Between 1645 and 1669, the Republic of Venice found itself compelled to defend against an attack from the Ottoman Empire, specifically targeting the island of Candia (Crete), its most crucial domain in the Levant. This conflict unfolded during a period of significant political and military isolation for the Serenissima, requiring it to deplete nearly all of its resources and manpower in the face of an enemy that could readily replenish both on the battlefield. This study examines the means and tactics employed by the Republic during this lopsided struggle. Following the inability to prevent the initial Turkish landing on the island, Venice concentrated all its forces at sea. The fleet, venturing as far as the entrance of the Dardanelles Strait, endeavored to disrupt the flow of Turkish reinforcements and supplies bound for Crete. The objective was to impede the intricate Ottoman logistics, which constituted its primary military strength. Despite initial successes with this strategy, Venice lacked the manpower to capitalize on the time gained and the resources essential to prevail in a war of attrition against an empire as extensive and organized as the Ottoman Empire. After several years of war, Venetian forces on Crete found themselves isolated in a few fortresses under siege. They were compelled to deplete their remaining manpower merely to delay their inevitable defeat, without any possibility of launching a counterattack. The belated support from other European powers, more symbolic than substantial, proved ineffective in preventing the ultimate defeat.
Tra il 1645 e il 1669, la Repubblica di Venezia si trovò a doversi difendere da un attacco contro l’isola di Candia (Creta), il più importante dominio del Levante, portato dall’Impero Ottomano. Questa guerra, scoppiata durante un periodo di grande isolamento politico e militare della Serenissima, la costrinse a dare fondo a quasi tutte le sue risorse e forze militari, nel tentativo di difendersi da un nemico che aveva a disposizione grande abbondanza di entrambi. Questo lavoro analizza i mezzi e le tattiche che la Repubblica mise in campo in questa lotta impari. Dopo non essere riusciti a prevenire il primo sbarco di truppe nemiche sull’isola, Venezia sposterà i suoi sforzi in primo luogo sul mare. Le sue flotte, spingendosi fino all’imboccature dello Stretto dei Dardanelli, tenteranno di ostacolare in tutti i modi la partenza di rinforzi e rifornimenti turchi diretti a Creta, sperando così di bloccare il meccanismo della sofisticata macchina della logistica militare ottomana, che era il suo principale punto di forza. Nonostante i primi successi di questa strategia, però, Venezia non aveva né la forza militare necessaria per approfittare del tempo guadagnato, né le risorse per vincere in una vera guerra di attrito contro un impero così esteso e organizzato. Dopo alcuni anni di guerra, le forze veneziane a Creta si trovarono isolate in poche fortezze sotto assedio, costrette a dar fondo a tutti gli uomini rimasti solo per ritardare la sconfitta, senza poter portare un contrattacco significativo. Il tardivo supporto di altre potenze europee, più simbolico che sostanziale, non bastò a prevenire la sconfitta finale.
L'ultima ridotta. Venezia e la difesa di Candia (1645-1669)
GROSSI, AMBROGIO
2022/2023
Abstract
Between 1645 and 1669, the Republic of Venice found itself compelled to defend against an attack from the Ottoman Empire, specifically targeting the island of Candia (Crete), its most crucial domain in the Levant. This conflict unfolded during a period of significant political and military isolation for the Serenissima, requiring it to deplete nearly all of its resources and manpower in the face of an enemy that could readily replenish both on the battlefield. This study examines the means and tactics employed by the Republic during this lopsided struggle. Following the inability to prevent the initial Turkish landing on the island, Venice concentrated all its forces at sea. The fleet, venturing as far as the entrance of the Dardanelles Strait, endeavored to disrupt the flow of Turkish reinforcements and supplies bound for Crete. The objective was to impede the intricate Ottoman logistics, which constituted its primary military strength. Despite initial successes with this strategy, Venice lacked the manpower to capitalize on the time gained and the resources essential to prevail in a war of attrition against an empire as extensive and organized as the Ottoman Empire. After several years of war, Venetian forces on Crete found themselves isolated in a few fortresses under siege. They were compelled to deplete their remaining manpower merely to delay their inevitable defeat, without any possibility of launching a counterattack. The belated support from other European powers, more symbolic than substantial, proved ineffective in preventing the ultimate defeat.È consentito all'utente scaricare e condividere i documenti disponibili a testo pieno in UNITESI UNIPV nel rispetto della licenza Creative Commons del tipo CC BY NC ND.
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14239/3502