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THE COTONOU PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT:
CHALLENGES AND LEGACY FOR ACP-EU COOPERATION

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Abstract

This dissertation examines the salient issues of the partnership between the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries, especially within the framework of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). The mixed results achieved by the CPA, which are highlighted in my work, should give some indications of the main challenges which this partnership faced and still faces to this day. Particular attention is given to the role of security and its correlation with development and migration in EU-ACP cooperation. Ultimately, this work should feed a reflection on the lessons learned since 2000 and on the meaning of the new Samoa agreement, especially in a time in which multilateral cooperation is increasingly called into question.

List of abbreviations

Abbreviation	Definition
AASM	Associated African States and Madagascar
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
CARIFORUM	Caribbean Forum
CPA	Cotonou Partnership Agreement
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DG AIDCO	EuropeAid Cooperation Office
DG DEV	Directorate-General for Development and Relations with ACP States
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG INTPA	Directorate-General for International Partnerships
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
EUTF	EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
FTA	Free trade area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
JPA	Joint Parliamentary Assembly
MDGs	Millenium Development Goals
OACPS	Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Introduction

On 15 November 2023, representatives of the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) met in Apia, Samoa, to sign a partnership agreement which, for the next 20 years, will frame cooperation between these two parties. The new Samoa Agreement is the last step in the evolution of the EU-OACPS cooperation, and it marks the end of a crucial phase in the history of this partnership: the era of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). For 23 years, the CPA framed the relation between the EU and its ACP partners. It revised several key features from the previous cooperation framework, introducing a new reciprocal trade regime, a more comprehensive approach aimed at encompassing various aspects of development, a particular attention to political dialogue with new joint institutions, and a participative strategy with provisions meant to foster civil society engagement. Because of its many new features and implications, the CPA has drawn the attention of many analysts and researchers: as we enter in a new era of EU cooperation with ACP countries, I use this opportunity to look back on the page that was just turned.

Indeed, the aim of this dissertation is to present the Cotonou Agreement and to examine it in the context of global debates on the nature of development cooperation, identifying key issues for the partnership to come. By dissecting the theoretical foundations, historical context and paradigms of EU-ACP cooperation, it contributes to a better understanding of different facets of the Cotonou framework. To achieve this, my work is the result of a desk-based research to gather information from institutional and academic sources as well as reports and studies of other origins, coupled with basic elements of quantitative analysis of aid flows.

In the first chapter, a theoretical basis will be provided to have a clear understanding of the key concepts used in this thesis. The debates around the definition of development and the impact of aid will be presented, as well as the concept of securitisation, used later in this work. The second chapter narrows the scope of the analysis as it addresses the EU paradigm of development cooperation, including the objectives and the approaches which shape said cooperation. The partnership with ACP countries is then discussed, presenting the historical background and the dynamics which underpin the CPA. The focus then moves to the Cotonou Agreement itself: its main features are presented, after which I aim to produce a more comprehensive critical perspective of the Agreement in its many elements and implications for development, keeping in mind the considerations made in the first two chapters. In the last chapter, particular attention is given to a specific challenge which characterised the past framework and which will remain of importance in the future: the securitising trends observed in the ACP-EU partnership as part of a narrative in which development, security and migration are dangerously interconnected.

Chapter 1: Theoretical framework

This first chapter aims to lay the foundations for understanding the complex dynamics of development cooperation. Indeed, it provides the critical and analytical tools necessary for the discussion unfolding in the rest of this dissertation. The definition of development is dissected before reviewing different approaches and schools of thought on development aid. Finally, this chapter introduces the concept of securitisation, which will be central to the final chapter of the thesis.

1.1 Defining and Measuring development

Over time, there have been multiple attempts to define and measure development, consequently affecting and shaping international aid policies and programmes.[1] When referring to a socioeconomic system, 'development' usually has a positive connotation, either in the system as a whole, or in some of its components. Development may occur due to some deliberate actions – such as development policies and private investments – or to favourable circumstances. Given this broad definition, "development" is a multidimensional concept in its nature, as an improvement of a complex system can occur in different parts, modalities or times, and be driven by different forces. Therefore, determining whether and to what extent a country is developing is an intrinsically multidimensional exercise.[2]

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[1] Edwards, S. (2014), "Economic development and the effectiveness of foreign aid: A historical perspective", https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/economic-development-and-effectiveness-foreign-aid-historical-perspective

[2] Bellù, L.G. (2011), "Development and Development Paradigms - A (Reasoned) Review of Prevailing Visions, FAO, https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/dcfe19e6-9ace-4aca-8a3d-2e5b4965e0f7/content

Progressively, studies and research have gone beyond the mainstream equations between wealth and human welfare, economic growth and development, taking into account new dimensions which also encompass social and political factors. According to the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen human development should be understood as the expansion of capabilities and consequent 'functionings', or the ability of people to do or be.[3] Sen considers development as the enablement of people to have choices, and it focuses directly on the quality of life that individuals are actually able to achieve. Sen's so-called 'Capability Approach'[4] has been employed extensively as a broader, deeper alternative to narrowly economic metrics such as growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, where 'poverty' is conceived as deprivation in the capability to live a good life, and 'development' as capability expansion. Sen's Capability Approach provides the theoretical foundation of the Human Development Index (HDI), a composite index which was first constructed by Sen and Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq in the 1990 Human Development Report.[5] The three components measured by the HDI were selected because as long as these dimensions are precluded to individuals, many other capabilities and 'functionings' remain not accessible to them. These components are:

- Life expectancy, namely the possibility to live a long and healthy life
- Expected years of schooling and mean years of schooling, which express the choice to acquire knowledge

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[3] Sen, A. (2001), *Development as freedom*, New York: Oxford University Press

[4] Sen, A. (1985), *Commodities and Capabilities*, Amsterdam: North-Holland

[5] UNDP (1990), "Human Development Report 1990", https://hdr.undp.org/content/human-development-report-1990

- Gross National Income (GNI) per capita expressed in constant Purchasing Power Parity US dollars terms, which represents the capability to people to access to resources needed for a decent standard of living.

The HDI is important because it provides a first and partial insight on the qualitative outcomes of people's lives in a certain country, and on how the income of a country is spent, be it for education, health or something else. Furthermore, the HDI takes into account aggregate country-level parameters and data that many countries have been collecting over time, and it can therefore be considered reasonably accountable. The HDI has significantly contributed to raising awareness on the importance of aspects of human welfare that are not well captured by just looking at market goods.[6] Many other so-called mashup indexes have been trying to integrate further dimensions – including social, political, ecological and environmental aspects – in their measurement and definition of development. For instance, international development is increasingly focused on environmental and societal concerns, progressively integrating human 'functionings' with relational 'functionings' – related to states of being of society such as, inequality, trust, and peacefulness – and systemic 'functionings' – describing the well-being of the ecosystem as a whole – towards an idea of sustainable development.[7] This posed the theoretical foundation for the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) first adopted in 2000 and later for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all United Nations

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[6] Ravaillon, M. (2012), "Mashup Indices of Development", The World Bank Research Observer, 27:1, pp. 1–32, https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkr009

[7] Assa, J. (2019), "Rethinking Human Development in the Context of the SDGs", https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335665935_Rethinking_Human_Development_in_the_Context_of_the_SDGs

Member States in 2015. The 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which have been identified recognize the multi-dimensional importance of development, meaning that ending poverty must go hand-in-hand with strategies that improve health and education, reduce inequality, and spur economic growth – all while tackling climate change and working to preserve ecosystems.[8]

Over time, countries, research and the international community have adhered to a so-called 'development paradigm', meaning a defined path encompassing a specific set of activities and framed by a common vision to follow to achieve development.[9] These changes and their integration in a common definition of development deeply affected the debate around how development could be achieved, and what role international aid could play in fostering and promoting development.[10]

1.2 Development aid – Impact and controversies

The complexity of the concept of development naturally reflects on that of development aid. As outlined by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Official Development Assistance (ODA) can be defined as government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of those countries which are listed in the DAC list of ODA Recipients.[11] Theoretically, aid should be able to stimulate development and economic growth, fill resource gaps and help establish key institutions and capacities in the so-called developing countries. In practice, foreign aid is often utilized as an instrument of

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[8] United Nations, https://sdgs.un.org/goals

[9] Bellù, L.G., op. cit.

