Global Justice and the Extension of the Rawlsian Difference Principle

From the primeval wheel, lever and nail to the modern cement and steel, and then to the most sophisticated oil drilling, personal computer and rocketry, innovation has graciously fulfilled the purposes that peoples have set for themselves. Starting from the paradigmatic example of the stirrup in the medieval cavalry, I tried to hypothesise the application of the Rawlsian difference principle at a global level, providing an extension argument, and highlighting the most relevant problems that this attempt could encounter. The aim is to provide answers to the problems inherent in innovation activities. The Principle states that economic and social inequalities will be permitted only if they maximise the condition of the most disadvantaged groups. The preliminary aspects of such an attempt revolve around three theoretical issues: (1) the problem of the analogy between the domestic and the global level (which calls into question the use of the contractarian device); (2) the problem of rational choice under the hypothesis of the mechanism of the original position and the veil of ignorance (which calls into question the effective choice of the difference principle by rational agents); and (3) the problem of the practical persistence of status quo bias (which, in accordance with the second issue, calls into question the real effectiveness of the practical application of the difference principle). The difference principle for the global level, operating as an assurance for the better-endowed party of their rightful claims for reasons of merit and economic efficiency, attributes entitlements to the bearers which take the form of exclusive property rights based on the assumption that they represent the ultimate authority over their domain of jurisdiction in accordance with their designation as “owners” by the basic structure of the global society. I have defined these claims as "internal claims" as they refer to factors internal to human beings, such as the capacity to innovate, on whose hope stands the engine of the well-being of mankind. But this is not the whole story. The dislocation between ideas and means necessary to materialise inventions makes the innovation process as requiring another claim for it to come into being. What I call the “external claim” concerns special claims to natural resources which innovation agents can’t procure in the same territory where ideas are conjectured, but obtained here and there, in different parts of the earth's surface, necessary for producing new inventions and maintaining the existing ones, implicating a discussion on peoples’ structures of expectation over existing innovations which explains why we ought to give at least some weight to the claims of innovation agents. Both the internal and external claims concur to form the general claim of the better-endowed under the auspices of difference principle so interpreted. This general claim is not absolute, and has to be weighed against the general claim of poorer states (the less-endowed innovation agents) as they too are designated “owners” in their respective domain of authority by the global basic structure.  The main idea is that the difference principle, for the global level, has really something concrete to get its teeth into. The bewildering array, let us say, between innovative and technologically advanced countries and developing countries, can raise fundamental issues in the face of staggering differentials in life prospects among the world’s inhabitants in our present day. A global difference principle would allow us to overcome the ubiquitous idea that these advantages are mere facts of unchangeable fate, where the global worst off are left behind under a veil of indifference.