The aim of the dissertation is to analyse the concept of the good man in David Hume’s ethical theory. In the first chapter, I deal with semantic issues about Hume’s use of the terms “virtuous man”, “great man” and “good man”. In conclusion, I suggest that it is possible and consistent with Hume’s philosophical works to speak about a “good man” in his moral theory. In the second chapter, I argue for the choice of the word “man” giving an account of Hume’s thoughts about women and comparing it with the contemporary reflections on feminism. Then, I stress the importance of the concept of a good man in Hume’s ethics, but also describe some of the superficial difficulties in finding a proper good man standard. In the third chapter, I give an introduction to the concept of sympathy and its central role in Hume’s account of moral approbation. In doing so, I suggest that a correct way of sympathizing could be considered a necessary condition to ascribe to a man the definition of good. In the last chapter, I deal with the concept of general point of view. I describe the general point of view stressing its function, namely to give stability to moral judgements. Therefore, I argue that the concept of general point of view is related to the virtue of wisdom, giving a reconstruction of Hume’s account of wisdom. In conclusion, I suggest that the capacity to judge from the general point of view and the virtue of wisdom could be intended as two other necessary characteristics of Hume’s good man.
L'elaborato si pone l'obbiettivo di analizzare il concetto di “uomo buono” in relazione al concetto di simpatia e saggezza all’interno della teoria morale del filosofo scozzese David Hume. Nel primo capitolo si affrontano questioni semantiche relative all'uso, da parte dell'autore, di termini quali "uomo virtuoso", "grande uomo" e "uomo buono". In conclusione del capitolo si argomenta a favore della possibilità di parlare compiutamente di “uomo buono” nella teoria morale di Hume. Nel secondo capitolo si analizza l'uso del termine “uomo” attraverso, per prima cosa, una ricostruzione del pensiero dell’autore a proposito delle donne e l’accoglienza di quest’ultimo da parte del pensiero filosofico contemporaneo. Secondariamente, viene specificata l’importanza del concetto di “uomo buono” per la filosofia di Hume, evidenziando, inoltre, possibili difficoltà nella sua individuazione insieme a possibili soluzione riguardo queste problematiche. Nel terzo capitolo si introduce il concetto di simpatia e se ne spiega l’importanza nella descrizione che Hume fa dell’approvazione morale, individuando nella simpatia, correttamente intesa, una prima condizione necessaria da attribuire all’uomo buono. Nel quarto e ultimo capitolo si affronta il tema del punto di vista generale introdotto da Hume come garanzia di stabilità nei giudizi morali. Si sostiene poi, che tale punto di vista sia strettamente legato alla nozione di saggezza, come presentata da Hume. La capacità di assumere un punto di vista generale e l’esercizio della saggezza sono quindi intesi come ulteriori condizioni necessarie per la definizione di un uomo buono nella teoria etica di David Hume.
Hume's good man. Moral philosophy between sympathy and wisdom
QUINTO, LUCA
2020/2021
Abstract
The aim of the dissertation is to analyse the concept of the good man in David Hume’s ethical theory. In the first chapter, I deal with semantic issues about Hume’s use of the terms “virtuous man”, “great man” and “good man”. In conclusion, I suggest that it is possible and consistent with Hume’s philosophical works to speak about a “good man” in his moral theory. In the second chapter, I argue for the choice of the word “man” giving an account of Hume’s thoughts about women and comparing it with the contemporary reflections on feminism. Then, I stress the importance of the concept of a good man in Hume’s ethics, but also describe some of the superficial difficulties in finding a proper good man standard. In the third chapter, I give an introduction to the concept of sympathy and its central role in Hume’s account of moral approbation. In doing so, I suggest that a correct way of sympathizing could be considered a necessary condition to ascribe to a man the definition of good. In the last chapter, I deal with the concept of general point of view. I describe the general point of view stressing its function, namely to give stability to moral judgements. Therefore, I argue that the concept of general point of view is related to the virtue of wisdom, giving a reconstruction of Hume’s account of wisdom. In conclusion, I suggest that the capacity to judge from the general point of view and the virtue of wisdom could be intended as two other necessary characteristics of Hume’s good man.È consentito all'utente scaricare e condividere i documenti disponibili a testo pieno in UNITESI UNIPV nel rispetto della licenza Creative Commons del tipo CC BY NC ND.
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14239/2023