[10] Edwards, S., op. cit.

[11] OECD (2021), "Official Development Assistance (ODA)", https://www.developmentaid.org/api/frontend/cms/file/2021/07/What-is-ODA.pdf

foreign policy, economic strategy, and domestic policy. This multifaceted approach helps countries achieve a range of objectives beyond mere humanitarian assistance.[12] Over the last 70 years, the development priorities and approaches both of donors and recipient countries has deeply changed, driven by the evolution of development studies, fast-changing situations at international and local contexts, or in response to empirical findings on aid effectiveness.[13]

The debate around developmental aid effectiveness started in the 1970s and became fervent in the 1990s, in response to increasing criticisms around aid, which according to some could also undermine broader development efforts.[14] According to Hungarian development economist P. T. Bauer, aid could also have important repercussions on recipient countries, hindering development: indeed, aid often supports damaging policies, often absorbing domestic resources which might otherwise satisfy the needs of the poorest groups.[15] Zambian economist Dambisa Moyo explains why aid is unproductive and how it generates negative consequences which eventually undermine development, with a focus on the African continent.[16] She suggests that aid fosters and

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[12] Bindra, S. S. (2018), "Foreign Aid And Foreign Policy: An Implementation Process", World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 22:3, pp. 126–141. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48520086

[13] Gunatilake, H. et al. (2015), "Foreign Aid, Aid Effectiveness and the New Aid Paradigm: A Review", Sri Lankan Journal of Agricultural Economics, 12:39, pp. 39-81, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285747079_Foreign_Aid_Aid_Effectiveness_and_the_New_Aid_Paradigm_A_Review

[14]Glennie, J., Sumner, A. (2014), "The $138.5 Billion Question: When Does Foreign Aid Work (and When Doesn't It)?", Center for Global Development, Policy Paper n. 49, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/1385-billion-question-when-does-foreign-aid-work-and-when-doesnt-it

[15] Bauer, P.T. (1973), "The case against foreign aid", Intereconomics, 8:5, pp. 154-157, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02927631

[16] Moyo, D. (2010), *Dead Aid – Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa*, London: Penguin Books

facilitates corruption while distorting the relationship between the government and its citizens: indeed, since the State is not dependent on tax revenues – and consequently on its citizens –, it can take decisions without considering the society's needs and pursuing only its own financial interests. This view is similar to Scottish economist and academic A. Deaton's argument that large amounts of foreign aid can reshape the relationship between government and citizens, as the accountability of a State towards its people is related to the former's dependence on taxes paid by the latter.[17] [18] From an economic perspective, Moyo notes how aid generates a need for more aid, following the so-called "vicious cycle of aid":[19] large economic inflows undermine economic growth by encouraging consumption rather than savings, by rising the inflation rates and by leading to an appreciation of the domestic currency, consequently affecting the export sector. Furthermore, Moyo analyses aid-dependency related problems generated by aid: on one hand, if inflows are considered as unlimited and permanent, governments will not need to elaborate long-term financial planning, on the other hand, all economic and political decisions will be subjected to donors' wills and priorities, undermining their freedom and fostering their aid-dependency.[20]

Another aspect to consider when discussing aid effectiveness is the lack of comprehensive evaluations and empirical findings which allow to

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[17] Deaton, A. (2013), *The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality*. Princeton University Press, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt3fgxbm

[18] Swanson, A. (2015), "Why trying to help poor countries might actually hurt them", The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/10/13/why-trying-to-help-poor-countries-might-actually-hurt-them/

[19] Moyo, D. (2010), op. cit., p. 49

[20] Amsler, J. &; Burkhardt, C. (2010), "Book Review: Dead Aid - Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa", Aussenwirtschaft, 65:3, pp. 327-332, https://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/auswrt/AW_65-03__06_Amsler-Burkhardt.pdf

draw firm conclusions about the positive impact of aid in recipient countries. According to researcher J. Glennie and development economist A. Sumner, there are significant methodological difficulties in clearly defining causality in aid.[21] They explain that "the possibility of making meaningful generalisations depends on the scope of the research question and the size of the aid intervention being investigated" [22] and that "the further one goes beyond concrete project outputs, the harder the evidence gathering and causation analysis becomes".[23] When examining specific interventions, economists Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo advocate the use of randomised control trials, originally used for clinical testing, to determine causality between an intervention and its outcomes: this is achieved by randomly assigning tested subjects to experimental or control groups, creating counterfactual evidence.[24] Going beyond the strict 'aid works / aid does not work' dichotomy, it is interesting to explore if there are conditions and modalities which foster its positive effect and effectiveness. These can include: the characteristics of the recipient country, such as human development levels and national policies; practices and procedures of the donors, including the modality used to deliver aid, heavy donor control, bilateral or multilateral aid; and the type of activity that the aid supports, which can range from emergency interventions to long term education support or more straightforward assistance in building infrastructure.[25] Based on the first characteristic – namely the idea that aid

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[21] Glennie, J., Sumner, A. (2014), op. cit.

[22] Ibidem, p. 17

[23] Ibidem, p. 17

[24] Banerjee, A. V., Duflo, E. (2012), *Poor Economics – A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty*, New York: Public Affairs

[25] Radelet, S. (2006), "A Primer on Foreign Aid", Center for Global Development, Working Paper n. 92, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/primer-foreign-aid-working-paper-92

is more effective in a good policy environment – many donors adopted the principle of selectivity in their aid allocation, providing support only to countries with good policies and good governance. [26] However, it became progressively clear that since donors and recipients are both responsible for all three elements, donor-recipient partnership is critical for aid effectiveness: this evolution of development aid theories and empirical findings on aid effectiveness shaped new paradigms from the donor community starting in the mid-1990s.[27]

1.3 New development paradigms

From the controversies and the evolutions briefly analysed regarding the effectiveness of aid, the aid community gradually shifted to a new development paradigm; its principles, which were formalized in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,[28] can be defined as follows:

- Country Ownership: Recipient countries have power over the design and the implementation of their development policies and strategies;
- Alignment: Development strategies are always in line and coherent with national strategies, institutions and policies;
- Harmonisation: Donor procedures, aid modalities, and delivery mechanisms are simplified and coordinated to avoid redundancies;

[26] Dijkstra, G. (2013), "The new aid paradigm: A case of policy incoherence", DESA, Working Paper No. 128, https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793993315500009X

[27] Gunatilake, H. et al., op. cit.

[28] OECD (2005), "The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles For Smart Aid", https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827300.pdf

- Managing for results: Better and clearer management of resources and improved decision-making, with a results-focused approach;
- Mutual accountability: Mutual trust and equity-based partnership are the foundation of the donor-recipient relationship.

In 2011, a global conference was held in Busan, South Korea, where the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was endorsed during the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, shifting the narrative from aid effectiveness to effective development co-operation.[29] In the Busan Partnership, the new architecture of aid and development is recognized, elevating the role of the private sector, multilateral organisations, and international financial institutions and highlighting the complexity of countries' relationships – including South-South cooperation. At the same time, the Partnership re-centres economic growth and productivity to the core of development and development thinking.

1.4 The concept of securitisation

In recent decades, the concept of securitization has appeared in the discourse on international cooperation. The concept of securitisation was developed in the 1990s by authors associated with the Copenhagen School of security studies, namely Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Wæver.[30] It is defined as the process of labelling an issue as a security threat or assigning a security value to it. In so doing, this issue is elevated from the

[29] Mawdsley, E. et al. (2014), "A 'post-aid world'? Paradigm shift in foreign aid and development cooperation at the 2011 Busan High Level Forum", The Geographical Journal, 180:1, pp. 27–38, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43868584

[30] Williams, M.C. (2003), "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics", International Studies Quarterly, 47:4, pp. 511-531, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693634?origin=JSTOR-pdf

realm of ordinary politics to an urgent threat that demands exceptional measures. This process unfolds around two key elements: a securitising actor, who frames the issue as a threat and "who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind",[31] and an actor or group of actors supposedly exposed to said threat – called the referent object.[32] Other scholars [33] [34] use the similar concept of crisis labelling, which entails the use of the word 'crisis' applied to political events, relying on the menacing meaning which it carries: here too, the process makes it possible to justify the exceptional mobilisation of attention and resources to face an issue.

