The European Commission has fined Google €4.34 billion for breaching EU an-titrust rules, specifically Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-ropean Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. In fact, despite the “open-ness” of the Android operating system for mobile devices, Google entered into contractual agreements with Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEMs”) and with Mobile Network Operators (“MNOs”) that, taken together, allow the firm to tie its app store (Google Play) with its search engine (Google Search), with the effect protecting its dominance in search advertising. In many situations, in order to buy one product a consumer must also purchase another product that exists in a separate market: this phenomenon is called tie-in sales. In some cases, tying different components or products together can have efficiency justifications, both in terms of commercialization (e.g. if the principles of division of labour and scale economies are considered, is more ef-ficient to market together certain components rather than do it separately), and in terms of asymmetric information (e.g. firms might wish to combine the right components into the final product in order to offer the highest possible quality of it). In other cases, tying may cause harm, since it “provides a mechanism whereby a firm with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage pro-vided by this power to foreclose sales in, and thereby monopolize, a second market” . Tying practices have traditionally been seen as anti-competitive by competition authorities, since they were mainly used by firms in order to harm competition in the market. Nowadays markets’ characteristics are not the same as years ago, and the advent of the digital markets entails the rise of the so-called two-sided markets, in which the effects of tying practices are ambiguous from a welfare perspective. Due to that, Competition Law has to take into account all the possible conse-quences that these practices may have on welfare when it analyses a possible tying case.
Nel caso di Google Android , la Commissione Europea ha inflitto a Google una multa di 4,34 miliardi di euro per aver violato le norme antitrust dell'UE, in par-ticolare l'articolo 102 del Trattato sul Funzionamento dell'Unione Europea e l'articolo 54 dell'accordo SEE. Nonostante l’“apertura” del sistema operativo Android per dispositivi mobili, Google ha stipulato accordi contrattuali con i costruttori di apparecchiature originali (“OEMs”) e con gli operatori di rete mo-bile ("MNOs") che permettono all'azienda di legare il proprio app store (Google Play) al proprio motore di ricerca (Google Search), con l'effetto di proteggere il proprio dominio nel settore pubblicitario. In molte situazioni, per acquistare un prodotto il consumatore deve acquistare anche un altro prodotto di un mercato separato: questo fenomeno si chiama tie-in sales (vendita vincolata o legatura). In alcuni casi, legare insieme componenti o prodotti diversi può avere giustificazioni di efficienza, sia in termini di com-mercializzazione (ad esempio, se si considerano i principi della divisione del lavoro e delle economie di scala, è più efficiente commercializzare insieme al-cuni componenti piuttosto che farlo separatamente), sia in termini di informa-zione asimmetrica (ad esempio, le aziende potrebbero voler combinare i com-ponenti giusti nel prodotto finale per offrirne la massima qualità possibile). In altri casi, il tie-in slaes può causare danni, in quanto “fornisce un meccani-smo in base al quale un'impresa con potere monopolistico in un mercato può utilizzare l'effetto leva fornito da tale potere per precludere le vendite in un se-condo mercato, e quindi monopolizzare, in un secondo mercato”. Queste prati-che di vendita sono state tradizionalmente considerate anticoncorrenziali dalle autorità garanti della concorrenza, in quanto le imprese le utilizzavano princi-palmente per danneggiare la concorrenza. Oggi i mercati non sono più gli stessi di anni fa, e l'avvento dei mercati digitali comporta l'ascesa dei cosiddetti mer-cati a due facce, nei quali gli effetti di tali pratiche sono ambigui dal punto di vista del benessere. Per questo motivo, il diritto della concorrenza deve tenere conto di tutte le pos-sibili conseguenze che queste pratiche possono avere sul benessere quando analizza un possibile caso di vendita abbinata.
Le vendite abbinate nei mercati a due lati: il caso Google Android
MADEDDU, JASMINE
2019/2020
Abstract
The European Commission has fined Google €4.34 billion for breaching EU an-titrust rules, specifically Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-ropean Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. In fact, despite the “open-ness” of the Android operating system for mobile devices, Google entered into contractual agreements with Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEMs”) and with Mobile Network Operators (“MNOs”) that, taken together, allow the firm to tie its app store (Google Play) with its search engine (Google Search), with the effect protecting its dominance in search advertising. In many situations, in order to buy one product a consumer must also purchase another product that exists in a separate market: this phenomenon is called tie-in sales. In some cases, tying different components or products together can have efficiency justifications, both in terms of commercialization (e.g. if the principles of division of labour and scale economies are considered, is more ef-ficient to market together certain components rather than do it separately), and in terms of asymmetric information (e.g. firms might wish to combine the right components into the final product in order to offer the highest possible quality of it). In other cases, tying may cause harm, since it “provides a mechanism whereby a firm with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage pro-vided by this power to foreclose sales in, and thereby monopolize, a second market” . Tying practices have traditionally been seen as anti-competitive by competition authorities, since they were mainly used by firms in order to harm competition in the market. Nowadays markets’ characteristics are not the same as years ago, and the advent of the digital markets entails the rise of the so-called two-sided markets, in which the effects of tying practices are ambiguous from a welfare perspective. Due to that, Competition Law has to take into account all the possible conse-quences that these practices may have on welfare when it analyses a possible tying case.È consentito all'utente scaricare e condividere i documenti disponibili a testo pieno in UNITESI UNIPV nel rispetto della licenza Creative Commons del tipo CC BY NC ND.
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14239/968