing more refugee parents into employment despite ongoing childcare challenges. The improvements of childcare access or employer flexibility may have contributed to this trend, but this is also a function of limited generosity of the welfare system in Poland. These findings highlight the importance of affordable childcare programs and parental employment support in improving labour market participation for refugee families (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016).

Migration motivations also play a decisive role in employment likelihood, aligning with the Migration Motivation Hypothesis (H3). Economic migrants, who made an active choice to emigrate, have higher employment rates. War refugees, in contrast, often face trauma, displacement-related instability, and disrupted career trajectories, making immediate labour market integration more challenging. The more successful integration of economic migrants

confirmed by the analysis of data can be attributed to the stronger alignment between their skills and the job market. War refugees, who migrated primarily for humanitarian or family reunification reasons, experience more significant obstacles to labour market participation. These findings highlight that forced migration creates additional barriers, necessitating targeted labour market policies to address the specific challenges refugee's encounter.

A key takeaway from these findings is that migration motivations, education, language proficiency, and caregiving responsibilities all shape employment outcomes in distinct ways. While some barriers, like language, can be addressed through policy interventions, other challenges, such as trauma and disrupted work histories, require more nuanced solutions. In addition, the overall situation of war refugees is highly dependent on external factors, i.e. the political situation in Ukraine.

Final Thoughts

This research demonstrates that economic integration is not a linear process but rather a multifaceted and evolving phenomenon. While Poland has historically welcomed Ukrainian workers, the scale and nature of migration after 2022 require a more structured approach to labour market integration (Górny & Kaczmarczyk, 2023). Key findings emphasize the need for tailored policies that address:

- Language acquisition programs, particularly for war refugees, as language remains the strongest employment enabler (OECD & European Commission, 2023).
- Credential recognition and skill validation initiatives to prevent underemployment among highly educated refugees (Brunarska et al., 2016).

- Parental employment support and childcare accessibility, given the shifting impact of caregiving responsibilities over time.
- Sectoral labour market inclusion strategies to ensure that refugees and economic migrants are not confined to precarious employment (Górny & Van der Zwan, 2024).

The research that has been done for the last five months highlights the complexity of the immigration phenomenon, where different factors need to be considered: individual agency, structural constraints and labour conditions (Favell, 2022). The vast amount of data, tables, percentages, and economic indicators, helped to quantify labour market integration, but the real challenge was to give sense to these numbers trying to understand the reality behind them. Numbers alone cannot fully capture the experiences of refugees navigating a new country, seeking employment, and rebuilding their lives.

Ultimately, the long-term integration of Ukrainian refugees will depend not only on economic opportunities but also on the adaptability of policies and institutions in ensuring that migrants can fully contribute to and benefit from the labour market (OECD, 2022). An interdisciplinary approach is fundamental to understand economic integration. Labour market access is not the only factor influencing employment outcomes: social policies, cultural adaptation and demographic shifts are highly interconnected. (Garcés-Mascareñas & Penninx, 2016). Poland's migration policies relied largely on short-term solutions, without structuring a long-term integration framework. Given the large-scale of Ukrainian refugee's flow, a more comprehensive strategy may be necessary to

better integrate refugees in every aspect of polish society (Górny & van der Zwan, 2024). It remains to be seen whether Poland's new Migration Strategy, announced in October 2025, is capable of meeting these expectations.

While this research does not provide definitive answers, it highlights critical areas for future research and policy development. European labour markets will always be reshaped by immigration, so addressing the structural and institutional barriers to integration will remain an ongoing challenge for academics, policymakers, and society.