The existence of a correlation between development and security in EU policies has been highlighted by many,[35] [36] [37] with some authors emphasising the reciprocity of this correlation: as explained by S. Keukeleire and K. Raube of the University of Leuven, "Economic and social development is recognized as one factor strengthening security, whereas, from a development perspective, security may also increase the

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[31] Buzan, B. et al. (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 5

[32] Ibidem

[33] Jeandesboz, J., Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2014), "Crisis, enforcement and control at the EU borders", in Lindley, A. (ed.), *Crisis and Migration: Critical Perspectives*, New York: Routledge, pp. 115-135

[34] Edelman, M. (1977), *Political Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

[35] Stern, M., Öjendal, J. (2010), "Mapping the Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?" Security Dialogue, 41:1, pp. 5-29, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010609357041

[36] Keukeleire, S., Raube, K., op. cit.

[37] Del Biondo, K. et al. (2012), "Security and Development in EU External Relations", in Biscop, S. Whitman, R. (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of European Security*, pp. 126‑41, London: Routledge, http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-3055343

chances for development".[38] Academics M. Furness and S. Gänzle offer a similar view:

> "the EU's internal peace-project vision has been adapted for the outside world through the assertion that security and development are mutually enhancing policy objectives of its external relations. Security is considered a precondition for development – if adequate security is not in place, activities aimed at reducing poverty will most likely fail. Development, in turn, is considered a core component of sustainable conflict resolution" [39].

According to Spanish researchers I. Olivié and A. Pérez,[40] securitisation processes in development cooperation can be identified on three different levels: the first is discourse, namely references made to security in communication, such as declarations or papers; the second level is funding, meaning that aid targets actors relevant for security or that it is directed towards sectors or projects focused on enhancing peace and security; the third is the institutional level, namely the creation of institutional structures or mechanisms which combine security with development issues.[41] Similarly, Keukeleire and Raube identify four dimensions in which securitisation can be observed: development: discourse, policy instruments, policy actions and institutional

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[38] Keukeleire, S., Raube, K., op. cit., p. 1

[39] Furness, M., Gänzle, S., op. cit., p. 141

[40] Olivié, I., Pérez, A. (2021), "Whose and what aid securitisation? An analysis of EU aid narratives and flows", Third World Quarterly, 42:8, pp. 1903–1922, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1939006

[41] Furness, M., Gänzle, S. (2016), "The European Union's Development Policy: A Balancing Act between 'A More Comprehensive Approach' and Creeping Securitization", in Brown, S., Grävingholt, J. (eds.), *The Securitization of Foreign* Aid, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-56882-3

framework.[42] These views identify the different possible expressions of securitisation in development processes; in the last chapter of this dissertation, these theoretical elements are used to identify securitising trends on different levels of ACP-EU development cooperation.

[42] Keukeleire, S., Raube, K. (2013) "The security–development nexus and securitization in the EU's policies towards developing countries", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:3, pp. 556–572, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.822851

Chapter 2: EU development cooperation and ACP-EU cooperation

In this second chapter of this thesis, the analysis is focused on one of the main actors in development cooperation: the European Union. The EU's approach to development cooperation will be explored, before retracing the origins of EU-ACP cooperation leading to the signature of the Cotonou Agreement.

2.1 The European paradigm for development cooperation

Since its evolution into a political community after the end of the Cold War, the EU has progressively become a major actor in development assistance.[43] M. Thiel, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University, explains how, at the time, the EU's interest in democracy and good governance naturally acquired relevance, stemming from concern over the instability of eastern European countries. Hence, democracy is considered not only an objective, but a condition integrated in cooperation agreements.[44] Since its creation, the EU has risen to be one of the main development aid donors in the world, due to a combination of assistance provided by EU institutions and member states. The EU's development cooperation approach is guided by the ultimate aim of eradicating poverty, as reflected in Article 208 of the Treaty on the

[43] Shah, A. (2017), "Development assistance and conditionality: Challenges in design and options for more effective assistance", EC-OECD Seminar Series on Designing better economic development policies for regions and cities, https://www.oecd.org/cfe/regionaldevelopment/Shah-Development-assistance-and-conditionality.pdf

[44] Thiel, M. (2004), "The conditionality of U.S. & E.U. development aid upon democratization – a comparison", Centro de Estudios Europeos, E-Working Papers, 2:1, https://www2.politicas.unam.mx/cee/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/conditionality_us_ue_development_democratization.pdf

Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [45] and in Article 21(d) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).[46] Under this overarching objective, the EU strives to support multilateral cooperation, democracy and the rule of law, to ensure the respect of human rights and to promote peace and environmentally sustainable practices.[47] Since 2015, SDGs have taken a prominent role in defining the aims of EU development cooperation, consequently broadening its scope as an acknowledgement of the multidimensionality of development.[48]

In addition to being shaped by the objectives just mentioned, the delivery of EU development aid follows certain visible patterns and modalities. Socialisation plays an important role in this sense: this means that the EU continuously seeks dialogue with other countries and works to build cooperative frameworks which are well accepted and integrated by its partners.[49] However, another important aspect of the EU's approach is conditionality, which can be defined as "attempts by donor governments to induce recipient governments to change their policies and behaviour, as

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[45] EUR-Lex (2012), "Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union", Article 208, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT

[46] EUR-Lex (2012b), "Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union", Article 21 (d), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT

[47] European Union (2017), "The New European Consensus on Development. Our dignity, our future", Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5a95e892-ec76-11e8-b690-01aa75ed71a1

[48] Ayadi, R., Ronco, S. (2023), "The EU-Africa partnership and development aid: Assessing the EU's actorness and effectiveness in development policy", CEPS, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/the-eu-africa-partnership-and-development-aid-assessing-the-eus-actorness-and-effectiveness-in-development-policy/

[49] Thiel, M. (2004), op. cit., p.15

well as to influence the way aid itself is spent".[50] To promote its principles and goals, the EU tends to link its development aid with the fulfilment of conditions related to human rights and democracy criteria by recipient countries, often with a threat of sanctions which is, however, not always followed through.[51] In the 21st century, increasing attention is given to aid effectiveness: development cooperation is informed by a concern for the quality and impact of aid, ownership of the recipient country and decreased conditionality; at the moment, however, results are mixed.[52] [53] The EU also increasingly shapes its policies following the concept of differentiation: this means "tailoring trade and development policy to match the level of development and development need of its partners".[54] Coupled with differentiation, regionalism has gradually become a fundamental principle in EU development cooperation, seeking to build partnerships with regional blocs above state level.[55] [56]

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[50] Frerks, G. (2006), "The Use of Peace Conditionalities in Conflict and Post-conflict settings: A Conceptual Framework and a Checklist", Clingendael Institute, p. 13, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep05506.6.pdf

[51] Shah, A. (2017), op. cit.

[52] Ibidem

[53] Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2020), "Effective Development Cooperation - Does the EU deliver?", https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/effective-development-cooperation-does-eu-deliver

[54] Carbone, M., Orbie, J. (2014), "Beyond Economic Partnership Agreements: the European Union and the trade–development nexus", Contemporary Politics, 20:1, pp. 1-9 (p. 2), https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.882570

[55] Carbone, M. (2013), "Rethinking ACP-EU relations after Cotonou: tensions, contradictions, prospects", Journal of International Development, 25:5, pp. 742-756, https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2929

[56] Hurt, S. R. (2003), "Co-operation and coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP states and the end of the Lome´ Convention", Third World Quarterly, 24:1, pp. 161-176, https://doi.org/10.1080/713701373

The EU still faces certain challenges in its approach to development: some highlight the tension between principles of global solidarity and the use of foreign policy for the Union's direct interests;[57] these interests are, in turn, rendered more complex by the "constant re-negotiation" [58] of competence areas to be shared between the EU's institutions and its member states.

