In the historical and speculative path of Husserlian thought the question of time occupies an important position. The present work is divided into three parts; in the first one we will consider the theoretical background at the basis of Husserl's work, deepening the essential concept of intentionality and the peculiarity of the relationship between static method and genetic method, in the light of the theoretical development given to phenomenology during the twenties and thirties. Furthermore, with reference to the distinction between static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology, it will be specified that it is not entirely correct to present the relationship between the one and the other form of phenomenology in terms of an opposition, from which the former must come out demolished and invalidated in all its results. Static acquisitions can largely retain their validity even after genetic research. The transition to genetic research is not to be thought of as a mere substitution, but as a deepening. Even after investigating the structure of temporal consciousness, the study of the static relationship between the foundations of different apperceptions continues to be a sensible task. These considerations anticipate the fundamental question concerning the status of the Urpräsentation and the analysis of the internal consciousness of the time present in Bernau's manuscripts. The second part is devoted to this aspect. Closely related to the question of the status of the original impression is the question of the plots and the different roles assigned to protension and retention in the perspective of genetic phenomenology. This issue is closely related, as we have seen, to Husserl's revaluation of the protension. In the lessons of Göttingen, Husserl attributes to the protension a marginal role with respect to the retention (it is considered substantially as a perspective reversal of the retention), while in the Manuscripts he devotes more importance to it. The new meaning acquired by the protension provides Husserl with the possibility of explaining the appearance of the new in terms of erfüllung (fulfillment, filling) of a protension. The protective consciousness is satisfied primarily by the consciousness of the Urpräsentation. The Urpräsenz is defined as a satisfied wait. This state of affairs leads Husserl to also consider the notion of absolute consciousness of time and that relating to its self-constitution. Not only does the constitution of experiences as temporal units in immanent time take place in absolute consciousness, but the very constitution of the temporal unity of absolute consciousness takes place, in turn, in the temporal synthesis that it itself originates. Finally, the third part primarily concerns the egological dimension of temporal inquiry. This will inevitably address the broad issue of subjectivity. Husserl, in the gottinghesi lessons, comes to the conclusion that the unity of all the acts as a whole, the flow of consciousness, is constituted in the temporal synthesis that it produces, so that subjectivity will have an eminently temporal and at the same time, as a constituent temporality will itself be above time. The phenomenological analysis of the internal consciousness of time thus culminates in the grasping of a close connection between the constituent identity of consciousness and temporal synthesis. The investigation of this connection will be taken up again and further, from different perspectives and angles, in the manuscripts of Bernau and in the manuscripts of group C, in which the temporal synthesis that represents the structure of subjectivity will be interpreted in terms of a living actuality (Lebendige Gegenwart) that persists and at the same time flows (stehend-strömend).
Nel percorso storico e speculativo del pensiero husserliano la questione del tempo occupa una posizione rilevante. Il presente lavoro è suddiviso in tre parti; nella prima si prenderà in considerazione lo sfondo teorico che sta alla base del lavoro di Husserl, approfondendo il concetto essenziale di intenzionalità e la peculiarità del rapporto tra metodo statico e metodo genetico, alla luce dello sviluppo teorico impresso alla fenomenologia durante gli anni venti e trenta. Inoltre, in riferimento alla distinzione tra fenomenologia statica e fenomenologia genetica, si preciserà come non sia del tutto corretto presentare la relazione tra l'una e l'altra forma di fenomenologia nei termini di una contrapposizione, dalla quale la prima debba uscire demolita e invalidata in tutti i suoi risultati. Le acquisizioni statiche possono mantenere in buona parte la loro validità anche dopo le ricerche genetiche. Il passaggio alla ricerca genetica non è da pensarsi come una mera sostituzione, ma come un approfondimento. Anche di seguito alle indagini sulla struttura della coscienza temporale, lo studio del rapporto statico tra le fondazioni delle diverse appercezioni continua a essere compito sensato. Queste considerazioni anticipano la fondamentale questione relativa all'analisi dello statuto della Urpräsentation presente nei manoscritti di Bernau. La seconda parte è dedicata a questo aspetto. Strettamente correlata alla questione dello status dell'impressione originaria è la questione degli intrecci e dei diversi ruoli assegnati alla protensione e alla ritenzione nella prospettiva della fenomenologia genetica. Tale tematica è strettamente correlata alla rivalutazione da parte di Husserl della protensione. Husserl, nelle lezioni di Gottinga, attribuisce alla protensione un ruolo marginale rispetto alla ritenzione (essa viene considerata sostanzialmente come rovesciamento prospettico della ritenzione), mentre nei Manoscritti gli dedica maggior importanza. Il nuovo significato acquisito dalla protensione fornisce a Husserl la possibilità di spiegare l'apparire del