Constitutive Norms of Assertion. An Alternative to Williamson's Proposal

Assertion, roughly speaking the speech act by means of which a sentence is presented as true, has been traditionally subjected to the interest of philosophy of language. More recently, it has become a key subject in the epistemological debate as well, particularly ever since Timothy Williamson (1996) argued for the existence of a constitutive norm of assertion. The proposal has been influential (albeit often controversial) for two reasons: it ties the normative standard of assertion to the epistemic status of the speaker and makes reference to the notion of constitutive rule, implying that assertions are ontologically and conceptually subordinate to the enforcement of certain rules in the linguistic community. The notion of a constitutive rule, and the related hypothesis that certain practices would not exist if the rules governing them had not be enforced, is a central issue in analytic philosophy, even if there are different opinions regarding whether such norms actually exist, which is their syntactic structure and their relations with their objects. Williamson’s proposal is controversial both with respect to the interpretation of assertion it provides, and with respect to his particular understanding of the general concept of constitutive norm. Many critics of Williamson have argued that assertion does not seem to have similarities with typical rule-constituted practices, such as the game of chess. Alternative explanatory theories of assertion, ones not involving reference to constitutive norms have been provided. Others have objected that while the hypothesis of a constitutive norm of assertion is plausible, Williamson’s account – the so-called “knowledge norm of assertion” – is unsatisfying. It has been argued also that Williamson’s methodology is grounded on the interpretation of normative intuitions which in no way relate to the concept of constitutive normativity. I believe that much of the controversy regarding Williamson’s account comes from the fact that he did not address several open questions about the general concept of constitutive norms. Therefore, I shall start with an overview of the main issues regarding the distinction between constitutive and regulative norms, the nature of rule-constituted practices and the relation of constitutivity. I will do so in order to individuate an adequate general theory of constitutive norms; I shall then verify whether Williamson’s account reflects this general theory of constitutive norms and finally I shall inquire whether such general theory provides a satisfactory explanatory theory of assertoric force. My aim is to explain some of what I consider the weaknesses of Williamson’s arguments with reference to his inadequate understanding of constitutive norms. I believe on the other hand that the hypothesis of constitutive norms of assertion is in fact plausible and that a normative explanation of the essence of assertion is possible once the general problems regarding constitutive rules have been settled. I shall propose that the best way to avoid the problems of Williamson’s account is to drop the idea that the constitutive norm of assertion defines some kind of warrant for assertion and instead, following MacFarlane and Rescorla, conceive the norm as something which defines obligations instantiated by assertion. This approach, I believe, can be successfully generalized in order to explain the force of other illocutionary acts.