2.2 ACP-EU cooperation

As the main characterising elements of EU development cooperation have been presented, this second part of the chapter narrows the scope of study to the partnership built by the EU and its predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC), with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.

The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which gave birth to the EEC, included the establishment of a fund to support the development of overseas territories and countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, including those which, at the time, had yet to gain their independence: the European Development Fund (EDF) was set to run in cycles of five years, the first starting in 1959. It has since been the main instrument for development

[57] Furness M. et al. (2020), "EU development policy: evolving as an instrument of foreign policy and as an expression of solidarity, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 16:2, pp. 89-100, https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v16i2.1156

[58] Ibidem p. 91

cooperation with ACP countries,[59] [60] and has been funded by voluntary contributions of member states.

A first milestone in the history of post-colonial cooperation between the European community and ACP countries is the Yaoundé Convention signed in 1963 between the EEC and the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM), which grouped 18 newly independent African countries. This free-trade agreement was renewed in 1969 with what became known as Yaoundé II. In 1975, Yaoundé II was replaced by the Lomé Convention, signed by nine EEC member states and 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The enlargement of the partnership was in part due to the United Kingdom's accession to the EEC in 1973 and the subsequent increased engagement with Commonwealth countries. This new agreement included elements from the soon-to-be New International Economic Order, rebalancing the relation with developing countries;[61] [62] it was deemed by some as "the most comprehensive, innovative and ambitious agreement for North-South cooperation".[63]

After the Lomé Convention was signed, ACP states formalised the existence of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States with the Georgetown Agreement; decades later, the 2020 Revised Georgetown

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[59] Muñoz Gálvez, E. (2012), "European Development Aid: How to be more effective without spending more?", Notre Europe, https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/developmentaid_e.munozgalvez_ne_july12.pdf

[60] OECD (2018), "The European Union's financing for development", https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264309494-8-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9789264309494-8-en

[61] Hurt, S. R. (2003), op. cit

[62] Carbone, M. (2008), "Better aid, less ownership: multi-annual programming and the EU's development strategies in Africa", Journal of International Development, 20:2, pp. 218-229, https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1452

[63] Ibidem, p. 219

Agreement would mark a further development for the group, officialising the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS). The Lomé Convention was renewed three times, giving way to Lomé II in 1979, to Lomé III in 1985 and to Lomé IV in 1989. While initially showing promise for a new post-colonial cooperation framework, these conventions were ultimately disappointing in the results achieved and increasingly shaped by political conditionality and the liberalising logics of the 1990s structural adjustment programmes.[64] [65] [66]

[64] Ibidem

[65] Gibb, R. (2000), "Post-Lomé: The European Union and the South", Third World Quarterly, 21:3, pp. 457-481, https://doi.org/10.1080/713701046

[66] Hangen-Riad, S. (2004), "Finding your way through the Cotonou Agreement", Regensburg: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/tanzania/04757.pdf

Chapter 3: The Cotonou Partnership Agreement

After reviewing the main characteristics of EU cooperation, and especially EU-ACP cooperation, this chapter focuses specifically on the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), its specificities and the main issues raised around it.

3.1 What is the Cotonou Agreement?

As Lomé IV came to an end, a new framework for ACP-EU cooperation was designed. On 23 June 2000, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement was signed in the city of Cotonou, Benin. Its full title is telling of the particular setup concerning its signatories: on the one hand, "the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States", meaning single states were involved rather than the ACP Group as a whole – Cuba, for instance, did not sign the Agreement; on the other hand, "the European Community and its Member States": indeed, the CPA bears the signature of the Council of the EU and the European Commission, as well as that of each EU member state. This reflects the more complex approval process on the EU's side for this type of agreement: for an agreement to be signed, the Commission must present a proposal for the ratification of the agreement to the Council, which is the expression of the will of EU member states. The Council must approve it with a unanimous vote. Thus, the signing of the Agreement is the result of a commitment of the EU in all its components, its institutions and its single member states included, whereas on the ACP side it reflects the political will of single states.

The guiding principles of the Agreement are stated in the first chapter of Part 1, titled "Objectives and principles". Article 1 reflects the priorities of the EU as previously mentioned, with the overarching aim of "reducing and eventually eradicating poverty" and other goals being

"economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States", "peace and security" and "a stable democratic political environment".[67] Article 2 emphasises the importance of differentiation and regionalisation, in line with the approach outlined in chapter 2.

The CPA was developed on three pillars. The first pillar is the political dimension of the agreement, which includes common principles of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. As explained in Article 8.1, it rests on "a comprehensive, balanced and deep political dialogue",[68] aimed at continuously addressing issues such as migration, security, or possible violations of the Agreement's main elements.[69] The second pillar is development cooperation: in this regard, the CPA sets a framework of objectives and principles to follow for financial and technical cooperation, drawing from the principles governing the EDF. The third pillar is trade cooperation, marked by the abolition of the principle of non-reciprocity: under the Lomé framework, ACP exports had a duty-free access to the European market whilst ACP countries could maintain their tariff barriers for European imports.[70] [71] When negotiating the Cotonou regime, the EU emphasized the incompatibility of this system with the rules of the WTO and pushed for non-reciprocal trade to be replaced by Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). As explained by

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[67] EUR-Lex (2011), "Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000", Article 1, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A22000A1215%2801%29

[68] Ibidem, Article 8.1.

[69] Hangen-Riad, S. (2004), op. cit.

[70] Gibb, R. (2000), op. cit.

[71] Busse, M., Großmann, H. (2004), "Assessing the Impact of ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreement on West African Countries", SSRN Electronic Journal, https://ssrn.com/abstract=601083

S. Hangen-Riad, researcher for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, "EPAs aim to create reciprocity, through the establishment of free trade areas (FTA), which conform to the regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO)".[72]

The CPA also introduced a new institutional structure which relied on several bodies. The Council of Ministers, the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) were the three joint institutions which directed cooperation under the Agreement: the Council of Ministers brough together representatives of the EU Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and each ACP government; the Committee of Ambassadors assisted the Council of Minister, and was comprised of representatives of each EU member state, the European Commission, and each ACP state's head of mission to the EU; the JPA is a consultative body which gathers members of the European Parliament and members of each ACP state's parliament. In Brussels, the Agreement established the ACP Secretariat and, within the European Commission, the Directorate-General for Development and Relations with ACP States (DG DEV); in 2011, the latter merged with the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (DG AIDCO) to form the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), which eventually became the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) in 2021. Finally, a National Authorising Officer and a Delegation of the European Commission were established in each ACP state: National Authorising Officers were appointed by each country to represent it locally in EU-financed projects.[73]

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[72] Hangen-Riad, S. (2004), op. cit., p. 9

[73] Ibidem

An important aspect of the CPA is Article 96, which establishes the procedure that is to be undertaken in case of non-compliance or failure to fulfil obligations, following three phases: continued political dialogue, consultations and "appropriate measures".[74] This latter step authorises the use of sanctions such as suspension of cooperation, and it has been used in several situations: for instance, in response to coups d'État or human rights violations in Fiji, Togo and Burundi among others.[75] [76]

The CPA was revised in 2005 and in 2010. Most importantly, its first revision introduced references to the MDGs, which had not yet been agreed at the time of the original signature, while the second revision lengthened Article 11 on "Peace – building policies, conflict prevention and resolution", emphasising among other things "the interdependence between security and development".[77]

3.2 Development cooperation in the Cotonou framework

The 23-year period covered by the CPA coincided with part of the 8th and all of the 9th, 10th and 11th EDF cycles. During that time, EDF allocations varied significantly among regions, as can be seen in Figure

[74] EUR-Lex (2011), op. cit., Article 96

[75] Euractiv (2018), "EU-ACP relations after Cotonou agreement: re-set, re-launch or retreat?", https://en.euractiv.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/special-report/EURACTIV-Special-Report-EU-ACP-Relations-after-Cotonou-agreement.pdf