nuovo nei termini di erfüllung (soddisfacimento, riempimento) di una protensione. La coscienza protenzionale è soddisfatta primariamente dalla coscienza dell'Urpräsentation. L'Urpräsenz è definita come un'attesa soddisfatta. Questo stato di cose conduce Husserl a considerare anche la nozione di coscienza assoluta del tempo e quella relativa alla sua autocostituzione. Non solo la costituzione di esperienze come unità temporali nel tempo immanente ha luogo nella coscienza assoluta, ma la stessa costituzione dell'unità temporale della coscienza assoluta avviene, a sua volta, nella sintesi temporale che essa stessa origina. Infine, la terza parte interessa primariamente la dimensione egologica dell'indagine temporale. Con ciò verrà inevitabilmente affrontata l'ampia problematica della soggettività. Husserl, nelle lezioni gottinghesi, giunge alla conclusione che l’unità di tutti gli atti nel loro insieme, il flusso della coscienza, si costituisce nella sintesi temporale che essa produce, cosicché la soggettività avrà carattere eminentemente temporale e al tempo stesso, in quanto costituente la temporalità, sarà essa stessa al di sopra del tempo. L’analisi fenomenologica della coscienza interna del tempo culmina così nel coglimento di una stretta connessione tra identità costituente della coscienza e sintesi temporale. L’indagine di questa connessione verrà ripresa e approfondita, da prospettive e angolature diverse, nei manoscritti di Bernau e nei manoscritti del gruppo C, nei quali la sintesi temporale che rappresenta la struttura della soggettività verrà interpretata nei termini di un’attualità vivente (Lebendige Gegenwart) che permane e al tempo stesso fluisce (stehend-strömend).
L'analisi fenomenologica della coscienza del tempo nei manoscritti di ricerca di Husserl. 1917/1918 - 1929/1934.
CARRARA, MARCO
2018/2019
Abstract
In the historical and speculative path of Husserlian thought the question of time occupies an important position. The present work is divided into three parts; in the first one we will consider the theoretical background at the basis of Husserl's work, deepening the essential concept of intentionality and the peculiarity of the relationship between static method and genetic method, in the light of the theoretical development given to phenomenology during the twenties and thirties. Furthermore, with reference to the distinction between static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology, it will be specified that it is not entirely correct to present the relationship between the one and the other form of phenomenology in terms of an opposition, from which the former must come out demolished and invalidated in all its results. Static acquisitions can largely retain their validity even after genetic research. The transition to genetic research is not to be thought of as a mere substitution, but as a deepening. Even after investigating the structure of temporal consciousness, the study of the static relationship between the foundations of different apperceptions continues to be a sensible task. These considerations anticipate the fundamental question concerning the status of the Urpräsentation and the analysis of the internal consciousness of the time present in Bernau's manuscripts. The second part is devoted to this aspect. Closely related to the question of the status of the original impression is the question of the plots and the different roles assigned to protension and retention in the perspective of genetic phenomenology. This issue is closely related, as we have seen, to Husserl's revaluation of the protension. In the lessons of Göttingen, Husserl attributes to the protension a marginal role with respect to the retention (it is considered substantially as a perspective reversal of the retention), while in the Manuscripts he devotes more importance to it. The new meaning acquired by the protension provides Husserl with the possibility of explaining the appearance of the new in terms of erfüllung (fulfillment, filling) of a protension. The protective consciousness is satisfied primarily by the consciousness of the Urpräsentation. The Urpräsenz is defined as a satisfied wait. This state of affairs leads Husserl to also consider the notion of absolute consciousness of time and that relating to its self-constitution. Not only does the constitution of experiences as temporal units in immanent time take place in absolute consciousness, but the very constitution of the temporal unity of absolute consciousness takes place, in turn, in the temporal synthesis that it itself originates. Finally, the third part primarily concerns the egological dimension of temporal inquiry. This will inevitably address the broad issue of subjectivity. Husserl, in the gottinghesi lessons, comes to the conclusion that the unity of all the acts as a whole, the flow of consciousness, is constituted in the temporal synthesis that it produces, so that subjectivity will have an eminently temporal and at the same time, as a constituent temporality will itself be above time. The phenomenological analysis of the internal consciousness of time thus culminates in the grasping of a close connection between the constituent identity of consciousness and temporal synthesis. The investigation of this connection will be taken up again and further, from different perspectives and angles, in the manuscripts of Bernau and in the manuscripts of group C, in which the temporal synthesis that represents the structure of subjectivity will be interpreted in terms of a living actuality (Lebendige Gegenwart) that persists and at the same time flows (stehend-strömend).È consentito all'utente scaricare e condividere i documenti disponibili a testo pieno in UNITESI UNIPV nel rispetto della licenza Creative Commons del tipo CC BY NC ND.
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14239/8988