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APPENDIX A

Table 15 - Linear Regressions Whole sample 2022 Dataset. Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

	(1) Gender	(2) Age	(3) Marital	(4) Children	(5) Language	(6) Education
Female	-0.227*** (0.015)					
age		0.007* (0.003)				
age_mid_sq		-0.000*** (0.000)				
Married			-0.143*** (0.017)			
Divorcee			0.010 (0.031)			
Widow/Widower			-0.134 (0.076)			
has_children=1				-0.170*** (0.015)		
Overall Language					0.112*** (0.006)	
Secondary						-0.016 (0.025)
Tertiary or more						-0.102*** (0.023)
Constant	0.839*** (0.013)	0.629*** (0.059)	0.775*** (0.016)	0.796*** (0.013)	0.564*** (0.009)	0.738*** (0.021)
Observations	5108	5108	5108	5080	5108	5108

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 16 - Linear Regressions for Refugees Arrived After February 2022. Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

	(1) Gender	(2) Age	(3) Marital	(4) Children	(5) Language	(6) Education	(7) Economic	(8) War-Related	(9) Family	(10) Other
Female	-0.057* (0.028)									
age		0.010** (0.004)								
age_mid_sq		-0.000*** (0.000)								
Married			-0.095*** (0.027)							
Divorcee			0.031 (0.046)							
Widow/Widower			-0.265* (0.114)							
has_children=1				-0.110*** (0.024)						
Overall Language					0.061*** (0.010)					
Secondary							-0.003 (0.036)			
Tertiary or more							-0.064* (0.032)			

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Gender	Age	Marital	Children	Language	Education	Economic	War-Related	Family	Other
Economic Reasons							0.157*** (0.027)			
War-Related								0.001 (0.018)		
Family-Related									-0.038 (0.023)	
Other Reasons										-0.023 (0.018)
Constant	0.587*** (0.026)	0.430*** (0.082)	0.615*** (0.025)	0.632*** (0.022)	0.504*** (0.010)	0.583*** (0.031)	0.519*** (0.009)	0.537*** (0.014)	0.544*** (0.010)	0.552*** (0.015)
Observations	3264	3264	3264	3241	3264	3264	3264	3264	3264	3264

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 17 - Linear Regressions for 2023 Dataset. Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
	Gender	Age	Marital	Children	Education	Language
Female	-0.008 (0.060)					
age		0.022** (0.007)				
age_sq		-0.000*** (0.000)				
Married			-0.062 (0.044)			
Divorcee			0.027 (0.054)			
Widow/Widower			-0.183* (0.086)			
Yes, staying with mee				-0.059 (0.054)		
No Children				-0.008 (0.069)		
Less than Secondary					0.193** (0.064)	
Tertiary or more					0.041 (0.042)	
Overall Language						0.095*** (0.019)
Constant	0.513*** (0.057)	0.137 (0.162)	0.540*** (0.038)	0.551*** (0.051)	0.458*** (0.036)	0.217*** (0.062)
Observations	842	842	842	842	842	842

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 18 - Comparison of OLS coeff, Logit Coeff, and Marginal Effects for War Refugees (WR) and Economic Migrants (EM). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

	(1) OLS WR	(2) Logit WR	(3) Marginal WR	(4) OLS EM	(5) Logit EM	(6) Marginal EM
Female	-0.260** (0.088)	-1.495** (0.520)	-0.176*** (0.027)	-0.140* (0.059)	-1.401 (0.933)	-0.121*** (0.015)
age	0.023*** (0.006)	0.098** (0.030)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.195*** (0.049)	0.017*** (0.004)
age_mid_sq	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.000** (0.000)
Female # age	0.002 (0.002)	0.016 (0.012)		0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.024)	
Married	-0.100 (0.051)	-0.500* (0.252)	0.089 (0.054)	-0.015 (0.025)	0.006 (0.423)	-0.023 (0.032)
Divorcee	-0.107 (0.155)	-0.550 (0.723)	0.199** (0.069)	-0.155 (0.088)	-1.601* (0.698)	-0.029 (0.048)
has_children	-0.275*** (0.075)	-1.241*** (0.333)	-0.064 (0.040)	-0.128* (0.056)	-1.402** (0.522)	-0.136*** (0.029)
Married # has_chil~n	0.233** (0.083)	1.044** (0.372)		-0.013 (0.061)	-0.344 (0.649)	
Divorcee # has_chi~n	0.374* (0.173)	1.701* (0.801)		0.199 (0.106)	2.063* (0.914)	
Overall Language	0.085*** (0.010)	0.390*** (0.050)	0.088*** (0.011)	0.055*** (0.009)	0.571*** (0.094)	0.052*** (0.008)
Less than secondary	-0.066 (0.042)	-0.300 (0.184)	-0.067 (0.041)	0.003 (0.023)	0.051 (0.317)	0.003 (0.022)
Tertiary or more	-0.051* (0.024)	-0.236* (0.110)	-0.052* (0.024)	-0.072*** (0.018)	-0.744*** (0.211)	-0.066*** (0.018)
Constant	0.495*** (0.133)	0.284 (0.739)		0.638*** (0.090)	-0.432 (1.160)	
Observations	2276	2276	2276	1409	1409	1409