[76] Bradley, A. (2005), "An ACP Perspective and Overview of Article 96 Cases", European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion Paper n. 64D, https://ecdpm.org/application/files/5216/5547/2822/DP-64D-ACP-Perspective-Overview-Article96-Cases-2005.pdf

[77] EUR-Lex (2018), "Consolidated text: Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000", Article 11, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A02000A1215%2801%29-20180531

1:[78] of the three ACP regions, Africa is by far the main focus of EDF allocations with 77% of the total, while intra-ACP, Caribbean and Pacific envelopes receive 15%, 6% and 2% respectively. It should be noted that the distribution of population varied significantly in those years, and that this was not reflected in the distribution of EDF allocations: the population of sub-Saharan Africa saw a significant increase (from 671 million in 2000 to 1,4 billion in 2016) while the population of Caribbean and Pacific states changed marginally.[79]

	Allocations				
Region	8 EDF	9 EDF	10 EDF	11 EDF	Total
Africa	82%	72%	77%	77%	76%
Intra-ACP	9%	20%	14%	15%	15%
Caribbean	6%	6%	7%	4%	6%
Pacific	3%	2%	2%	3%	2%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 1- Evolution of EDF allocations by region, 2000-2016 (European Commission 2016)

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has a database which makes it possible to review ODA flows and break them down by donors, recipients, sectors and time period.[80] Considering that almost all EDF financing is eligible and declared as ODA – since its ACP recipients are developing countries and assistance comes from an official source and has a development purpose [81] – and that the EDF is the main development aid instrument for ACP countries, trends in

[78] European Commission (2016), "Joint Staff Working Document: Evaluation of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement", p. 26, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-09/evaluation-post-cotonou_en.pdf

[79] World Bank Group, "World Bank Open Data", https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?end=2016&locations=ZG-S3-S2&start=2000

[80] OECD, "Query Wizard for International Development Statistics", https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/

[81] OECD (2018), op. cit.

EDF disbursements should be reflected in trends in ODA disbursements for ACP countries. Using the OECD database, I analysed ODA disbursements (expressed in 2021 US dollars) by EU institutions for 77 ACP signatories of the Cotonou agreement – all but South Africa, which is funded outside of the EDF –, between 2000 and 2022, the most recent year selectable in the database. To put results into perspective, I then compared the figures with total ODA disbursements by DAC countries for those 77 recipients in the same time period. Based on OECD data, the ODA by DAC countries between 2000 and 2022 amounts to over 560,8 billion dollars; ODA disbursements by EU institutions in the same period represent 16,3% of this total (about 91,2 billion dollars).

As explained in Chapter 1, the positive impact of development aid is widely debated and depends on a variety of elements in the donor-recipient partnership. There are several sources presenting an assessment of what was achieved under the CPA in terms of development cooperation: these range from analyses produced within European institutions to studies by academics and observers presenting an external perspective.

In July 2016, a joint evaluation of the CPA was conducted by the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). It provides background information on the evolution of the partnership and on the main features of the Cotonou Agreement, and it takes stock of the implementation at the time of publication. In its main part, the document contains eleven evaluation questions covering issues across the Agreement's three main pillars (political dimension, economic and trade cooperation, and development cooperation) and proceeds to discuss progress made for each question. The evaluation was conducted by a taskforce that included representatives of the relevant Commission and EEAS services. It benefited from public consultations, internal surveys, an

external evaluation coordinated by then-DG DEVCO and other internal contributions.

To determine the Agreement's development impact, the European Commission assessed the results of the CPA in terms of progress towards the objectives outlined in the UN's MDGs, and provides data as evidence of this progress. For instance, according to this evaluation, progress towards MDG 4 – Reduce child mortality – and MDG 7C – Improve WASH services – was achieved respectively by immunising 5 million children under one year of age against measles and by providing 17 million people with access to sanitation facilities; these figures are presented as evidence of how "the CPA contributed to improved coverage, quality and access to basic social infrastructure and services".[82] However, when examining these claims, it is important to understand the methodology followed to calculate the figures provided and ensure they are a direct result of the CPA. In the case of this report, the claims and arguments made by the Commission are weakened by an unclear methodology. The evaluation includes an annex called "Method and Analytical models" [83] which, however, does not explain how the figures mentioned above were calculated.

The difficulty of proving an impact is also visible in the discrepancies in the numbers provided. For instance, among the many aspects of the CPA addressed in the evaluation, the Commission includes a focus on MDG 1 – Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger – as part of an evaluation question on poverty reduction. It claims that "3 million people were trained in technical and vocational training and education" [84]

[82] European Commission (2016), op. cit., p. 79

[83] Ibidem

[84] Ibidem, p. 94

between 2004 and 2013 as a result of EDF contributions. The source referenced for this figure is a 2015 Commission report [85] which presents the EU's contribution to achieving MDGs. However, the figure presented in this report is much higher: 7.7 million people between 2004 and 2012.[86] Another example are the 9 million new pupils enrolled in primary education according to the 2016 evaluation, as part of MDG 2 – Achieve universal primary education:[87] the source indicated here is once again the 2015 report, which mentions 13.7 million new pupils instead.[88] As is the case for the 2016 evaluation, the methodology used in the 2015 report is unclear; a methodological note is included, which only states that "in cases where concrete outputs could not be directly linked to projects […] results were calculated on a pro-rata basis, taking into account the Commission's proportion of overall inputs".[89]

This illustrates the difficulty of isolating an impact and tracing it back to a specific intervention. Coming back to Glennie and Sumner's argument mentioned in Chapter 1, choosing specific indicators within MDGs to reduce the scope of research, as was done by the Commission, may have helped mitigating this difficulty, but the size of the intervention analysed remains too broad to reach firm conclusions.

A number of authors outside EU institutions also analysed the CPA and the EU-ACP partnership under several aspects. A welcome innovation

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[85] European Commission (2015), "The EU's Contribution to the Millenium Development Goals", https://op.europa.eu/it/publication-detail/-/publication/925eb065-7274-11e5-9317-01aa75ed71a1

[86] Ibidem, p. 9

[87] European Commission (2016), op. cit. p. 81

[88] European Commission (2015), op. cit.

[89] Ibidem, p. 32

brought by the Cotonou Agreement was the weight given to participative development and the involvement of non-state actors and civil society organisations (CSOs): this was all the more significant at a time in which liberalisation in ACP countries created more opportunities for non-state actors. The involvement of civil society is important to foster democratic and sustainable development.[90] According to M. Carbone, Professor of International Relations and Development at the University of Glasgow,

> "A vibrant civil society is a critical precondition for a more equitable, democratic, pluralistic, and humane society. […] The Cotonou Agreement clearly acknowledges the important role played by civil society in development".[91]

This is visible already from the beginning of the Agreement, as Articles 1, 2, 4 and 6 reference several times the inclusion of different types of non-state actors in alignment with national specificities and needs. However, in its 2016 evaluation, the European Commission found that the involvement of CSOs had yet to be mainstreamed, and that, ultimately, "contributions made by CSOs are positive but their involvement in the implementation and in particular in the monitoring of public action indicates varying (and often reduced) spaces to exist and operate".[92]

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[90] Lanz, K. (2020), "The role of civil society organisations in development", DAC-CSO Reference Group, https://www.dac-csoreferencegroup.com/post/the-role-of-civil-society-organisations-in-development

[91] Carbone, M. (2005), "The Role of Civil Society in the Cotonou Agreement", in Babarinde, O., Faber, G. (eds.) (2005), *The European Union and the Developing Countries,* Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff,, pp. 177-218 (p. 193), https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047406785

[92] European Commission (2016), op. cit., p. 84

Linking development and trade is among the EU's main development priorities.[93] [94] For the Commission, the Agreement's trade framework produced some positive results in that it contributed to a growth in trade flows between ACP countries and the rest of the world, as well as trade flows within ACP countries.[95] However, for Young and Peterson, there is a paradox between the EU's approach to trade as an instrument for development and the trade policies it implements, often with negative consequences for its developing partners.[96] In this sense, an issue raised by many is the importance of an alignment of the Agreement with goals and policies of the WTO, as specifically mentioned in Articles 34, 36 and 37. Pushing to discard the previous non-reciprocal regime in favour of EPAs, the EU ignored the 1997 Libreville Declaration, in which ACP states called to maintain non-reciprocal and preferential arrangements.[97] In the words of Nigerian economist Adebayo Adedeji, EPAs are:

> "another example of how Brussels abuses its vast negotiating power and aid budget to isolate and exploit individual African states and coerce

[93] European Commission (2000), "Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament", https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0212:FIN:EN:PDF

[94] European Commission (2016), op. cit.

[95] Ibidem

[96] Young, A. R., Peterson, J. (2013), "'We care about you, but …': the politics of EU trade policy and development", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:3, pp. 497–518. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.734782

[97] OACPS, "The Libreville Declaration", https://www.oacps.org/libreville-declaration/

them to open their markets to unfair penetration by European farmers and manufacturers".[98]

Although EPAs could theoretically be signed between the EU and individual countries, the latter have been encouraged to enter these agreements as regional groups such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM): this push for regionalisation delayed the signing of new trade agreements, as achieving regional integration is a difficult process in ACP countries due to their institutional weaknesses and political instability, as well as the challenging costs of adjustment to this new system; previous experiences seem to confirm this difficulty, as "the history of regional integration projects within the ACP group, especially in Africa, is one of consistent failure to achieve meaningful integration and development" [99] (Hurt 2003, p. 173). Furthermore, this division in different regions was imposed without necessarily corresponding to actual regional dynamics, creating confusion, redundancies and fragmentation.[100] [101] This is the case with overlapping agreements with the SADC, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and South Africa as an individual country; this overlap was later cited among reasons for South Africa leaving the OACPS in 2022,

[98] Adedeji A. (2012), "The travails of regional integration in Africa". In Adebajo, A., Whiteman, K. (eds), *The EU and Africa: From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa*, London: Hurst & Co., pp. 83–104 (p. 91)

[99] Hurt, S. (2003), op. cit. p. 173

[100] Ibidem

[101] Euractiv (2018), op. cit

further complicating the painstaking negotiations taking place at the time for the signature of the Samoa Agreement.[102]

[102] Chadwick, V. (2022), "Exclusive: South Africa quitting OACPS", Devex, https://www.devex.com/news/exclusive-south-africa-quitting-oacps-104273

Chapter 4: Securitising trends in ACP-EU Cooperation: linking development, migration and security

Having examined the Cotonou Agreement in several of its aspects and implications, I wish to consider a subject in particular, which is of importance and interest to the ACP-EU partnership: securitisation. While the first part of this chapter will address securitisation in EU cooperation as a whole, the second part will explore securitisation in relation to the issue of migration: the analysis therefore naturally shifts its focus to sub-Saharan Africa, which is of far greater relevance for this matter to the EU than the Caribbean and Pacific regions. Indeed, as noted by the European Commission, "Whereas migration, both legal and irregular, from some regions in Africa […] to the EU is an important phenomenon, there is very little migration from the Caribbean and Pacific regions to the EU".[103] This remains true when looking specifically at irregular inflows: "There is only little irregular migration from Caribbean countries […] and even less from the Pacific States".[104] The same can be said of asylum seekers, the number of which reached a yearly maximum of 15 applicants from the Pacific region, compared to tens of thousands from Africa.[105] The importance of this area is reflected in the main initiatives for dialogue on migration within the EU, which keep the debate centred on sub-Saharan Africa: the main examples of this are the 2006 Rabat process, the 2014 Khartoum Process and the 2015 Valletta Summit.

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[103] European Commission (2016), op. cit., p. 52

[104] Ibidem, p. 52

[105] Ibidem

4.1 Evidence of securitisation in EU cooperation

When considering the first level of evidence of securitisation, which is discourse, official EU communications clearly relate development with security. In a document on the European Security Strategy published by the European Council, it is stated that "Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda".[106] The link established between security and development is reflected in the Cotonou Agreement itself, and especially in its most recent version, which includes the 2005 and 2010 revisions: as stated in the first sentence of Article 11, "The Parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development".[107]

This reasoning seems to demonstrate a concern for the safety of individuals in non-EU countries, which is coherent with the idea that peace and absence of violence are essential elements of human development. However, as Keukeleire and Raube highlight,[108] a double concern is in fact visible in institutional discourse: while attention is indeed paid to the protection of people outside the EU, another aspect which is visible in institutional communication is the concern for safety within EU borders

[106] European Council (2009), "A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy", p. 41, https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d0928657-af99-4552-ae84-1cbaaa864f96/

[107] EUR-Lex (2018), op. cit., Article 11

[108] Keukeleire, S., Raube, K., op. cit.

and the need "to ensure *our* security and meet the expectations of *our* citizens" [109] (emphasis added).

This is where security discourses no longer stem from a mere concern for human safety as a factor of development and, instead, can be seen as part of a securitising trend in which the referent object, who must be protected from a threat, is extended to include the EU, its member states and its citizens.[110] With this conceptual shift, ACP partner countries become a source of security threats for Europe, especially fragile States and unstable or lawless areas.[111] As Keukeleire and Raube explain, "securitization can imply that poverty and structural underdevelopment are perceived as existential threats or that development is linked to other issues such as inter- and intra-state conflict, state failure or organized crime".[112] In establishing a correlation between development and security, the EU can justify devoting funds and institutional instruments to maintaining security in the name of development.

Olivié and Pérez [113] looked into elements of securitisation within official EU development discourse. To do so, they took into consideration narratives in official strategic documents published by EU institutions and by the seven main EU donor countries between 2000 and 2019 (Germany,

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[109] European Council (2008), "Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy—providing security in a changing world", https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf

[110] Keukeleire, S., Raube, K., op. cit.

[111] Vircoulon, T., Lecompte, D. (2014), "The European Union's Development Aid: from Development to Security, the Example of the European Development Fund", IFRI, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/european-unions-development-aid-development-security-example-european

[112] Keukeleire, S., Raube, K., op. cit., p. 2

[113] Olivié, I., Pérez, A. (2021), "Whose and what aid securitisation? An analysis of EU aid narratives and flows", Third World Quarterly, 42:8, pp. 1903–1922, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1939006

the UK, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy and Spain), whose "narratives and flows are a fair representation of the EU narratives and flows of international assistance".[114] Italy was excluded from the study as the authors did not identify enough relevant documents for the analysis, but aid from the remaining six member states constitutes almost 83% of total aid from all member states.[115] The texts were coded to identify references to three predominant paradigms: social development, sustainable development and security. Findings show that "quotes labelled with the security paradigm are now at 19.8% of the total coded text, up from 11.7% in the early 2000s".[116] Therefore, there seems to be a significant rise in the use of a security paradigm in official discourse. To deepen this analysis, it is interesting to match this evidence with what is visible for the institutional level and the funding level.

In order to find securitising trends at the institutional level for development, it is useful to examine changes in institutional architecture and instruments which reflect a tendency to merge development and security issues. Some examples of this are visible within the EU institutional framework since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and the subsequent formation of the EEAS,[117] which "has been interpreted as a means of legitimizing the EU's foreign and security policy by bringing it closer to development policy".[118] Another example is the use of cooperation instruments blending development aid and security, as is the case of the African Peace Facility (APF) created in 2003, which

[114] Ibidem, p. 1907

[115] Ibidem

[116] Ibidem, p. 1913

[117] Keukeleire, S., Raube, K., op. cit.