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 19 - OLS Coefficients, Logit Coefficients, and Marginal Effects for Refugees Arrived After February 2022. Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

	(1) OLS	(2) Logit	(3) Marginal
Economic Reasons	0.130*** (0.026)	0.576*** (0.120)	0.132*** (0.026)
War-Related Reasons	0.019 (0.018)	0.083 (0.078)	0.019 (0.018)
Family-Related Reasons	-0.041 (0.023)	-0.181 (0.097)	-0.043 (0.023)
Other Reasons	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.121 (0.078)	-0.028 (0.018)
Female	-0.168* (0.083)	-0.763 (0.399)	-0.099*** (0.028)
age	0.027*** (0.005)	0.119*** (0.023)	0.030*** (0.005)
Female # age	0.002 (0.002)	0.008 (0.009)	
age_mid_sq	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Married	-0.134** (0.048)	-0.599** (0.210)	0.090* (0.044)
Divorcee	-0.121 (0.114)	-0.549 (0.502)	0.205*** (0.056)
No Answer	0.339 (0.297)	1.440 (1.347)	0.000 (.)
has_children	-0.302*** (0.062)	-1.307*** (0.269)	-0.060 (0.036)
Married # has_chil~n	0.268*** (0.071)	1.159*** (0.305)	
Divorcee # has_chi~n	0.389** (0.130)	1.691** (0.575)	
Overall Language P~e	0.060*** (0.010)	0.259*** (0.044)	0.061*** (0.010)
Less than secondar~	0.001 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.150)	-0.001 (0.034)
Tertiary or more	-0.062** (0.021)	-0.271** (0.091)	-0.063** (0.021)
Constant	0.329** (0.117)	-0.773 (0.554)	
Observations	3216	3216	3216

Standard errors in parentheses
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 20 - Comparison of OLS Coefficients, Logit Coefficients, and Marginal Effects (2023 Dataset). Own elaboration based on the CMR Ukrainian panel (“Between Ukraine and Poland”).

	(1) OLS	(2) Logit	(3) Marginal
Female	0.036 (0.213)	0.279 (0.975)	-0.069 (0.063)
age	0.040** (0.014)	0.203** (0.069)	0.044*** (0.013)
Female # age	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.014 (0.021)	
age_sq	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Married	-0.231* (0.113)	-0.985* (0.491)	-0.088 (0.055)
Divorcee	-0.005 (0.137)	-0.014 (0.587)	-0.020 (0.063)
Children Staying	0.018 (0.047)	0.099 (0.204)	0.068* (0.034)
Married # Children	0.103 (0.063)	0.437 (0.283)	
Divorcee # Childre	-0.012 (0.085)	-0.051 (0.370)	
Overall Language	0.093*** (0.020)	0.399*** (0.087)	0.091*** (0.019)
Less than secondary	-0.186** (0.062)	-0.807** (0.275)	-0.182** (0.060)
Tertiary or more	-0.164** (0.055)	-0.719** (0.251)	-0.161** (0.053)
Constant	-0.389 (0.397)	-4.478* (1.884)	
Observations	841	841	841

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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