[118] Furness, M., Gänzle, S. (2016), op. cit., p. 147

"demonstrates most clearly the interpenetration of security and development and the securitization of the EU's development policy".[119] It was designed to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) created by the African Union, and it is funded by the EDF [120] [121] even though development "represents the lowest share of all APF priorities".[122] Similarly, the EDF funds 77% of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), which aims to tackle the root causes of irregular migration and improve the management of migratory flows. [123]

The link between these institutional structures and funding instruments like the EDF is an example of how the institutional dimension goes hand in hand with funding, the third dimension examined here. In order to find evidence of securitisation in aid flows, one can look at variations of aid disbursement specifically for security, using total disbursements across all sectors as a baseline for comparison. Using OECD data,[124] I examined the evolution of ODA disbursements by EU institutions for sub-Saharan Africa – having once again excluded South Africa from my analysis – between 2000 and 2022. I then compared this data with total ODA disbursements by DAC countries in the same time period. As mentioned before, total disbursements by EU institutions

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[119] Keukeleire, S., Raube, K. (2013), op. cit., p. 560

[120] Ibidem

[121] Del Biondo, K. et al. (2012), op. cit.

[122] Faria, F., Youngs, R. (2010), "European conflict resolution policies: truncated peace-building", FRIDE, working paper n. 94, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131019/WP94_UE_Paz_Construccion_ENG_mar10.pdf

[123] Prestianni, S. (2016), "Le tappe del processo di esternalizzazione del controllo alle frontiere in Africa, dal Summit della Valletta ad oggi", ARCI, https://www.integrationarci.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/esternalizzazione_docanalisiARCI_IT.pdf

[124] OECD, "Query Wizard for International Development Statistics", https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/

represent about 16,3% of total DAC disbursements. However, when looking specifically at aid for the 'conflict, peace and security' sector, disbursements by EU institutions amount to 28% of DAC disbursements. Furthermore, EU disbursements for the security sector represent 2,7% of total EU disbursements between 2000 and 2022, while DAC disbursements for security represent only 1,6% of their disbursements across all sectors. This significant difference can be interpreted as showing the higher importance given by EU institutions to security-related interventions.

4.2 Connecting development, migration and security

Having analysed security in and of itself, it can then be investigated in relation to a specific threat. In security discourses, migration is often the issue identified as a threat, as evidenced by Raineri and Rossi: "European (and increasingly American) public opinion often associates migratory flows with a threat to their security and identity" [125]. The reasons for this view can be found in a variety of factors. In conservative political narratives, migration is often framed as a menace to a community's unity and identity: for instance, Huysmans explains how a sense of identity can be built or reinforced by emphasising a danger to a community: in this sense, "[migration] is identified as being one of the main factors weakening national tradition and societal homogeneity".[126] Another reason for which migration is perceived as a threat to security is the tendency to associate it with crime, often blurring the lines between illegal

[125] Raineri, L., Rossi, A. (2017), "The Security-Migration-Development Nexus in the Sahel: A Reality Check", in Venturi, B. (ed.), *The Security–Migration–Development Nexus Revised: A Perspective from the Sahel*, Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies, p. 25, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/9788868129729.pdf

[126] Huysmans, J. (2000), "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", Journal of Common Market Studies 38:5, p.758, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00263

activities and normal mobility practices. For instance, in its 1998 work programme, the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the EU focused on the use of a fingerprints database for asylum-applicants that "in recent years the steep rise in the number of illegal immigrants (and therefore potential asylum-seekers) caught has revealed the increasing need to include their fingerprints in the system".[127] By creating confusion between two distinct phenomena – illegal migration and asylum – migration is framed as problematic, thereby justifying the use of special measures – collecting fingerprints – to face it.

The years 2014 and 2015 marked a turning point in the securitisation of migration: this period saw a significant surge in the flows of migrants and refugees into Europe; in the words of then-Secretary-General of the International Organisation for Migration, William L. Swing, 2015 saw "three to four times as many migrants and refugees coming north as [the EU] had in 2014":[128] this caused alarmed responses in public discourse [129] and let to the labelling of this phenomenon as a crisis. In the words of Katy Long, Lecturer in International Development at the London School of Economics, "The language of crisis was deliberately invoked […] because it served the interests of governing elites to securitise migration and asylum".[130] Furthermore, 2014 and 2015 were

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[127] Statewatch (1998) as cited in Huysmans, op. cit., p. 755

[128] As cited in Miles, T. (2015), "EU gets one million migrants in 2015, smugglers seen making $1 billion", Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKBN0U50WI20151222

[129] Ahmed, B. (2017), "The Security-Migration-Development Nexus in the Sahel Region: a View From Sudan", in Venturi, B. (ed.), *The Security–Migration–Development Nexus Revised: A Perspective from the Sahel*, Brussels: Foundation for European Progressive Studies, pp. 85-108, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/9788868129729.pdf

[130] Long, K. (2014), "Imagined threats, manufactured crises and 'real' emergencies: The politics of border closure in the face of mass refugee influx", in Lindley, A. (ed.), *Crisis and Migration: Critical Perspectives*, New York: Routledge, pp. 158-180 (p. 158)

relevant in the shifting discourse on migration because of the Khartoum Process (2014) and the Valletta Summit (2015), which marked important steps in the EU's border externalisation and militarisation policy and led to the creation of the EUTF, using the EDF for a more militarised control of migration flows.[131]

The heightened concern for migration emerging in 2015-16 should therefore be reflected in aid, and in particular in aid for security-related projects. Using the OECD database, I analysed once again the evolution of the share of EU disbursements devoted to security in sub-Saharan Africa. Between 2000 and 2014, 1,5% of EU disbursements were destined to the 'conflict, peace and security' sector, whereas between 2015 and 2022 the share more than tripled, rising to 4,86%. For reference, the percentage of DAC disbursements for security was of 1,4% between 2000-2014 and rose to 1,8% in 2015-2022, showing a distinct securitising trend by EU institutions. Following a similar approach, Olivié and Pérez [132] examined ODA allocation by EU institutions and the six EU donor countries mentioned in their discourse analysis. They used the OECD Creditor Reporting System to track the evolution of ODA allocation to the 'conflict, peace and security' sector between 2008 and 2017. They noted that the average yearly disbursements by EU institutions for security were 26% higher in 2016 and 2017 than in the previous eight years.

Given the claim of a link between security and development, and between security and migration, in EU external policies, a connection can be made to the emergence of another nexus, this time between migration and development. The reasoning behind this view is that fostering development and eradicating poverty in countries of departure or transit

[131] Prestianni, S. (2016), op. cit.

[132] Olivié, I., Pérez, A., op. cit.

of migrants would eliminate a root cause for migration: according to this logic, migrants arriving on European shores left their countries only because of a lack of resources, hoping to find better living conditions once in Europe; this creates further confusion among categories and mobility phenomena, transforming potential asylum seekers into economic migrants.[133] Consequently, this justifies the diversion of development assistance funds and mechanisms towards the management of migration. In the Cotonou Agreement, migration is the subject of Article 13, which calls for strategies and policies which would "contribute in the long term to normalising migratory flows".[134]

Many refute the validity of the migration-development nexus: according to Nyberg Sørensen et al.,

> "There is little evidence of a direct link between poverty, economic development, population growth, social and political change on the one hand and international migration on the other. The 'migration hump' suggests that some economic development generates both the resources and the incentives for people to migrate. By implication, poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy".[135]

For some, the correlation is even to be inverted to understand higher levels of migration as a result of development.[136] [137] The linkage of migration

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[133] Prestianni, S. (2016), op. cit.

[134] EUR-Lex (2011), op. cit., Article 13.5

[135] Nyberg Sørensen, N., Van Hear, N., Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2003), "Migration, Development and Conflict: State-of-the-Art Overview", in Van Hear, N., Nyberg Sørensen, N. (eds.), *The Migration-Development Nexus*, co-published by the UN and the IOM, pp. 5-50 (p. 36), https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_dev_nexus.pdf

[136] Gubert, F. (2019), "Les migrations sont-elles un vecteur de développement ?", L'Economie politique, n.84, pp. 18-32, https://doi.org/10.3917/leco.084.0018

[137] Raineri, L., Rossi, A. (2017), op. cit.

with development is problematic because it leads to the use of funds which could have otherwise been devoted to other important sectors of development; as stated by Global Health Advocates, "[there] is a serious risk that development ceases to be regarded primarily as a tool for poverty eradication and that EU aid will continue to be used to leverage partner countries' cooperation on migration".[138] Furthermore, these efforts to restrict migratory flows hamper the mobility of people which is important for many local economies: researcher Mark Akkerman of the Dutch organisation Stop Wapenhandel explains how measures to stem migration can "[undermine] an important migration-based economy".[139] An example of this is the case of Tuareg groups in Niger , whose profitable business of transporting migrants northwards was accepted and even encouraged by the Nigerien government: in recent years, measures taken by the EU to restrict migration in the area obstructed these activities, forcing local populations into criminality and increasing banditry and violence.[140] [141]

These problems translated into tensions between the EU and its partners, as evidenced by Carbone:

> "On the one hand, African governments have attempted to make sure that migration contributes to development – most notably through remittances, through brain gain, and by raising additional resources that address the root causes of migration. On the other hand, the EU has used

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[138] As cited in Akkerman, M. (2018), "Expanding the fortress: The policies, the profiteers and the people shaped by EU's border externalisation programme", Transnational Institute, p. 37, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/expanding_the_fortress_-_1.6_may_11.pdf

[139] Ibidem, p. 36

[140] Ibidem

[141] Comolli, V. (2019), "Niger: Curtailing migration has unintended consequences", The Africa Report, https://theafricareport.com/19517/niger-curtailing-migration-has-unintended-consequences/

> a combination of repressive measures and incentives with the view to inducing African countries to comply with the re-admission and migration control measures".[142]

This is all the more problematic considering the low level of supervision and accountability in the use of EU development funds to stem migration: for instance, the EUTF was criticised by the European Court of Auditors for the vagueness of its scope and its strategy, and for using ill-defined assessment methods to select projects for funding. The Court also stated that "[the] plethora of information and monitoring systems means there is no single, comprehensive overview of the results achieved by the EUTF for Africa as a whole".[143]

The trend towards securitisation is therefore coupled with conceptual errors and low standards of control and accountability.

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[142] Carbone, M. (2013), op. cit., p. 748

[143] European Court of Auditors (2018), "Special report n. 32/2018: European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Flexible but lacking focus", p. 27, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_32/SR_EUTF_AFRICA_EN.pdf

Chapter 5: Implications for the future of the ACP-EU partnership

The aim of this dissertation was to look back to the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which served as a framework for the partnership between the EU and ACP countries from 2000 to 2023. It sought to place considerations on cooperation under this framework within a broader discussion on the complex issue of development cooperation.

The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1 provides an overview of the complexity of development cooperation and its diverse expressions. The idea of 'development' seems simple and straightforward on the surface, yet it carries a multitude of meanings and assumptions, and shapes systems and policies globally in ways that vary depending on views. The conditions for and limits to the effectiveness of interventions aimed at fostering development are widely discussed, also as a result of methodological difficulties in conclusively establishing causality between aid and its impact.

Following the overarching goal of eradicating poverty, European development cooperation is articulated in a number of directions, aiming to promote peace and democracy, to ensure good governance and the respect of human rights and to protect the environment. It seeks continuous multilateral dialogue, and its approach is characterised by conditionality, differentiation and regionalism. In this context, the European community strove ever since its birth to construct a strong relationship with ACP countries, creating a partnership which has grown and evolved over the decades.

The turn of the millennium saw the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, which marked a new phase in this partnership. Having explained the features and the setup introduced by the CPA, different

aspects of the agreement and its framework are analyzed, based on official data, internal evaluations and external reviews on aspects such as trade, participation and progress made towards development goals. Where results were identified, they should be considered with some scepticism, given the difficulty of measuring impacts.

Finally, a particularly relevant topic to consider in the study of the Cotonou framework is the importance given to security. Evidence points to securitising trends within discourse, institutions and funding; the nexus between development, migration and security shapes the European approach to the ACP partnership, with potentially damaging consequences for people and for the EU's ACP partners.

The Samoa Agreement, which replaced the CPA, presents a new structure that comprises a common foundation and three separate protocols, one for each of the ACP sub-regions: this allows for more tailored policies and actions based on the priorities and needs of the different areas covered by the Agreement. This regionalisation is also visible in the institutional setup: while the institutions of the CPA are maintained, three separate joint Councils of Ministers and three JPAs are now created for Africa-EU, Caribbean-EU and Pacific-EU cooperation.

As we turn to this new phase of EU-ACP cooperation, the observations made in this work may be useful to inform a debate on future trends. The CPA was initially set to expire in 2020 to be replaced by the new Samoa framework: negotiations began in 2018, and a deal was announced in December 2020. However, the approval procedure was delayed by the COVID-19 crisis and by a stalemate within the EU Council, which could not reach the required unanimous decision on signature because of objections by two member states successively. First, Hungary vetoed the deal due to concerns for the new agreement's measures on

migration, sexual rights and gender education; the veto was removed in April 2023, once Hungary was assured that those issues would remain under national jurisdiction.[144] Then it was Poland that blocked the vote on the ratification, demanding that the EU first buy its excess of grain and agricultural products coming from Ukraine, which were stacked in the country and harmed Polish producers.[145] [146]

The ratification of the agreement eventually got the green light on the EU side in July 2023, and the signing ceremony took place in Apia, Samoa on 15 November 2023. The credibility of the partnership seems less solid than in the past: the holdouts by Hungary and Poland exposed the internal divisions within the EU and the difficulty of balancing the interests of member states; unanimity remains distant on the ACP side too, as several OACPS countries have yet to sign the new Agreement.[147] [148]

Another question concerns the fate of European funding and especially the EDF which, until 2021, was separate from the EU's general budget and was under the control of the European Commission and, in

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[144] Reuters, "Hungary will sign EU's Africa-Pacific trade deal after amendments, says minister", https://www.reuters.com/world/hungary-will-sign-eus-africa-pacific-trade-deal-after-amendments-says-minister-2023-04-19/

[145] Keijzer, N. (2023), "New start for Cotonou Agreement: What future for the past?", Welternährung, https://www.welthungerhilfe.org/global-food-journal/rubrics/development-policy-agenda-2030/post-cotonou-is-the-signing-coming-now

[146] Hanke Vela, J. (2023), "Brussels Playbook: Rates day — Poland's gambit — Trump's not big in Ireland", Politico, https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/brussels-playbook/rates-day-polands-gambit-trumps-not-big-in-ireland/

[147] Fox, B. (2023b), "Holdouts cast shadow over new EU pact with African, Caribbean and Pacific states", Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/africa/news/holdouts-cast-shadow-over-new-eu-pact-with-african-caribbean-and-pacific-states/

[148] Pichon, E. (2023c), "The Samoa Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific States", European Parliamentary Research Service, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/757563/EPRS_BRI(2023)757563_EN.pdf

part, of the European Investment Bank (EIB).[149] In 2021, the EDF was incorporated into the EU's general budget: this is expected to "increase transparency and give the [European] Parliament powers over scrutiny and approval".[150] However, the OACPS stated they were "strongly in favour of maintaining the European Development Fund (EDF) as the main financial instrument in support of ACP-EU development cooperation".[151] CSOs also criticised this new funding setup, voicing concern for a lack of clarity and the possibility of a stronger focus on migration management, to the detriment of other cooperation areas.

Overall, the legacy of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement is a nuanced, multifaceted reflection of the difficult combination between already complex guiding principles and the interests of all parties. As the EU strives to improve development cooperation models, the EU-ACP partnership enters into a new phase, carrying with it old challenges which will add to the ones it will encounter in the future.

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[149] European Commission (2002), "The European Development Fund in a few words", https://aei.pitt.edu/40696/1/DE_112.pdf

[150] Saltnes, J. D. (2018), "Why the debate over the European Development Fund is a question of politics", LSE European Politics and Policy Blog, p. 2, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eu-roppblog/2018/06/29/why-the-debate-over-the-european-development-fund-is-a-question-of-politics/

[151] As cited in Saltnes, J. D. (2018), op. cit.

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